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ABSTRACT 
In the course of 2007-2008, the successive anti-satellite weapon tests respectively 
conducted by China and the US refreshed the global concerns on the question of governing 
states’ space actives. Various international space regime initiatives, namely the EU-led 
International Code of Conduct and the China-Russia sponsored PPWT, were proposed 
respectively outside of any existing multilateral forum and at the non-UN Conference on 
Disarmament. The new happenings within the galaxy of global governance drew our 
attention to ultimately realize there is not merely the galaxy of space governance but a 
number of interconnected galaxies for space governance. This particular agglomerating or 
federating governing force has been embedded and constantly appeared in countries’ 
negotiations regarding the development and the control of human space activities. It was 
with this fundamental understanding, we put forward to decipher such interconnecting 
global space governance structure as a way to seize the vivid dynamics in international 
space politics over time. And we have chosen one of the most inspiring theoretical 
frameworks in our time, regime complex as our way to undertake a piloting analytical 
narrative in order to cultivate a broadened understanding of the topic.            
The regime complex framework focuses on investigating various types of interplay between 
the international regimes within a specific governing issue area that fragmented the entire 
governance scheme. This general architectural framework provided the limits within which 
our research examined as its object of study all international regimes closely or more 
distantly related to issues of space governance. Nevertheless, bear in mind that we could 
not explore and study in-depth the galaxies of interconnecting governance issue areas, but 
merely establish a pilot analytical narrative which is expected to prove useful for further 
and more narrowly focused case studies in the future. In this regard, the analytical strategy 
proposed by colleagues at the Ghent Institute for International Studies (GIIS), which 
identifies how the strategic, functional and organizational driving forces led the growing 
institutional fragmentation within the global space governance architecture, was extremely 
valuable for our research. 
With this analytical instrument, we have established our general understanding of the long-
standing space governing issues (Chapter II), the legal inconsistency between different 
governing principles, norms, their interpretations and implementations over time (Chapter 
III), the highly politicized institutionalization process that from the beginning of the space 
age strongly stressed the de-militarization or disarmament objectives and consequently 
divided the entire global space governance architecture into two distinct dimensions 
between disarmament and the “peaceful use” of outer space, though the space affairs are 
never indivisible for it dual-use (Chapter IV). By applying the regime complex framework 
and the GIIS analytical strategy, we investigated “space security” governance by introducing 
the main actors, key governing issues and the institutionalization process of the sub-
governing regimes constellation in order to investigate how the space security governing 
constellation developed toward to its current fragmented stage of regime complex. In the 
power-interest centered space security governance dimension, states constantly required 
for regime change though almost always failed in the course of the last half century. New 
regime initiatives such as ICoC and PPWT raised new hopes though without certainty 
(Chapter V). With the same methodology, we achieved our analytical narrative on global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS) governance, which in our view represents a microsphere 
iv | P a g e  
 
that demonstrates the fundamental problem of the whole of space governance and its 
structural fragmentation, the dual use that means military and civilian purposes, or 
nowadays “trio use” with the addition of a commercial dimension to the use of outer space. 
The interconnectivity of the three physical and practical dimensions naturally bring all the 
relating regimes together with overlapping mandate or missing competence to co-manage 
the space affairs.  
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CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION: HUMAN-SPACE CONNECTIONS   
Abstract: The introductory chapter presents the general motivation and the academic 
interests of the author underlying the decision to analyze the regime complex of global space 
governance as the topic of his doctoral research project. This research project puts forward 
two telling recent events, the Chinese ASAT test in 2007 and the EU-initiated ICoC of 2008 
as the salient historic points of reference marking a new era alongside the evolutionary 
international space race. Hence, international race in and through the outer space arena has 
become ever complicated and complex in the sphere of global space governance. The 
increasing creations of the new space-relevant international regimes and the continuous 
functional changes of existing space institutions seemed not merely related to the new 
common challenges for all countries to commonly overcome. The expansion and 
fragmentation of the entire space governance architecture has also become increasingly 
connected with the states’ pursuit of their individual interests. To decipher the growing 
complex structure of the global space governance architecture, a recently developed 
analytical framework, the ‘regime complex’, was viewed valid to depict how the 
competitive-cooperative hybrid global space regime complex has attained its expanded and 
fragmented state. Furthermore, the three-logic analyzing methodology that stresses the 
distinct gravitational forces, namely the strategic, functional and organizational forces, 
offers a pertinent lens to observe how the expansion and fragmentation of the global space 
governance architecture has been growing individually and jointly steered by these 
gravitational forces.  
               
1. THE STORY OF HUMAN-SPACE CONNECTIONS 
Humankind has always watched the sky or the universe with general curiosity and 
enthusiasm. Because space is fascinating! Writers, artists, astrologists, astronomers, or 
aerospace scientists and engineers, each have their particular interests and focuses in their 
individual exploration of outer space. Otherwise, those interested in political science and 
the study of international relations are attracted by the facts that outer space, or precisely 
the human use of outer space, has, since the late 1950s, grown in its influence on the self-
positioning of states and their interaction with each other in world politics. 
Although some consider that the space age was effectively opened for all humankind when 
the first German V-2 rocket came down from the edge of space and exploded on the 
residents and buildings of London in September 1944,1 for most of us it was the successful 
launch of the Soviet Sputnik I satellite into orbit in 1957 that inaugurated the international 
competition on space capability, commonly considered a ‘space race’, particularly between 
the two Cold War powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. In this race, the USSR 
achieved the first manned spaceflight mission in human history in 1961. The Soviet Air 
                                                             
1 Lambakis, Steven. (2002). Putting Military Uses of  Space in Context. In James Claz Moltz (ed.) Future Security 
in Space: Commercial, Military, and Arms Control Trade-Offs, Occasional Paper No. 10 (Monterey, CA: Monterey 
Institute of  International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies and University of  Southhampton, 
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, July 2002), pp. 23-24.      
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Force Colonel Yuri Gagarin became a Soviet hero as the first astronaut who flew to and back 
from orbit. This successful manned spaceflight spurred the US ultimately to fund an 
ambitious Moon exploration project – the Apollo Missions. As addressed by President 
Kennedy in his famous ‘Moon speech’ delivered in 1962 at Rice University, Texas, the 
Americans “choose to go to the Moon to win”.2 The US Moon exploration project firmly 
demonstrated the American desire to pursue national pride, power and leadership through 
the development of its space capabilities. This subsequently resulted in the first manned 
Moon landing on July 20, 1969, by the US astronauts Neil Armstrong and Buzz Aldrin. This 
mission was one of the US Apollo Missions undertaken by the US National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA) in the 1960s and 1970s. Hence, during the Cold War the 
focused interests of states and the general enthusiasm of peoples were both directed 
towards developing space capabilities in order to uphold their national military capability 
superiority over the enemy, and to develop more sophisticated space technology 
applications than the adversary in and through outer space. This space race accordingly 
became openly and heavily politically charged. 
The US and the USSR continued to develop their respective national space capability to 
increase their military and strategic forces during the Cold War. Various types of focused 
military space capability were undertaken, for example, nuclear weapons in space, 
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). These weapons actually use the same rocket 
launch technology as space exploration, and as satellite-supported telecommunication and 
navigation operational systems. Once a country became heavily dependent on space 
systems for military purposes, it became vital to develop anti-satellite weapons to 
neutralize the satellites of the adversary space systems, or otherwise, to prevent anti-
satellite attacks upon one’s own satellites. The space capability race between the United 
States and the Soviet Union was not merely a race of the giants but also involved other 
countries, for example, the member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
to support political allies. These countries were involved as relays to support the 
functioning of the space system of the space power to which they were respectively allied. 
Others might be affected by the consequences if ‘star wars’ were to break out. To this end, 
the ways and the outcomes that states individually or collectively handled such conflicting 
space capability competition could either contribute to the maintenance of a balance of 
power and to assuring continuous strategic stability and peace between the space powers 
and their allies, or exacerbate the race for space power toward a space war that should 
concern all countries. To avoid the worst scenario, the exploration and the uses of outer 
space became quickly and deeply politically charged by states and were decided to be 
arranged and regulated throughout the international negotiations via bilateral channels, 
and in the auspice of the United Nations (UN), the existing international regulating 
mechanisms and newly created space relevant international institutions.          
When the Cold War reached its end after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, it did not end 
the ‘space race’ even though the two Cold War space powers had to drastically reduce their 
efforts at building space capability and their financial investment. But, the end of the Cold 
War nevertheless contributed to the lift of the former ‘Iron Curtain’ that had prevented the 
free flow of space related personnel exchanges, know-how and technology transfers, and the 
trading of equipment and services between the two hostile camps. Other states than the two 
                                                             
2 John F. Kennedy, Moon Speech at Rice Stadium, September 12, 1962. http://er.jsc.nasa.gov/seh/ricetalk.htm   
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traditional space powers gained more room to develop their own space capabilities for both 
military and civil purposes. In the 1991-1992 Persian Gulf War, the striking performance of 
the American space systems which overwhelmingly supported the US-led military coalition 
in the Operation Desert Strom for intelligence, communication, and navigation functions as 
well as guiding precision munitions and enabling “network-centric warfare” through 
remote command centers and live video links from the battlefield primed the spacefaring 
countries of the European Union, and the emerging nations such as China, India and others 
to seize upon the novel situation. It was the moment to develop their general or specific 
space capabilities for their own strategic independence and to boost a new wave of 
domestic industrialization in the way of accommodating space related devices 
manufacturing facilities and commerce in satellite telecommunication and satellite 
navigation services. 
In parallel with the continuous space capability competitions over time, the use of outer 
space was also marked by its cooperative nature due to a functional necessity as well as its 
quality of a global public good. Undeniably, the costs of space capacity development and the 
need to have worldwide supportive relay ground stations or other facilities to operate a 
global space system will not attract any single nation to carry the full operational and 
financial burdens alone. If it does not involve any immediate strategic and security concern, 
international cooperation even between traditional rivals is without doubt more 
advantageous than working alone. Space powers and spacefaring nations also have benefits 
to cooperate with each other for maintaining their geostrategic importance and gaining geo-
economic advantages. Russia and China, for example, have been getting closer to each other 
on making the Russian global navigation satellite systems (GLONASS) and Chinese BeiDou 
compatible and interoperable to break through the US GPS monopoly. 
Although the Soviet Sputnik I is still widely known as the first orbiting artificial satellite in 
the world, the project was presented together with the US Army-Navy joint project 
Vanguard and the Explorer satellite projects under the international cooperation 
framework of the International Geophysical Year (IGY) between 1957 and 1958. The IGY 
was in fact an international cooperation project that brought together the Soviet Union, the 
United States, and sixty-five other countries to coordinate their respective scientific efforts 
regarding the geographical observation of the Earth, data sharing, and geophysical research 
findings. It was obvious that since the dawn of the space age, in parallel with the military 
race for security space capability as such, states have also chosen to work with each other to 
develop some sort of division of labor and sharing of research experience in order to 
maximize the outcomes of their projects for the particular and general interests of 
humankind. Not only that, the useful parts of outer space can to a certain extent be 
considered ‘common pool resources’ (CPR),3 or ‘global public goods’.4 To operate any space 
system that supports military and civilian purposes, it is necessary to place a number of 
satellites in orbit and employ a certain bandwidth of radio frequency spectrum to transmit 
the information data. Because of the Earth’s gravitational force, only a limited zone of orbit 
can be allocated satellites, and these satellites need to be distanced from each other. 
                                                             
3 Ostrom, Elinor, Walker, James and Gardner, Roy, Covenants With and Without a Sword: Self-Governance is 
Possible, The American Political Science Review 86 (2) (Jun., 1992): 404-417. 
4 Karl, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle, and Stern, Marc A. (Eds.) (1999) Global public goods – International cooperation in 
the 21st Century published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Oxford/New York: 
University Press.  
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Otherwise, they can collide with each other or interfere with each other’s radio 
communications. This means that rules and regulations that allocate orbital placement slots 
and radio frequency bandwidth are needed before any individual space system can be 
designed or launched. 
Another example of hybrid space competition-cooperation is that, until 2016, the American 
launch company United Launch Alliance (ULA) continued to purchase Russian-made RD-
180 rocket boosters for the Atlas 5 rocket to launch US military satellites into orbit. This 
despite the fact that since the Ukraine-Russia Crimea standoff in 2014, the issue has 
continuously been raised among US congressional concerns regarding US independent 
launch capability and security. Purchasing ready-made and high-quality Russian RD-180 
rocket engines costs the ULA and its contractor, the US government, much less than would 
developing its own boosters. In order to improve the service quality of their respective 
global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs), Russia and the US each need the other to host 
the augmentation ground stations of the American GPS and the Russian GLONASS on their 
territory. The US agreed to share its sophisticated space situational awareness information 
data to allow China to save critical time for avoiding collision between Chinese spacecraft 
and other orbiting objects such as the International Space Station (ISS) and the space-based 
telescope.5 This was not simply to the advantage of the Chinese but also of the security of all 
American space assets, such as satellites for various purposes and the Hubble space 
telescope, and of other international spacecraft, such as the International Space Station 
orbiting in low Earth orbit (LEO). Another example of such cooperation is that Europe has 
purchased satellite imagery data from some Asian countries that European geospatial 
satellites do not cover.  
The use of outer space has brought significant benefits to millions of people who often enjoy 
these without even being aware of it. Further to the post-Cold War opening of the free flow 
on developing global space capabilities between states, there has been a popularization of 
the use of outer space to expand the applications of space-related technologies. This has 
resulted in offering wide-ranging possibilities to improve the daily lives of the population at 
large. Satellite communication and navigation services offer access for people who live in 
remote rural regions and urban areas to practice e-education, e-medicine, e-commerce and 
to enjoy satellite radio and TV broadcasts. The GNSSs not only support the military 
operations they were invented for but have become vital for humanitarian aid missions, as 
well as for search and rescue operations after natural disasters. GNSSs have become 
requirements for air, sea and land transportation and their traffic control. GNSSs now guide 
farmers to operate precision farming in their fields, and provide accurate synchronization 
services for international online banking and global financial systems with their atomic 
clocks. The users and drivers of Uber depend on GNSSs to find each other and their 
destinations. Earth observation satellites have been used for weather forecasting, natural 
disaster mitigation, climate change and environmental protection since the beginning of the 
space age. In sum, many of us are discussing the global issues on space for security and 
safety, space for economy and development, and space for sustainability (Illustration 1).  
Nowadays, the uses of outer space offer much more extensive utilities but also face higher 
risks and challenges than before. For many of us, the scenario of ‘a day without space’ or 
                                                             
5 Defense News, China-US space relations see small but important step. December 14, 2014.  
5 | P a g e  
 
more precisely ‘a day without satellites’ could be a disaster with irreversible damage. The 
deaths of ordinary people and additional social costs could easily result from the sudden 
loss of a satellite signal which might be transmitting the trajectory information of an 
incoming missile in order to intercept it, or guiding a maritime cargo fleet to avoid a 
foreseen stormy zone, or helping an ambulance to find the injured at a critical moment. This 
makes assuring the integrity and the effective functioning of all the space systems a global 
issue of general interest, concerning not only the space powers and spacefaring countries 
but increasingly also non-spacefaring countries and the global population. States are 
therefore compelled to moderate their competition and encouraged to broaden their 
functional cooperation when using outer space. Already from the beginning of the space age, 
states have explored the channels of bilateral negotiations and multilateral forums to 
resolve disputes and soften tensions regarding the use of outer space. They jointly created 
the governing principles and guidelines on the use of outer space in order to further 
establish legal norms, operational regulations and equipment standards to assure human 
safety and the protection of space assets by preventing omission and harmful acts. Last but 
not least, countries with different space capabilities are urged to work together in order to 
merge the development gap between them. In sum, there is a strong expectation that the 
use of outer space will be governed within a global framework.  
Illustration1. Multiplication of the use of outer space in our daily lives 
 
                                                                                                                          Concept: Author; Illustrator: Marianne Hoffman 
6 | P a g e  
 
In general, we are impressed by the uninterrupted merging connections between mankind 
and space in general. In particular, we are spurred to learn more about how the hybrid 
competitive-cooperation international relations changed as international space politics 
expanded its relevance. A complex global governance structure has developed that consists 
of various governing patterns and managing mechanisms that cover the governance of all 
the different global issues relating to the uses of outer space by states. We are therefore 
keen to start our journey to explore the universe of international space politics and the 
galaxy of global space governance. 
 
2. DEFINING THE PROBLEM: THE EVER GROWING SPHERE OF 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLITICS     
 
2.1. A NEW PHASE FOR INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLITICS AND GLOBAL SPACE 
GOVERNANCE: CHINESE ASAT TEST AND THE EU-LED ICOC 
In December 2008, the European Union (EU) launched its ‘multilateral consultations’ with 
non-EU states to discuss the initiative of creating a new multilateral, non-binding, voluntary 
International Code of Conduct for space activities (ICoC or CoC)6. The EU ICoC7 put forward 
a comprehensive approach that explicitly targeted the global governance issues related to 
the security, safety and sustainability of human space activities. With this stance, the EU 
ICoC took the position that the growing security issue is no longer limited to the traditional 
military security arena but already extends to other global governance issue areas, such as 
protecting human safety, space objects, and the space environment. Furthermore, as human 
space activities are becoming increasingly interconnected with the social, economic, 
scientific and technological development of all nations, and with the management of global 
issues such as the preservation of the environment and disaster management, the EU ICoC 
proposes that an additional sustainability approach to governing human space activity is 
desirable and beneficial. The EU’s initiative was not proposed without outside stimulus. The 
ICoC initiative is widely considered a functional and strategic reaction of the European 
Union vis-à-vis the worrisome potential harms of space debris to space safety and 
sustainability, and a likely new situation of conflict in international space politics after 
China’s Anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007 that was followed by the US ASAT test in 2008. 
On January 11, 2007, China launched a ground-based, medium-range ballistic missile to 
destroy one of its own defunct weather satellites in orbit. The Bush Jr. Government in the US 
reacted to China’s ASAT capability demonstration with a similar capability demonstration in 
February 2008. The immediate consequence of the Chinese ASAT test was that the 
destroyed satellite shattered into over 3,000 tracked pieces of orbital debris larger than 10 
                                                             
6 European External Action Service (EEAS), European Union. http://eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm  
7 Preamble, Point 2, ICoC draft, version 31 March, 2014. http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/pdf/space_code_conduct_draft_vers_31-march-2014_en.pdf  
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cm.8 The American ASAT test by contrast created a smaller amount of debris. There are 
myriad ways in which space debris spread through a heavily explored belt of Earth orbit has 
the potential to harm thousands of orbiting space assets, such as satellites, space-based 
telescope, manned and unmanned spacecraft, and not least to the International Space 
Station (ISS), which is currently owned by around 60 countries, international organizations 
and companies. The total amount of the existing in-orbit space debris amounts to some 
21,000 pieces of 10 cm in diameter or larger (NASA 2013).9 This includes the debris created 
by China’s ASAT test as well as debris created by the US and the USSR during the Cold War, 
such as the thousand pieces of debris left after the US ALMV system was tested to destroy 
an aging Sol-wind satellite in October 1985. This ‘space junk’, all travelling at speeds up to 
10 km per second, has the potential to cripple or destroy working spacecraft and to 
endanger astronauts. The movie Gravity (2013) provided a dramatic visualization of the 
serious security and human safety issue in space.  
China’s 2007 ASAT test, continuously hailed by China’s state-owned media as a legitimate 
experimental orbital satellite removal operation,10 was strongly criticized by the Western 
countries. According to the US Congressional Report Service, the US government responded 
with a formal protest to China. Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union 
and China’s neighboring states, such as South Korea, Japan and Taiwan, reportedly 
expressed concern. Russia by contrast downplayed the test.11 The criticism and concerns 
were obviously due to the expectation that the test signaled the start of a new type of 
military space capability race between the US, Russia and likely the third space power, 
China. The new situation also broached the question of whether the bipolar balance of space 
power between the US and Russia, or the ostensible US space hegemony after the Cold War, 
had reached an end. However, as a matter of fact, the kinetic-kill or hit-to-kill technology 
that China’s ASAT test applied had already been abandoned by the US and the USSR after 
their intensive tests in the 1960s and the 1970s respectively. Instead, since the 1980s both 
Cold War space powers had chosen to develop directed electromagnetic energy (laser) 
ASAT weaponry. This was out of tactical efficiency concerns and a desire to minimize 
potential harm to their own spacecraft. Nowadays, disruptive radio communication 
between a satellite and its users on the ground – satellite jamming – or developing 
maneuvering to derail a targeted satellite from its programmed orbit are viewed more 
effective and ecological. Knowing this technological insight, China’s ASAT test was not so 
significant in showing its full range space power but about Chinese missile defense 
capability which is not only related to international space security but to international 
security and peace as well as regional stability in Chinese neighboring area.   
At the global level, as far as the safety of human and space assets was concerned after the 
significant space debris increase caused by China’s ASAT test, the United Nations Committee 
on the Peaceful Use of Outer Space (COPUOS) in April 2007 rapidly adopted the Space 
                                                             
8 Secure World Foundation, (2014 updated). Space Sustainability – A practical guide, Washington D.C./Denver/: 
Secure World Foundation.   
9 US National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2013. 
http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/news/orbital_debris.html#.VFifCNJDuGU 
10 Global Times, Editorial: ‘By wishing the story about China’s ASAT weapon development was true’, January 6 
2013 (环球时报社评: 愿中国研制反卫星武器传闻是真的).   
11 Kan, Shirley, China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test, Congressional Report Service Report for Congress, RS22652, April 
23, 2007.  
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Debris Mitigation Guidelines drafted and submitted by the Inter-Agency Space Debris 
Coordination Committee (IADC). The guidelines put forward three fundamental principles 
which are shared by all thirteen IADC national space agency members: “(1) Preventing on-
orbit break-ups; (2) Removing spacecraft and orbital stages that have reached the end of 
their mission operations from the useful densely populated orbit regions; and (3) Limiting 
the objects released during normal operations.” 12  Yet the IADC, an international 
intergovernmental forum consisting of thirteen national space agencies, is only mandated to 
regulate the civilian use of outer space by the thirteen national space agencies. The IADC 
has no regulatory power regarding the military use of outer space by national defense 
services, which is precisely what the ASAT test was. Thus, the ASAT test that created on-
orbit break-ups (space debris) caused by the spacecraft removal operation (removing a 
dysfunctional satellite), fell outside the remit of the IADC guideline.  
The above institutional governing complexity regarding the use of outer space can be traced 
right back to the beginning of the space age, since the use of outer space was ‘politically 
charged’ from the first.13 The controversial governing principle that promotes the ‘peaceful 
use’ of space technologies and applications of military origin continuously led to divergent 
interpretations and implementations of the space-related treaties that came to be 
concluded, and generated gaps in the governance rulemaking. To illustrate this governance 
architectural imperfection, since 1985 mounting ‘space weaponization’ has led several 
spacefaring countries to probe the opening of an international negotiation in the Conference 
on Disarmament (CD) to reach international agreement to prevent an arms race in outer 
space (known as PAROS). The question of ‘space weaponization’ was in many ways related 
to what was banned by Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST).14 The OST 
prohibited the placement of weapons of massive destruction (WMD) in space. There was, 
however, no ban on the development and testing of ‘space weapons’. Moreover, the OST 
does not define whether co-orbital anti-satellite weapons or ‘space mines’ (suicide orbiting 
satellites designed to collide with a targeted orbiting satellite) are to be categorized as a 
space weapon. No further definition of ‘space weapons’ has been agreed since. As from 2002, 
China and Russia started jointly promoting a tentative ‘Treaty on the prevention of the 
placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects’ 
(PPWT). According to these two countries, the term “weapon in outer space” means ‘any 
device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially 
produced or converted to destroy, damage or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in 
outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or 
components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or inflict damage on 
them.’ If this definition can be globally agreed, the remaining question is whether or not the 
development and testing of ASAT weapons will be banned. 
The safety issue raised by the space debris problem and the reemergence of the various 
longstanding governing institutional imperfections offered an excellent opportunity and 
legitimacy for different actors to stand out with the good causes for their own national 
security and general interests globally. To this end, after having got the EU member states 
                                                             
12 Introduction, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines, April 2007   
13 Quote from my interview with Mr. Frank Asbeck, Principal Advisor for Space and Security Policy, EEAS on 
January 24, 2016.   
14 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of  States in the Exploration and Use of  Outer Space, including 
the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 1967.  
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on board, the European External Action Service (EEAS) started organizing a series of 
informal consultations over the course of the years 2008-2010 with two traditional space 
powers (the US and Russia) and other spacefaring and emerging countries, such as China, 
Brazil, Canada, India, Indonesia, Israel, South Korea, South Africa and Ukraine, to revise the 
ICoC proposal. In May and November 2013 respectively, the EU organized ‘Open-ended 
consultations’ in Kiev and Bangkok. The latest revised ICoC draft was released on 31 March 
2014 and a third open-ended consultation session was organized in Luxembourg in May 
2014 (European External Action Service - EEAS).15  The ICoC aims to create a new soft regime 
with a comprehensive approach to space security, safety and sustainability issues, such as 
space debris, satellite crowding, the saturation of the radio frequency spectrum, and so on,16 
which are directly or indirectly linked to the use of outer space for military purposes, e.g. 
the ASAT test. To accomplish its goal, the EU has chosen the unusual method of organizing 
‘multilateral consultation’ distanced from the UNCOPUOS and the CD – the two international 
forums where states customarily negotiate the rules on space activities respectively for 
peaceful uses and on matters inherently related to space security. The justification for this 
unusual method is that neither of the two international forums is suitable to accommodate 
international discussion and negotiation of a comprehensive ICoC.17 Looked at less 
favorably, it is a diplomatic maneuver with which the EU profiled itself as a global actor in 
international space politics.  
As was said above, in parallel with the EU-led ICoC proposal, there was a working paper18 
that had already been jointly proposed to the CD in June 2002 by Russia, China, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, Belarus, Zimbabwe, and Syria. This document became the basic document of the 
PWWT jointly introduced to the CD by Russia and China in February 2008. The goal of the 
PPWT was ‘to eliminate existing lacunas in international space law, create conditions for 
further exploration and use of space, preserve costly space property, and strengthen 
general security and arms control.’19 It also aims to solve the outdated problem of Article IV 
of the 1967 OST regarding the issue of ‘space weaponization’, though it preserves ASAT 
weapons. The two newly proposed space regimes evinced a new power struggle in the 
arena of international space rulemaking. The United States regarded the PPWT draft as 
‘fundamentally flawed’ because of its lack of verification measures. Without the consent of 
the US to provide the verification services operated by the US Space Surveillance Network 
(SSN, started since 1961 by the US Air Force), the PPWT would in truth be ineffective. And it 
would be surprising if the US would agree to open their verification facilities to support the 
PPWT co-sponsored by Russia and China. Not to be outdone, Russia and China pointed out 
that the US and Israel had repeatedly voted against UN resolutions preventing an arms race 
in outer space, and that the new legally binding regime proposed would outlaw the 
weaponization of space. As for the ICoC, the US and the UN were initially skeptical, 
especially because the EU was seeking to establish its own multilateral initiative by clearly 
avoiding the usual platform under UN auspices. The US later changed its position on ICoC to 
                                                             
15 http://www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm. 
16 European External Actions Service (EEAS) website: www.eeas.europa.eu/non-proliferation-and-
disarmament/outer-space-activities/index_en.htm.  
17 Remark by Mr. Frank Asbeck, Principal Advisor for Space and Security Policy, EEAS at the meeting of  the 
author’s doctoral Examination Committee on April 12, 2016.   
18 Russia-China joint working paper to the Conference on Disarmament, ‘Possible Elements for a Future 
International Legal Agreement on the Preventions of  the Deployment of  Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat 
or Use of  Force against Outer Space Object’, 28 June, 2002. CD/1679.  
19 Statement of  Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Plenary Meeting of  the Conference on 
Disarmament, Geneva, 12 February 2008.        
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one of support, but without going further than committing itself to further discussions 
about a possible ICoC. The US also retains the option not to sign for reasons of national 
security and national interest. 
 
2.2. THE CONGESTED, CONTESTED, AND COMPETITIVE SPACE ARENA  
China’s ASAT test and the ICoC-PPWT power struggle for global rulemaking were new 
manifestations of old concerns accompanying the rapid growth of human-space 
connectivity over the last half century. Nonetheless, the new déjà-vu underlined some 
significant situational changes in international space politics, or astropolitics. It is inevitable 
to repeat the statement of the US government20 that space has become congested, contested 
and competitive. The statement was made from an America-centric viewpoint but equally 
recapitulates the current situation in outer space in its physical, political, and socio-
economic sense. After the Cold War, (1) Space became congested due to a significant 
increase of the users population of outer space; (2) Space became contested, particularly 
viewed by two previous Cold War space powers, or by the US alone, because the spacefaring 
countries and the emerging space nations have started rapidly developing a wide range of 
space capabilities; and (3) Space is becoming increasingly competitive due to the space 
economic liberalization that took place in parallel with the popularization of the use of 
broadened space technologies and applications for civilian utilities.  
1) Space became congested 
After the Cold War, the formerly politically restricted bipolar space economy systems 
were finally opened to a global market. In the meantime, space technologies and 
applications were also more broadly used for both military and civilian purposes. The 
spacefaring countries were keen to improve their existing space capabilities and to 
develop new trade sectors. As for the non-spacefaring states, some were seduced into 
jumping on board to industrialize their manufacturing sectors through means of space 
capability development. Many countries that had had no industrial capability at all 
used space technologies and applications to create new impetus in their domestic 
economy. These technologies and applications include telecommunications, 
transportation services, internet banking, and others. There was also a growing 
interest among small medium industrialized countries in developing some specific 
ranges of space capabilities or simply in owning a space system, without investing an 
astronomical budget, to possess some necessary or profitable space capabilities. This 
space economy, according to the OECD, comprises the space industry’s core activities 
in space manufacturing and in satellite operations, plus other consumer activities.21  
The overall trend of the growing population that physically started to use outer space 
can be seen in Graph 1. We can see that over the four and a half decades of the Cold 
War, up to 1990, fewer than 25 states possessed satellites. By 2010, over 50 countries 
possessed orbiting space assets. Between the Cold War era and the end of 2010 the 
                                                             
20
 Lynn, III, William J. (2011) A Military Strategy for the New Space Environment, The Washington Quarterly 34(3) 
(Summer 2011): 7-16.   
21 OECD, (2007) The Space Economy at a Glance 2007. 
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number of states owning space assets rapidly grew by a factor of two and a half. In 
contrast, the other remarkable trend is that although there was a significant increase 
in the total number of satellite-owning states, there was almost no growth in the 
number of launching states. Since 1993, only Iran has joined the launching states (in 
2009), and more recently the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) in 
2012 seemed to have become the newest launching state. The lack of growth in the 
number of launching states underscores that the majority of satellite-owning states 
have to rely upon the minority of launching states to get their satellites into orbit and 
sometimes to operate them as well. This naturally is a part of space economic 
activities.  
Figure 1. Number of countries owning an orbiting satellite 
launched independently or via a third party  
 
Another interesting detail provided in Table 1 is that from the 1990s there was a 
significant increase in the number of developing countries possessing their own 
satellites. As mentioned above, most of them depend on the political, technical, and 
financial support of launching states and spacefaring nations to put their satellites 
into orbit and to operate these sophisticated space systems. This created more space 
technology, manufacturing and service interdependence with ties across different 
continents, in a word the globalization (Keohane & Nye 200022) of space capacity 
building. Finally, it must be noted that, as the space commercial activities are mostly 
operated by the national space programs and national space agencies, state-owned 
companies, or public-private joint venture companies, the interdependence of space 
capacity networks and technology manufacturing service remains highly political, and 
cannot be purely commercial.  
                                                             
22 Keohane, O. Robert and Nye Jr., Joseph S. (2000) Introduction. In Governing in a Globalizing World (Eds.) John 
D. Donahue and Joseph S, Nye Jr., Washington DC., NW: Brookings Institute Press.      
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Table 1. Countries with spacecraft in orbit 
Period Region Country Sum 
Before 1980s  US & USSR 2 
 Europe Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain, 
Czechoslovakia, Netherlands 
7 
 Asia-Pacific Japan, China, India, Australia, 
Indonesia 
5 
 North America Canada 1 
Total before 1980s   15 
New states in the 1980s Europe Sweden 1 
 Asia-Pacific Philippines  1 
 Latin America Brazil, Argentina, Mexico  3 
 Middle East   Israel 1 
Addition of the 1980s   6 
New states in the 1990s Europe Norway, Lithuania, Greece, Portugal, 
Denmark 
5 
 Asia-Pacific Pakistan, Thailand, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan 
6 
 Latin America Peru, Chile 2 
 Middle East Egypt, Turkey 2 
 Africa South Africa 1 
Addition of the 1990s   16 
New states in the 2000s Europe Switzerland 1 
 Asia-Pacific   0 
 Latin America Venezuela, Columbia 2 
 Middle East Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Iran, Iraq 
4 
 Africa Nigeria, Algeria 2 
 Central Asia Kazakhstan 1 
Addition of the 2000s   10 
New states in the 2010s Europe Luxembourg, Belgium, Romania, 
Estonia 
4 
 Asia-Pacific Singapore, North Korea 2 
 Latin America Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador 3 
  Middle East  0 
 Africa  0 
 Central Asia Azerbaijan 1 
Addition of 2010-2014   10 
Total until 2014   57 
Table: Author arrangement; Source: www.sattelitedebris.net 
2) Space became contested  
From the perspectives of both the military and the civilian use of outer space, the race 
for national space capability previously limited to the US and the USSR expanded on a 
global scale after the Cold War. More interested and capable states are trying to enter 
the arena. So, space became contested vis-à-vis the existing space powers. These 
interested and capable newcomers are interested in developing their own launch 
capabilities that would be beneficial for the commercial reasons, or in developing 
their indigenous missile capabilities. Likewise, developing satellite technologies, 
applications and space system services are commercially lucrative but also useful to 
provide communication, surveillance and navigation support to military operations. 
The dual use of space technologies and applications make the development of various 
space capabilities attractive to states. This global popularization of national space 
capability building obviously leads to security and stability concerns, especially in 
some geographical areas where tensions between neighboring countries remain 
constantly important, such as between India and Pakistan, in the region of China, 
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Taiwan, Japan and North Korea, and between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
Furthermore, these countries have particularly heightened interests in developing 
their national space capabilities.  
3) Space became competitive 
The new trend towards developing national space capability has made the realm of 
global space economy much more competitive than it was during the Cold War. This 
trend broadened and accelerated the flow of space-relevant technology transfers, and 
international trade in space-related equipment and services across the former 
politically restricted national boundary between the two opposing camps. More 
countries finally entered the global market either to offer their products and services 
related to different applications of space technologies in communications, navigation, 
and remote sensing, or simply to remain end users to be connected with all space 
related commercial activities. The term “space economy”23 refers to ‘commercial 
activities that have been derived over the years from the space sector’s research and 
development programs. Additionally, it also covers several mature downstream 
activities which have reached mass markets, and includes information technology 
products and services, such as satellite television and GPS receivers.’ Table 2 shows 
that all G20 countries have their own national space programs. It also indicates that 
the growing global space economy is actually in the hands of the two space powers 
and the emerging spacefaring countries. Adding up a conservative estimate of the 
national space program budgets of the US, China, the EU, Japan and Russia for 2010 
suggests that these major actors were together making a total of 62.6 billion USD 
available to nourish global and domestic space commercial activities.  
An important issue illustrated by Table 2 is that to develop and operate their space 
programs many countries that have their own space programs or are developing their 
specific space capabilities still depend heavily on the traditional space powers and the 
emerging spacefaring countries to acquire space scientific and technological support, 
precision equipment, side-products and support services. The new challenges here 
are particularly for the supply side. The dilemma of the countries that developed 
space industries early, such as the US and Russia, is that on the one hand they need to 
release their advanced space related products and services as quickly and broadly as 
possible to gain a commercial edge on aggressive competitors, but on the other hand 
can better dominate and steer the space economy, and better protect their strategic 
and national security, by keeping critical advanced know-how, technologies and 
operation systems to themselves. A completely free-trade space economy would 
weaken their national interest and security. Now, however, the strongest competition 
comes from emerging space nations, such as China, India, and Europe. They offer 
competitive products and services at a price and a quality that severely challenge the 
previous space economy oligarchies of the US and the USSR, and current American 
space leadership. The US has continuously resisted the trend towards free space trade 
by upholding a national trade barrier, the US International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR). ITAR strictly limits US exports of sensitive (e.g. satellite-related) 
technologies and goods. This is however a sword that cuts two ways, the export 
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 OECD, (2011) The Space Economy at a Glance 2011. 
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control mechanism directly preventing American space industries from growing their 
global commercial activities, for example, in the GPS market.   
Figure 2. Estimated G20 space program budgets (2010) 
 
                                                                                 Source: OECD (2011), The Space at a glance, OECD Publishing Paris.               
 
The situational changes have not only resulted in reshaping the balance of power in the 
arena of international space politics in the 21st century, but have also affected the directions 
in which global governance rulemaking are heading. Instead of the traditional focus on a 
country’s individual space capability, often with military and scientific exploration 
capabilities to determine a county’s space power, new focuses have been added to evaluate 
whether a country could maximize and extend all its individual space capabilities to benefit 
itself and also assist to other countries, or even aiming higher to benefit all mankind. 
Likewise, such space power can be developed in the realm of global space governance by 
exploring a nation’s power to influence the ways in which new space relevant rules are 
created and designed, or in which existing international space law and space institutions 
are implemented or adjusted.  
 
2.3. READING THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLITICS OF THE 21ST CENTURY     
This new situation in the arena of international space politics and in the realm of global 
space governance has attracted the attention and interest of international relations (IR) 
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scholars, space lawyers, space diplomats, national and global space policymakers, and the 
leaders of national space programs. Different existing approaches have been explored to 
analyze international space politics in the Cold War and in the 21st century. First, the 
conceptual frameworks of geopolitical ‘astropolitics’ and national military ‘spacepower’ 
have been developed, notably in the United States. These two power-centered realist 
approaches stress the national interest in international space politics. The two schools 
commonly evaluate the balance of power in international space politics at a given moment 
with the parameter of space-related physical forces and material capabilities between 
countries. The former put forward the geopolitical context to see the geopolitical power 
status quo. The latter, by contrast, centers on evaluating a country’s own space power while 
taking into account the space power of others, particularly of adversaries. The realist 
frameworks have inspired extensive literatures analyzing the space capability competition 
between the US and the USSR. Nowadays, they are developed to analyze the emerging intra-
regional space power competition in different geographical regions. An alternative and less 
developed approach is based on liberal institutionalism, or neo-liberalism. Liberalism 
stresses the actual interstate interdependence that is present throughout on-going space 
capability development and interstate space capability competition. This approach explains 
why and how competing states were compelled to coordinate and cooperate with each 
other to institutionalize common rules and regulating mechanisms. States agreed to 
establish international treaties, set up operational rules and equipment standards, and 
create international institutions to implement and verify the common rules precisely in 
order to preserve strategic stability, fulfill functional necessity, promote prosperity, and 
perhaps also for mutual interests and long-term peace. The third approach, which is 
fragmented, issue-focused and is close to legal study, is space policy analysis. Space policy 
analysis takes account of the international space political status quo as background 
reference yet aims at finding functional and technical solutions to overcome ad hoc or 
systemic political, legal, and technical challenges related to space issues.  
 
2.3.1. REALIST POWER-INTEREST CENTERED INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLITICS   
Realism, focusing on security competition and war among the great powers,24 interprets the 
development of international space politics by stressing each state’s concern to defend its 
individual national security and preserve its national interests. In the line of this thinking, 
Astropolitik25 was conceptualized to explain the competitive political context wherein states 
are interested in building their space power status by developing their space capability 
supremacy vis-à-vis that of other states. In the absence of global space hegemony, the great 
powers have great interest in upholding their superior space capability and even extending 
this space power toward neighboring areas to dissuade potential external threats, and to 
assure their national security, interests and prosperity. The astropolitics concept builds 
upon the doctrines of sea power (Mahan) and air power (Douhet), which argued that states 
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and Strategy, (Eds.) Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan, London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass; Dolman, 
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make use of a geographical or physical regional interface (land, sea, air and space) to 
demonstrate their military or comprehensive power. By pursuing such power status, the 
great powers acquire their leadership position in given geopolitical or regional arenas, 
protect their national security, and maximize their national interests. The concrete means 
by which a great power upholds its space power status is continuously to maintain the use 
of space capability and to deny its use to enemies,26 or even more broadly to possess ‘the 
capabilities to conduct military operations in and from space and to utilize space for 
commercial and other peaceful purposes’.27 Further to the post-Cold War international 
astropolitical situational changes, Johnson-Freese & Erickson noted that ‘geotechnological 
balance’ has replaced traditional geopolitical rivalry in which space powers only upheld 
their military space power status and their political influence. One critical and constructivist 
component of the substance of space power was added, that of ‘techno-nationalism’ which 
stresses ‘the economic and political power associated with access to the most advanced 
technology’ as the crucial determinant of a state’s international power and status.28 In this 
regard, space power should be extensively assessed with the support of scientific theories, 
philosophy, human nature, politics, economics, and geopolitics in addition to the theories of 
war and military affairs.29  
This realist ‘space power’ approach was valuable notably to analyze the US-USSR military 
and space exploration capability competition that lasted from the late 1950s through to the 
late 1980s. Both countries adopted the zero-sum concept as well as the strategic thinking 
that one’s defense is another’s danger to assure their respective space power through the 
continuous development of military and civil space capability. The salient cases for the 
realist ‘space power’ approach to analyze interstate space capability competition and to 
simulate possible outcomes of such a game for power were the continuous technological 
race between the US ABM system and the Soviet ICBMs, the Moon Landing mission vs. the 
USSR full-range space capabilities, and the comprehensive US Strategic Defense Initiatives 
(SDI, more commonly known under the nickname ‘Star Wars’), a strategic plan to counter 
the growing Soviet strategic force but also to bankrupt the Soviet economy.30 Nonetheless, 
the space power concept is less pertinent to deciphering the latent complex 
interdependence between of the Cold War adversaries, and especially the fact that the two 
space powers still reached a certain agreement on security and safety issues related to the 
uses of outer space by institutionalizing international space regimes, such as, among others, 
the 1967 OST. Moreover there are now more than two space powers – in the broadened 
arena of space capability competition, it has become even more complicated to determine 
an absolute enemy or partner. The dimension of space-power competition has expanded 
toward non-military or non-security realms at both the national and global level because 
space technologies and applications are today broadly employed to deal with global issues 
of human safety, economic growth and development, and environmental and generational 
sustainability. In this new context, the space-power-centered analysts have deepened and 
                                                             
26 Gray, Colin S. (1996) The Influence of  Space Power upon History, Comparative Strategy 15 (4) (October-
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diversified their investigations to determine which are the great, middle, small and 
emerging space powers in a given geopolitical and geostrategic context where military and 
economic space capabilities are being developed to maintain geopolitical influence. Or, how 
the existing space powers struggled to uphold their power to influence and continue 
shaping the global or regional political order to their optimal model by utilizing their 
advanced space capabilities.  
A significant number of publications based on the realist approach, centered on power and 
interest, have been produced. We name just a few, for example those that view space as a 
national strategy asset (Hitchens 200831, Johnson-Freese 2007,32 Moltz 2008 and 2011;33 
2010;34 and Venet 2012;35 Robinson 2014) and those that have monitored the current 
space-power equilibrium and tend to formulate new relative equations (Hitchens 200836) 
between the shrinking space power of the US (Sadeh 2008,37 2012;38 Noble 2008;39 Logdson 
201240) and of Russia (Podvig 2008;41 Sourbès-Verger 201242) vis-à-vis the emerging space 
forces of the European Union (Pasco 2009,43 2012;44 Nardon & Venet 2010,45 2011,46 
201147), China (Johnson-Freese 2007;48 Johnson-Freese & Milowicki 2008;49 Lele 2008,50 
Zhang 2008;51 Cheng 2012,52 2012,53 201154), Japan (Sawako 2009;55 Anan 201356) and 
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India (Lele, 201457; Rajagopalan 201358). Recently, regional space policy studies are 
unsurprisingly stimulated by the proactive space diplomacy case of the European Union, the 
EU ICoC. A few scholars have attempted to understand the general condition of growing 
space regionalism (Liao 2015a, 2015b), to explain how respective space regionalism or 
regionalization of national space mechanisms developed in Europe (Peter 2006;59 200760), 
in Asia (Lele 2013;61 Moltz 2011,62 2012;63 Noichim 2008;64 Peoples, et al., 201365) and in 
Africa (Aganaba-Jeanty 201366), and how Astropolitik stands out in the competition of 
regionalization activities led by regional spacefaring states, for example between China and 
Japan (Suzuki 2013;67 and Aliberti 201368) in the Asia-Pacific region. 
The space power approach has also often been taken when space policy analysts assess the 
national space capacity in comparison with other states to propose policy measures, 
overcome bureaucratic hurdles and functional obstacles to implement the policy at both the 
domestic and international dimension. According to Goldman, space policy at the national 
level, refers to “the decision-making process for, and the application of, public policy 
regarding space exploration. It includes policy regarding a country’s civilian space program, 
as well as its policy on both military use and commercial use of outer space”69. Space policy 
usually “intersects with other policy areas, such as science, education, defense policy and so 
on. It also encompasses government regulation of third-party activities such as commercial 
communications satellites and private spaceflight. To these, space policy also encompasses 
the creation and applications of space law, and space advocacy organizations exist to 
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support the cause of space exploration.”70 “As the military, economic and social implications 
of the use of outer space expanded, so it does the relevance of outer space on a world wide 
scale.”71 Space policy researchers, often affiliated with independent think tanks or in-house 
research institutes of public services and international space law schools, monitor the 
dynamics and maneuvers of space diplomacy, and propose policy analyses and 
recommendations for the parties requesting them.  
In sum, the realist space-power-centered framework is valuable to analyze the international 
politics at a given moment based on a policy-impact causality analytical method. 
Nonetheless, international space politics is not only characterized by its security and 
industrial competitiveness, but also marked by interstate interdependence due to functional 
necessity and social-economic interdependence. For this, cooperation was omnipresent 
across the course of the continuous race. The space-power approach fulfills the goal of 
establishing a causal link between the calculated strategic actions of a space power and the 
impact they wish to create and in actuality create in the domestic realm and in international 
astropolitics. Yet it has difficulty establishing meaningful interpretations of the ambiguity 
that the space powers have been compelled to negotiate with other non-space power states 
for all possible relative gains since the very beginning of the space age. They have also 
released cutting-edge technology, enabling know-how, precision equipment, and supportive 
systems to support their allies, as well as their supposed “strategic partners” (rational 
partnership) in order to extract the maximum advantages from such burden-benefit sharing 
partnership, or to maintain strategic peace and stability in the context of dynamic regional 
or global astropolitics.  
 
2.3.2. THE GALAXIES OF INTERNATIONAL SPACE REGIMES  
The liberal-institutionalist or neo-liberalism approach in IR studies works from the 
viewpoint that states and other actors engage in mutually rewarding exchanges, including 
trade and commerce based on specialization and comparative advantage. Cooperation 
benefits states as well as individuals and groups, all of which become increasingly 
interdependent. Hence, order and rules emerge as self-interested units in an anarchic 
setting cooperate for mutual benefit. States cooperate with each other to establish norms 
and standards, and international institutions – in a word, international regimes.72 Liberal 
institutionalism puts forward the effects of the international organizations and 
international regimes that depend on individual states power-interest stances and their 
superior capability to handle the cooperation and the organizational division of labor. 
Liberal institutionalism is also notable for explaining national space policies with a stronger 
focus on domestic factors. It provides a mechanism for seeing national space policy not as 
the output of a unitary national government, but as the end product of complex political 
interactions between domestic actors. Regional space cooperation, namely the merging of 
the European Launch Development Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research 
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Organization (ESRO) into the European Space Agency (ESA) in the course of 1960s and 
1970s is viewed as an obvious case to be deciphered with the neoliberal approach.73  
Grawin74 observed that the space age showed repeatedly that many of the political, 
economic and social issues of the Cold War period could neither be contained by, nor 
successfully resolved within the constraints imposed by the traditional boundaries of nation 
states. At the same time, the growing cooperation between different national space 
programs emphasized the inadequacy of traditionally autonomous states in addressing 
certain contemporary challenges. The high cost of space ventures, along with the associated 
technological interdependence, makes cooperation necessary and inevitable. Pfaltzgraff75 
noted that once states develop a presence in space as an adjunct to their terrestrial interest, 
they begin to form regimes that codify normative standards designed to facilitate 
cooperation based on agreed procedures and processes as well as common interest and 
shared values about space-related activities. Sheehan76 noted that liberal interpretations 
are more useful in explaining those dimensions of space policy at the confluence of 
domestic and international politics, seeing no sharp boundary between the two. This is in 
line with the liberal stress on the way in which national policies adapt to the international 
environment during the complex bargaining sequences that are a feature of international 
space regimes. We see this in the governance of the geostationary Earth orbit satellite 
spectrum, international cooperation regarding the International Space station, and more 
recently space debris mitigation. 
As a matter of fact, the vision of liberal institutionalism is pertinent to explaining the 
ambiguity that the United States and the Soviet Union, the only two space powers in the 
Cold War, could agree on the Legal Principles on governing the activities of states in the 
exploration and use of outer space in 1963 through a UN declaration. They also agreed 
with each other in the 1963 Treaty on banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in 
outer space and under water (PTBT, LTBT or NTBT), creating the Outer Space Treaty in 
1967, four more space-related international conventions in the course of the 1970s, the 
1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
(ABMT). Yet attaining an agreement on banning ASAT tests remains questionable. Right 
after the end of the Cold War, the two remaining space powers started cooperating with 
each other on the international space station (ISS) space exploration project. As the use of 
space was popularized and the space economy liberalized, the space powers and the 
spacefaring nations in 1996 agreed upon a UN Declaration on ‘International Cooperation 
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, 
taking into Particular Account the Needs of Developing Countries’ (often shortened to 
International Cooperation Declaration). After the rapid development and ubiquitous 
applications of space technology for both military operations and civil utilities of the 
American GPS since 1993, and the growing remote sensing technology applications for 
Earth observation, disaster mitigation, and other uses, more international regimes were 
created to manage these overarching issues together, such as the UN International 
Committee on Global Navigation Satellite Systems (ICG) which promotes the 
                                                             
73
 Sheehan, Michael, (2007) International Politics of  Space, London and New York: Routledge. 
74 Garwin, Richard, Space defense – the impossible dream?, NATO’s sixteen Nations (April 1986): 22-26.    
75
 Phaltzgraff, Robert (2011) International Relations Theory and Spacepower. In Toward a Theory of  Spacepower 
(Eds.) Charles D. Lutes et al. Washington DC.: National Defense University. 
76 Sheehan, Michael (2007) International Politics of  Space, London and New York: Routledge.  
21 | P a g e  
 
interoperability of different satellite navigation systems, the UN Principle relating to 
Remote Sensing (1986), the International Charter on “Space and major Disasters” 
(International Disaster Charter, 2000) which relies heavily on the international 
cooperation to use communication, navigation and remote sensing satellites for joint 
rescue operations, the Group of Earth Observation (GEO) coordinates the efforts to build a 
Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS 2005-2015). A non-exhaustive list of 
the proliferating international space regimes is documented in Table 2 below. The list of 
space regimes continues to expand. 
This list reaffirmed the general trend of international institution proliferation since the 
postwar previously noticed by Keohane77 and by Krasner.78 In the similar way, the increase 
in the number of international space regimes made the global space governance 
architecture denser over time. The question is whether there is any formula with which we 
could discern the dynamics of competition and capture the trends of cooperation in such a 
complex changing system? The non-exhaustive list equally exposes what is still missing in 
the IR literature that requires suitable theoretical framework and empirical methodology to 
better understand how international space politics developed the dimension of governing 
space issues through international institutions. Not long ago, Stuart79 argued that the 
regime theory developed in the 1980s remains pertinent to considering how states and 
other actors manage space related issues by establishing formal and informal regimes to 
satisfy the maximum actors’ expectations. Indeed, the recent proposal of ICoC, PPWT and 
other multilateral space relevant initiatives marks a new era in the history of human-space 
connection. This new era is vividly illustrated by the fact but also the worry that space has 
become congested, contested, and competitive for all. The crowded orbital environment and 
the limited satellite radio frequency resources for the artificial use of outer space become 
veritable global issues for general interests of human safety, state security and strategic 
interest, and international stability. Aiming to overcome these new challenges, the 
initiatives such as ICoC and PPWT also targeted the current imperfect global space 
governance architecture wherein co-exist a myriad of outdated, incomplete, dysfunctional 
or even contradictory international space related regimes. Such architectural imperfection 
can be traced from the continuous creations of international space regime with narrow 
focuses regimes with a lack of technical definition, verifying measures and implementable 
means to regulate space security issues. Or, in the case that the UN endeavors to create the 
ICG for peace and development purpose, service provider states’ strategic calculation and 
commercial interests often prevail the search for general interest of human kind. Although 
restrained by the contractual conditions80, GNSS service providers continue deploy rational, 
self-interested strategy to maximize their influence power and advantages by involving 
trade rules made by the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
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Table 2. An overview of the international regimes (1958-2014) 
Year International Regimes Core/related Issues 
1958 Establishment of the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Use of Outer 
Space (COPUOS)  
Comprehensive aims 
1962 
 
ITU entrusted for safety regulation, space resources allocations related 
to satellite use  
Safety 
1962 WMO entrusted for atmosphere science  Safety/capacity development 
1963 UN Legal Principles on governing the activities of states in the 
exploration and use of outer space 
Comprehensive aims 
1963 Treaty Banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water (LTBT or PTBT) 
Security/safety 
1963 Convention relating to the distribution of program-carrying signals 
transmitted by satellite 
Space tech applications 
1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)  Comprehensive aims 
1968 ICAO Resolution A-16-11: ICAO Participation in programmes for the 
exploration and use of outer space 
Safety/aviation technology 
standardization  
1968 (Astronaut) Rescue Agreement Safety/Security 
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT) Security 
1972 Liability Convention for damage caused by space objects Safety/security  
1973 Int’l Maritime Satellite Organization became Int’l Maritime 
Organization (IMO) 
Safety/Economy  
1975 (Launched space objects) Registration Convention Safety/security  
1979 Moon Treaty  Space exploration  
1981 CD Committee on a ‘Pact a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in 
outer space’ (PAROS) 
Security 
1982 UN Missile Technology Control Regime for reduce missile proliferation 
(MTCR) 
Security 
1982 UN principles governing the use by states of artificial satellite for 
international direct TV broadcasting 
Space tech applications  
1986 UN satellite remote sensing principles  Space tech applications 
1987 (Inter-space agencies) Committee on Earth observation (CEOS via G8)  Space tech applications; 
safety/sustainability  
1992 UN Principles relevant to the use of nuclear power sources in outer 
space  
Safety/sustainability 
1992 International Telecommunication Union (ITU) radio regulations for 
satellite radio frequency spectrum and orbital slot allocations 
Safety/space economy & 
capacity development   
1996 UN International Cooperation Declaration for benefiting developing 
countries with outer space exploration and uses 
Space tech applications; 
economy & development 
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)  Security/safety/sustainability 
2000 Charter on space and major (natural or technical) disaster (Disaster 
Charter) 
Space tech applications; Safety 
2001 Charter on the right and obligations of states to GNSS (global 
navigation satellite systems) services of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO-GNSS Charter) 
Space tech applications; Safety 
2002 International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
(the Hague CoC) 
Security  
2005 Group of Earth Observation (GEO & GEOSS 2005-2015)  Sustainability/safety  
2007 UN resolution to enhance the practices of states and international inter-
governmental organizations in registering space objects 
Safety/sustainability 
2007 UNCOPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines  Safety/sustainability 
2008 EU-led ICoC / Russia-China PPWT  Comprehensive aims/Security 
2009 Safety Framework for Nuclear Power source applications in outer space 
(IAEA/COPUOS) 
Safety/sustainability 
2012 ICAO-ITU Cooperation MOU for preventing harmful interference on 
GNSS for the aviation safety 
Safety/sustainability  
                                                                                                                                                                     Source: Author’s creation 
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2.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The requests for agreement on an ICoC or a PPWT indicate there are important gaps in the 
entire puzzle of global space governance architecture. In this dissertation, global governance 
is used for its analytical meaning, referring to a regulatory system with “more than the 
formal institutions and organizations, summed up as ‘international regimes’, through which 
the management of international affairs is or is not sustained.”81 Such a system is ‘conceived 
to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity in which the pursuit of goals 
through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.’82 The ICoC aimed at the 
ambitious long-term modus operandi that should overcome current and future challenges 
related to issues of the security, safety and sustainability of human space activities. The 
PPWT, by contrast, was more focused on regulating the existing ‘space weaponization’ issue. 
These proposals reflected the incompletion and imperfection of current global space 
governance. First, there has been no willingness to establish a global space government, for 
example, an international space organization to replace the current loosening governing 
structure. The current global space governance was politically charged for its artificial 
fragmented ‘labor division’ between the COPUOS, the UN Fourth Committee, the CD and 
some other specific international regimes, such as the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU), and World Meteorological Organization (WMO) as from the early space age. 
With the continuous innovation in space technologies and the broadened applications, new 
appearing issues compel states to establish new norms, regulatory rules and operational 
standards to avoid conflicts and abuses. It consequently remains uncertain whether either 
the ICoC or the PPWT if accepted would fix the existing fragmented space governing system, 
or make it even more complex. The expanding and fragmenting space governance 
architecture of international regimes corresponds to the conceptual framework of ‘regime 
complex’, created by Raustiala & Victor,83 and developed by Alter & Meunier84 and later by 
Orsini et al.85 from 2004 onwards. The regime complex refers to “an array of partially 
overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area” (Raustiala 
and Victor 2004: 279) or more completely, it is viewed as “a network of three or more 
international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping 
membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as 
potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively”. (Orsini et al. 2013:29) 
For our research project, we considered exploring the ‘regime complex’ framework as our 
conceptual lens to develop a general understanding of the complex global space governance 
architecture. Since our investigation is a pioneering pilot project, our research objective was 
to answer the very fundamental research question:  
How and why has the global space governance architecture attained its 
current form of regime complex over time? 
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To answer the main question, it will be relevant to investigate the following sub-questions:  
1. What form has the global space governance architecture currently attained? 
And why is it complex?  
2. What are the driving forces that shape the operation and development of the 
global space regime complex? 
3. What are the prospects for renovating the global space architecture?   
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
In the groundbreaking work of Raustiala & Victor (2004) regarding the concept of ‘regime 
complex’, the authors explored the global plant genetic resources (PRG) governance case as 
a whole and investigated one of the salient causes, the ‘interplay’ (Young 2000;86 Stokke 
200187), interconnected (e.g. Heer and Chia, 1995; King, 1997; Brown Weiss, 1993,88 Young 
1996;89 1999,90 2000a,91 2000b,92 United Nations University 1999,93 Gehring and Oberthür 
2000,94 2006,95 Stokke 2000,96 Rosendal 200197) which extended the global PRG governance 
networks to a regime complex. In essence, the institutional interplay refers to a causal 
relationship between two institutions, with one of these institutions (“the source institution”) 
exerting influence on the other (“the target institutions).98  
Biermann et al. (200999) later treated global environmental politics by stressing the concept 
of the ‘issue-linkage’ of the ‘architecture of global environmental governance’ to describe 
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the ‘overarching system of public and private institutions that era valid or active in a given 
issue area of world politics’ (Biermann et al. 2009: 15). With the conceptual framework of 
‘regime complex’ or the ‘architecture of global governance for a given issue area’, various 
studies related to other issue areas e.g. trade policy (Davis, 2009100), international security 
(Hofmann, 2009101), global refugee (Betts 2009,102 2013103), energy (Van de Graaf 2011104, 
2013105), international monetary and finance governance (Lesage 2013106), food security 
(Margulis 2013107), maritime piracy (Struett et al. 2013108), forestry (Haug et al. 2013109) 
were proposed one after another. The architectural approach regarding the regime complex 
of global space governance (Liao 2014110) was proposed during an international gathering 
of the space community which assembled international relations scholars, space lawyers, 
space science and technology experts, policymakers and diplomats. This view was 
elaborated into the formal declaration of this international gathering by recognizing that 
‘global space governance’ is noted for its coverage of a wide range of international regimes - 
counting norms (i.e. international treaties and other agreements, regulations, procedure and 
standards, code of conduct, confidence building measures, safety concepts), and formal and 
informal international institutions (Montréal Declaration 2014).111  
In addition to the primary focuses of considering the regime complex of a given issue as a 
whole, and recognizing regime interplay as one of the causes of the fragmentation of the 
global governance architecture of a given issue area into a regime complex, scholars 
diversify their focuses more deeply, to investigate other causes or ostensible patterns, for 
example institutional labor division among international regimes (Biermann et al. 2009;112 
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Zürn & Faude 2013;113 Gehring & Faude 2014114), horizontal cross-issue areas where 
governance clusters intersect, i.e. trade and environment (Zelli et al. 2013115), or vertical 
mutual coherence between the policy from a given issue global regime complex and their 
domestic implementations (Bernstein & Cashore 2012;116 Morin & Orsini 2013117). Some 
remain at the meta-level by investigating principal explicatory elements and patterns to 
analyze how a regime complex of a given governance issue area was born, grew and lives in 
the issue areas, such as climate change (Keohane & Victor (2011118), the global monetary 
and finance system (Lesage 2013), and energy governance (Van de Graaf (2013). These 
studies underpin the notion that the institutional design and operation of regime complexes 
or ‘changes of regimes’ are developing alongside three interactive forces based on the 
rationales of 1) distribution of interests, 2) issue-specific attributes and 3) institutional 
feedback mechanism (Keohane & Victor 2011), or because of the strategic, functional, and 
organizational or managerial logics (Lesage 2013; Van de Graaf 2013). These three driving 
forces intersected in various forms and propel the architecture’s permanent expansion, 
deepening and reform (Lesage 2013: 486).  
 
3.1. OUR ARGUMENTS  
In parallel to the continuous space power and capability race of space power states, space 
technologies and applications, or the use of outer space, have become increasingly 
important and even indispensable. The overarching uses of and through outer space also 
strengthened its federating force as states were compelled to coordinate and cooperate 
with each other for various functional necessities. Space technologies and applications have 
become vital for a wide range of governing issue areas, therefore space governance as such 
was no longer limited to regulating the use of outer space, but implicated the governance 
systems of other global issues for guaranteeing human safety, for enhancing socio-economic 
development, and for safeguarding environmental sustainability. These separate global 
governance systems are also becoming closely connected and interconnected with the space 
regime complex as such because of the broadened utilities of space technologies and 
applications. Because of this, our research scope should not be limited merely to 
investigating the intra-governance system regime interplay but also cover those inter-
governance system interplays. For example, the overlap that constitutes “a separate 
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category of linkages in which individual regimes that were formed for different purposes and 
largely without reference to one another intersect on a de facto basis, producing substantial 
impacts on each other in the process” (Young 1996:6), which can be found in the case of ICG 
& WTO. The ICG was created for development purpose to enhance the compatibility and 
interoperability between different GNSSs and Regional Navigation Satellite Systems 
(RNSSs). Nonetheless, the non-discriminatory trade regulations of the WTO were implicated 
on the inter-GNSSs/RNSSs harmonization process handled by the ICG. However, with the 
restraints on the scale of this doctoral research project, we unfortunately have to limit our 
research focus to analyzing the space regime complex as such, and in particular its general 
form at the current stage. In other words, we will concentrate our endeavors on building a 
fundamental and comprehensive ‘analytical narrative’ that will serve as a roadmap or an 
architectural blue print to continue deepening future investigations, either to enrich 
supportive literature about the interpreting model on the morphogenesis of regime 
complex, or to empirically identify different types of institutional interaction119 within the 
existing complex of space governance architecture.  
With this research scope, we argue that the formation of the space regime complex can be 
understood from the aspects of 1) distribution of interests, 2) issue-specific attributes and 3) 
institutional feedback mechanism or in brief, with strategic, functional, and organizational or 
managerial logics (Lesage 2013; Van de Graaf 2013). 
First, the distribution or dispersion of interests refers to how states, by deploying their 
strategic preferences and influential capacities relevant to the issue area, can lead the 
creation of a regime, or change an extant regime to fulfill their self-interest. According to 
Krasner,120 national power was the most ostensible driving force that maintains the power 
balance in global politics and also the equilibrium of the entire global governance 
architecture, likewise in the construction of the space governance architecture. The 
strategic logic was obviously discernible through the historic fact that, after the successful 
Soviet launch of the Sputnik I orbital satellite in 1957, US President Eisenhower before 
Congress in 1958 called for “a sound and safeguarded agreement” with the US ally “for open 
skies, unarmed aerial sentinels, and reduced armament in order to provide a valuable 
contribution toward a durable peace”.  
The term ‘peaceful use’ of outer space followed the ‘Atom of peace’ speech addressed by the 
same author to the UN General Assembly in 1953, which in 1957 led the creation of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). And this time, the desired agreement aimed to 
“reverse the trend toward ever more devastating nuclear weapons; reciprocally provide 
against the possibility of surprise attack; mutually control the outer space missile and satellite 
development; and make feasible a lower level of armaments and armed forces and an easier 
burden of military expenditures.”121 A similar speech was delivered at the UN General 
Assembly in 1958. Subsequently, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 1348 (XIII) 
to establish an ad hoc committee on the peaceful use of outer space in 1958. The ad hoc 
committee became the permanent UN COPUOS in 1959 based on the UNGA resolution 
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1472(XIV). This irrefutably peaceful approach was actually based upon the US national 
security interest in impeding the rapid development of Soviet space technology which was 
expected to enable the Soviet military capacity for satellite surveillance, ICBMs, space 
platforms, and long-rang unmanned weapons. This would become a significant threat to 
American national security and great-power status. Therefore, creating such international 
regime for peaceful use was legitimate and would fulfill the US interests. Subsequently, the 
Soviets ought to submit their proper version for an international space regime at the UN 
General Assembly by calling for international cooperation in the exploration of cosmic space 
and the restriction of the use of space to peaceful purposes122. The different interpretations 
of two Cold War adversaries regarding ‘peaceful use’ of outer space became one of the ‘sin’s 
that expand and fragment the space governance architecture to its regime complex.  
Secondly, the functional necessity equally motivated states to constantly create new 
regimes, or adjust the functional missions and organizational rules to satisfy their needs. 
The functional linkages appear “when substantive problems that two or more institutions 
address are linked in biogeophysical or socioeconomic terms” (Young et al. 1999:23).123 It is 
first the “facts of life” interdependence that created these institution interactions because 
“the operation of one institution directly influences the effectiveness of another through some 
substantive connection of the activities involved”.124 In contrast, there are “political linkages” 
which “arise actors decide to consider two or more arrangements as parts of a larger 
institutional complex”.125 The space powers and spacefaring countries attempted to create 
and lead their own space-related network of interdependence to gain commercial benefits, 
reinforce their space capacity network, and create markets for their individual space 
systems. They also use these institutions for reasons of burden-benefit sharing. Countries 
are naturally sensitive regarding whether their efforts or investments would or would not 
be refunded in comparison with what other countries invest or promise to implement. In a 
word, states apply a functional logic to find where they can satisfy their functional necessity 
(issue-specific attributes), and within which institution to maximize their benefit (gain 
linkages). Because of this, when the non-spacefaring states expect to gain relative 
advantages by skipping the long process of getting critical technology and the advanced 
space-related systems, they agree to be part of the regional cooperative platform even 
together with their traditional neighboring adversaries. The institutional interaction based 
on such functional logic triggers ‘forum shopping’. 
Nowadays, the application of this functional logic is saliently discernible in the regional 
space governance cases. For example, China and Japan both created their respective 
regional space cooperation mechanisms, the Asia Pacific Space Cooperation Organization 
(APSCO), and the Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF). Both regional space 
cooperation organizations carry functional linkages for “fact of life” interdependence as well 
as political linkages. They respectively gather their own regional political allies to form the 
two separate but functionally and geographically overlapping space institutions. When the 
ASEAN member states have to decide to be affiliated with the China-led Asia Pacific Space 
Cooperation Organization (APSCO) or with the Japan-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency 
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Forum (APRSAF), or with both regional space cooperation platforms, they assess which 
organization will maximize their advantages for gaining technical assistance and political 
partnership. Similar cases have been studied, such as when the Arab League states were 
‘regime shopping’ to choose between the Cairo-led Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) 
and the Riyadh-led Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ARABSAT) in 1970s.126  
Lastly, international regimes encounter institutional feedback effects (Keohane & Victor 
2011),127 or the organizational gravitational force in their evolutionary path. International 
space regimes were primarily created to ease political tensions, specifically those of the 
“space race”, or to overcome common challenges, such as satellite orbital-slot and radio-
frequency attribution. Certain governing principles, guidelines, norms and organization 
rules were agreed to ensure that the functioning of these space regimes would be well 
organized. These fundamental governing principles, guidelines and norms gradually 
generate an embeddedness relationship of a governance institution to overarching principles 
and practices, 128 such as “non-appropriation” and “peaceful use” of outer space. Sometimes, 
the high-level political steering groups or interagency organizations, such as the UN, the CD 
and the COPUOS, were compelled to consider some structural change within the extant 
space regimes by modifying the division of labor. Nestedness denotes the relationship of a 
smaller institution to a functionally or geographically broader institution.129 For example, 
nesting the UN specialized agencies, such as the ITU for satellite orbital-slot and radio-
frequency attribution, the WMO for international weather forecast cooperation, and the ICG 
for harmonizing inter-GNSSs interoperability and compatibility. Or, in order to improve the 
effective functioning and differential management of space governance as a whole, the UN 
decentralized space for sustainable development to the regional space cooperation forum 
with account of regional heterogeneity. These regimes were limited to bear the 
transcendent normative restraints from the existing international regimes. The ICG, for 
example, was created in the line of the UN development program UNISPACE. The mandate 
of the ICG is to accommodate technical discussions limited on regulating the “peaceful use” 
of such military or dual-use space technology and the applications. And the issues of 
harmful radio interference, and the aviation safety issues which depend heavily on GNSSs 
also fell outside the ICG mandate, and are only partly under the mandates of the ITU and the 
ICAO. It shows an important path-dependence relationship among the various space 
regimes that gradually fragmented the development of space governance architecture 
toward its regime complex.  
To sum up, the development of the space regime stretched by the intersected gravitational 
forces as discussed above, the strategic choice/dispersion of interest (vector X), functional 
logic/issue-linkages (vector Y) and organizational sequence/path-dependence (vector Z), 
are represented in a visual model that demonstrates the regime complex of space 
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governance (RCSG) starting from the primary regime A within the 3-dimension region. Each 
gravitation force pulls the A in their own direction and gradually stretches A toward the 
RCSG corn. The blue surface which shows the current size of the regime complex of space 
governance, and within this expanding RCSG, the existing various space related regimes are 
gradually created, reformed, or deserted and dissolved, will be demonstrated and discussed 
in this doctoral dissertation.  
As for the dashed arrowed lines which prospect the likely expanding direction of such RCSG, 
the question of predicting the likely trajectory and the future dimension of such RCSG, or 
whether there is another hidden yet significant particular gravitational force(s) also 
participate/anticipate in the development of the space governance architecture toward its 
regime complex, just like physicists and mathematicians only gradually discovered that not 
only gravity but also other forces of nature, such as electromagnetic force, weak and strong 
nuclear forces, that intersected and steered the universe to attain its instant status quo. But 
this will remain for us and any interested political scientist to explore later.      
Figure 3. The development model of a regime complex of space governance  
resulting from three driving forces 
  
Author’s model, inspired by Hawking, Stephen (1988) A Brief History of Time. 
4. RESEARCH SCOPE, METHODOLOGY AND CHAPTER STRUCTURE  
To answer our main research question regarding how and why the global space governance 
architecture has attained its current form of regime complex over time, we will take the 
following methodological steps to look through the entire constructing evolution of global 
space governance architecture by identifying the major challenges (Chapter II: The key 
governing issues in international space politics), the architecture blueprint (Chapter III: The 
governing principles and guidelines), and the governing agencies (Chapter IV: The 
governing institutions) of space governance in order to get its general picture. Hence, we 
follow the artificial division decided from the very beginning of the space age to respectively 
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Path-dependence 
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discuss the governance architecture of military use of outer space, or space security issues 
(Chapter V: The regime complex of space security governance), and one of growing 
important governing issue, the GNSS governance (Chapter VI: Regime complex on governing 
a “peaceful use” of outer space: GNSS governance case study). This chapter particularly 
indicates the ambiguous architectural design from the beginning of the space governance 
construction, because the GNSS technology and applications originated from the military 
use and are still mostly operated and controlled by the military of the service provider 
countries, except the European Union. Yet, the issues related to the inter-GNSSs 
interoperability and compatibility have not been negotiated under the space security 
governance scheme but, because of its broadened civilian utilities from its dual-use, as one 
of the issues of the “peaceful use” of outer space. Finally, Chapter VII concludes this 
academic work with the findings to our research questions. Some policy reflections are 
presented to stimulate constructive threads of thinking based on our empirical trials 
regarding the regime complex framework and well as to the improvement of the changing 
global space governance architecture. 
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CHAPTER II THE KEY GOVERNING ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL 
SPACE POLITICS 
Abstract: Chapter II presents the general and specific ongoing governing issues that have 
gradually created the physical or functional ‘issue linkages’ of space relevant regimes within 
the global governance architecture. The functional issue linkages are complicated because 
the utilities of space technologies and the applications are overarching for military, civilian, 
and the dual-use purposes. During the Cold War, the two space powers and their respective 
allies agreed to establish an ambiguous governing concept “peaceful use” of outer space to 
restraint each other’s space military capability growth. Nonetheless, the USSR and the US 
continued to maintain their divergent interpretations of “peaceful use” as either “non-
military”, or “non-aggression” respectively. After the Cold War, the liberalization for general 
space capability development and the popularization of the use of outer space through 
advanced space technologies and applications expanded human space activities. These 
became ever further connected and interconnected with practically all national policy 
issues for military, civilian and the dual-use purposes. Therefore, the use of outer space has 
now expanded to four more functional governing areas: (1) military use of outer space, or 
space security as such; (2) space for safety: the use of space is expanded from its traditional 
security arena to search and rescue operations and disaster mitigation; (3) space for 
economy and development: space is becoming increasingly important to boost economic 
activities that range ‘from farming to banking’, and to enable national or regional (re-
)industrialization by stimulating economic activities and improving peoples’ daily life; and 
finally (4) space for environmental and generational sustainability: space technologies, 
particularly remote sensing technology and its applications facilitate the observation of 
terrestrial situation, water and climate change for establishing preventive measure of 
human lives and assets protection for now and the future generations. With the four main 
issue areas, it covers numerous specific space related policy issues, so expanded the global 
space governing scheme ever broadened.  The complication of space governance is that 
states are never neutral when seeking and using these space technologies and their 
applications. They are often triggered by the dual-use of outer space. Dual-use refers to the 
use of outer space for physical devices and virtual services that can be dedicated for either 
military operations, civil utilities, or both, according to the aims of their operators and users. 
Concretely, the military uses of satellite telecommunication, navigation and remote sensing 
technologies for communication, navigation, surveillance are equally essential for civilian 
TV broadcasting and internet, for commercial land, sea and air transportation, and for 
gathering accurate geographical information data for farming, fishery activities and the 
Earth observation for environmental protection. These issue linkages create nuance and 
pitfalls for states to negotiate self-interest stressed governing rules and institutions. Such 
issue-linkage mapping exercise regarding the key governance issues will help us to discern 
what states struggle for in the international space politics in the 21st century and why they 
make a certain issue-linkage while jointly constructing the entire governance architecture 
toward its regime complex. 
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1. THE BROADENING “SPACE RACE”   
The terminology of “space race” has generally been viewed in terms of a “space arms race” 
or more often dramatically simplified as “star wars” in the diplomatic forum, by the media 
and in the literature written by security experts. Actually, although lacking an authoritative 
definition, an ad hoc international committee was formally proposed at the non-UN 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in 1985 to discuss the prevention of an arms race in outer 
space (PAROS). Indeed, space was first of all and above all developed for military use to win 
war and to prevent war, or in another words for international security and peace. The wide 
range of space technologies and their applications in telecommunication, navigation and 
remote sensing were already studied as early as 1946, by Project RAND.130 The report of the 
US aeronautic producer analyzed the engineering possibilities of designing an artificial 
Earth satellite and its particular utilities for military purposes. This shows the US interests 
in developing space capability for military purposes. After the Soviet Union launched the 
world’s first orbiting satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, the US President Eisenhower proposed the 
“peaceful use” of outer space. The approach opened the space technologies and applications 
developed and controlled by the military to restricted civilian uses of outer space. Hence, 
the neutral space capability became military, civilian or dual-use depending on its 
designer’s will or user’s desires and control. 
The US President Kennedy’s “Moon speech” in 1962 131  illustrates this broadened 
international “space race” as representing the ultimate challenge for men to explore, for 
countries to conquer and prove their power, but also to protect and share with others. He 
pointed out that, in order to accomplish all or any of these objectives, his fellow Americans 
should support his Administration to work on 1) stronger military capabilities, 2) better 
capacities in civilian space activities than foreign competitors, and perhaps 3) smart but 
autonomous generosity to share these capacities with others through global cooperation. So 
the US would be enabled 1) to develop critical scientific know-how and accurate technology 
as well as advance industry and increase financial ability to build up a space program, 2) to 
maximize and maintain such power dominance based on a cost-benefit, cost-effective and 
efficient method, and 3) to engage partners without losing its own autonomy and 
superiority. The strategic vision of the US President sounded legitimate, pacifying, and 
stimulating for the US citizens. The address simultaneously disclosed the paradox that such 
ambitious human project to connect man and space was not only based on a pure universal 
ideal but also due to the competition between the US and the Soviet Union at that time. The 
“space race” therefore expanded more and more its arena from its limited “space arms race” 
toward an all-range competition on individual state’s space capability development and 
possession. This competition consequently also affected the following international space 
cooperation to functionally share the political, technical, and financial burden as well as in 
the process that states negotiate general governing principles, common operational rules 
and international technical standards related to the use of outer space.  
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2. FOUR SPACE-RELATED GOVERNING ISSUE AREAS & KEY ISSUES   
Nowadays, the original military-focused use of outer space has expanded to four major 
governing areas in total. (1) Military use of outer space, or space security per se; (2) space 
for safety because the uses of space have expanded to search and rescue operations and 
disaster mitigation through the use of satellite telecommunication, navigation and remote 
sensing technologies; (3) space for economy and development: space become increasingly 
beneficial for economic activities ranging ‘from farming to banking’, and to enable national 
or regional (re-)industrialization in order to improve the quality of peoples’ daily life; and 
finally (4) space for environmental and generational sustainability: space technologies, 
particularly remote sensing technology and the applications facilitate the Earth observation 
on terrestrial situation, water and climate change for establishing preventive measure of 
human lives and assets protection for now and the future generations. Within the four main 
issue areas, it covers numerous specific space-related policy issues, so expanding the global 
space governing scheme ever further.  
 
2.1. ISSUES ON SPACE SECURITY 
 
2.1.1. BANNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN OUTER SPACE  
The first space security governing issue seemed to be due to the general fear, after the two 
atomic bombings in Japan in 1945, that a likely third world war would result in mutual 
destruction throughout nuclear warfare. With the inter-continental ballistic missiles with 
nuclear warhead, a nuclear war can kill significantly more people and destroy more assets. 
But in fact, this fear did not prevent the two Cold War powers from developing nuclear 
weapons through and in space until 1963. They stopped only when both powers had 
exhausted their nuclear weapons tests and realized that cost-benefit considerations make 
nuclear weapons inefficient way to kill the main targets, orbiting satellites. The weapon is 
unsafe because it creates space debris that can hit all orbiting satellites. It is also unsafe to 
astronauts and a threat to human lives more generally because of the remaining nuclear 
fuel in space and the radioactive material fallout into the atmosphere and on the ground 
after detonating the nuclear weapon in atmosphere or in space. Because of this, in 1963 the 
Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States agreed the Treaty banning nuclear 
weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, often abbreviated as the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), or Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). The two space powers 
subsequently became more concerned about a possible arms race in outer space. In 1967 
the Soviet Union and the United States agreed on the “peaceful use” of outer space and to 
abstain from placing nuclear weapons and any other kind of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) in space, as proscribed in Article IV of the Treaty on principles governing the 
activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies (known as the “Outer Space Treaty”, OST). The remaining issue is that in 
addition to the countries that are keen to develop nuclear capability for “peaceful” or even 
explicitly for military purpose, such as Iran and North Korea, a number of other states still 
retain the capability to break their formal promise and use their remaining nuclear 
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weapons to defend their national security. The issue of governing nuclear weapons in space 
is not closed.  
 
2.1.2. THE PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE  
The continuous “space race” between the USSR and the US attained its first critical moment 
after the Soviets successfully launched the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on October 4, 1957. 
On the US side, already in early 1957 President Eisenhower had stated that the country not 
only faced the problem of determining what the US wanted to do in space but also what 
kind of rules for unilateral activity and mutual interaction should prevail in space. 132 
Following President Eisenhower’s five-point disarmament speech to the US Congress, the 
US presented a disarmament proposal to the UN General Assembly in 1958 to call for a 
sound and safeguarded international agreement for open unarmed skies (known as “open 
skies”) and reduced armament. The disarmament proposal for establishing a space security 
governing agreement actually embedded strategic calculations. The key technical elements 
concerned military security, such as international inspection for satellites, intercontinental 
missiles, space platforms, and long-range unmanned weapons addressed in this talk were 
actually what the Soviet Union was more advanced than the US at that time. The US had a 
vital interest in institutionalizing any international regime as an instrument to restrain the 
Soviets. By contrast, if a possible international agreement could slow down, not stop, the 
arms race, it could be beneficial for the Soviets to reduce its efforts and investment for 
arming itself. In this sense, proposing the “peaceful use” of outer space gained moral 
support from all. Consequently the Soviet Union also submitted a proposal to the UN 
General Assembly in 1958, equally calling for international cooperation in the exploration of 
cosmic space and the restriction of the use of space to peaceful purposes.133 Knowing that 
not all governing issues, especially space-related matters, could be brought in the UN 
agenda to start negotiating for any formal agreement, the act demonstrated the great 
interest and concerns of the two space powers regarding the nature and the use of outer 
space.  
With the agreement of the two space powers and the endorsement of the UN, the OST was 
signed by 104 countries on January 27, 1967. The term “peaceful use” that has been hence 
repetitively employed in many subsequent UN documents and space law treaties still 
remains problematic as it lacks an authoritative definition.134 The terminological problem 
triggered divergent interpretations for its substance, between “non-military” and “non-
aggressive”. The former considers any military activities in outer space to be not peaceful. 
The latter by contrast provides leeway, in practice that all military uses of outer space were 
to be permitted and lawful as long as they remain “non-aggressive”.135 Primarily, the “non-
military” interpretation was used by both the US and the Soviet Union. Due to the gap in 
military space capability innovation between the two powers, the US had gradually attained 
superior space capability vis-à-vis the Soviets and therefore began to push for the “non-
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aggressive” rather than the “non-military” meaning. In contrast, the Soviet Union insisted 
that all military activities in outer space are non-peaceful and unlawful but in practice 
continued placing a growing number of military payloads in orbit. Actually, as both space 
powers and then more and more countries increase their dependence on space technology 
in their military planning and operations, the reality is that space has been constantly 
militarized regardless, although not yet claimed for any aggression. In sum, as some 
admitted at the Conference on Disarmament, “even in some contexts ‘peaceful’ means ‘non-
military’, any ambiguity has been clarified by States practice which had not been 
contradicted in a forceful manner by any State formally protecting military utilization of 
space”.136 This means that although the “peaceful use” of outer space remains legally 
unclear it still seems politically manageable. 
 
2.1.3. MILITARIZATION & WEAPONIZATION OF OUTER SPACE 
Besides the non-defined “peaceful use” of outer space, Article IV of the OST also prohibits 
states to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other 
kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies, or station such 
weapons in outer space in any other manner. This explicit prohibition has been viewed as 
imperfect and triggered a long-running debate because some stressed the “placement a 
weapon” in outer space as the “militarization of outer space”, others focused on the 
“weapons in space” (or “space weapons”) considered as the “weaponization of outer space”. 
Nair argued that the fine line between militarization and weaponization may exist if taking 
outer space as an interface of military operation, or as the battlefield of warfare.137 The 
distinction is similar to another way of categorizing the military assets between the “force 
support” (communication, command and control, sensor and surveillance) and “force 
applications”, i.e. striking weapons according to Johnson 138 and Rosas139. Such distinctions 
would not change the application of each term in its substance if the final objective of the 
act is to physically harm the adversary people and assets to paralyze their military 
capability. 
In the realm of space governance, the core technical issue causing the continuous debate is 
the problem of when the dual-use of space technologies and applications tips over into 
military use and being a weapon. As said above, any satellite designed and operated for 
civilian utilities carries the potential of being turned to military use in a given context 
according to the will of its operators and end users. More extensively, the information 
collected and retrieved from satellite encrypted data, such as real-time weather reports, 
remotely sensed geographical information of land, water and air about a given region, and 
the recorded trajectory of moving people and objects followed by the navigation satellites 
are precious intelligence to prepare and coordinate military operations in and outside of the 
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warfare battle field. The US space shuttle space exploration program (1981-2011) 
developed by NASA was claimed to be a mere space transportation system carrying civilian 
and military payloads but it may also have had an ASAT or other attack capability.140 If 
following the same line of technical feasibility, the LEO orbiting space lab has the similar 
potential. Finally, in an unusual situation, any remote controllable spacecraft can be 
manipulated to be a suicide “ASAT weapon” to neutralize other hostile orbiting satellite by 
physically colliding them. This way of transforming a civilian-use spacecraft into a war 
machine is doubtless costly and therefore unusual. But it is certainly a possibility, 
comparable to the Japanese Kamikaze suicide fighter planes and their pilots near the end of 
the World War II. 
As for the arena of international space security politics, the major technological concern 
was stressed on the international continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that made the 
Soviets capable of hurling their rockets with warheads across vast distances, flying them 
through orbit before descending on their targets. This weapon was viewed as direct 
destructive aggression from outer space. Because of this, the US ballistic missile defense 
(BMD) was developed with the similar technologies though stressing the reactive tactic of 
intercepting incoming missiles before their entry from space. Since BMD depends on 
satellite support, various types of anti-satellite weapons were therefore developed and 
intensively tested during the Cold War. The development and deployment of a variety of US 
Space Control systems (ability to assure access, freedom of operations, and deny it to the 
enemy), capable of damaging or destroying adversary spacecraft141 were constantly 
developed by strategists and among militaries. The Space Control systems became essential 
for assisting distant military operations. The evidence can be traced since the 1991 Gulf 
War and the 1999 Kosovo airstrikes and so on. The NATO alliance reportedly used various 
satellites to their advantage,142 including what the Americans claimed was the “accidental” 
bombardment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the NATO air offensive against 
Yugoslavia.143 The bombardment incident was suspected of having been intended to 
neutralize a spying mechanism embedded in the Chinese embassy. Similar technologies and 
equipment were more broadly applied in the US anti-terrorism military campaign in 
Afghanistan. Together with the Soviet Union, China has been consistently concerned about 
the issue of “space weaponization”. In 1985, China and the Soviet Union, then Russia, 
introduced a working paper to the CD to oppose the placement of weapon in space. Since 
2001, China prompted its concerns to the fact that Donald Rumsfeld, US Secretary of 
Defense in the Bush Jr. Administration, delivered a congressional report by calling for the 
National Space Policy to include the option of deploying weapons in space to deter threats 
to, and if necessary, defend against attacks on US interests.144 Many Chinese officials 
assumed that China was the real target for US missile defense and space planning. From 
their perspective, it is implausible that the US would expend such massive resources on a 
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system that would be purely defensive and aimed only at “rogue” states.145 In sum, the 
confusing governing issues on “space militarization” and “space weaponization” are not 
only about the a priori legal definition and the a posteriori lack of verification means. Both 
need political good will. Adequate verification depends on a state’s good will to register its 
space launch beforehand and release sensitive information regarding the payload of its 
spacecraft. Once the spacecraft is in orbit, only the astronomically valued space surveillance 
system can trace spacecraft. For instance, only the US can afford such verification system. 
Finally, a state’s national security and interest prevails the functional necessity of setting up 
clear governing rules. 
  
2.1.4. ANTI-SATELLITE (ASAT) WEAPONS 
An on-going space security issue is some states’ concern with anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. 
The debate has been revivified by safety concerns about space debris generated by the 
Chinese ASAT test in 2007, and the growing interest of countries such as India, and perhaps 
the DPRK (North Korea), in developing ASAT capability in parallel with their missile 
development and satellite launch capability. The technological rationale of developing anti-
satellite weapons was to neutralize or disturb the orbiting communication and surveillance 
satellites of hostile countries in order to damage or reduce the enemy’s military operation 
support capability. One way of damaging the targeted satellite is with a direct kinetic 
weapon, such as missiles or a suicide spacecraft of any kind, to collide with the target. The 
Soviet ICBMs can be used for this purpose. As said previously, in an extreme case, satellites, 
a space shuttle, or even the ISS, Hubble space telescope, and so forth, can also become a 
“space mine” to collide with a targeted satellite whether lawfully or not. Other technologies, 
such as blinding or dulling a satellite with a laser beam or jamming satellite radio signals 
have been developed to paralyze satellites partially or entirely. The latter can efficiently 
disturb military C4ISR146 space control systems without leaving space debris in orbit that 
can equally harm the attacking state’s own orbiting spacecraft. 
The USSR and the US had probed and tested various ASAT technologies during the Cold War. 
Since the international political endeavors were centered on banning all military activities 
in and through outer space in the late 1950s, the two space powers both increased their 
efforts to test their ASAT capacities. The Soviets started testing a co-orbital ASAT system 
from 1963 and continued at different periods during 1976-1977 and 1978-1982, until the 
ASAT program was decommissioned in 1993. Meanwhile, the US President Reagan in 1983 
proposed a space-based missile defense system – the “Brilliant Pebbles” program of small, 
satellite-based non-nuclear interceptor missiles and on the existing research efforts of 
space-based lasers. The program was part of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) popularly 
known as “Star Wars”. The ambitious SDI programs stimulated great expectations yet 
subsequently were incomplete due to various circumstances. Nonetheless, the SDI achieved 
the development of various types of space-based interceptors for the US to possess intrinsic 
ASAT capacities. In 1985, a US F-15-based homing vehicle (missile guidance) system was 
successfully tested. Afterwards, the US anti-ballistic missile system was deployed in Alaska 
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and California. The attempt was viewed by adversaries as a historical flash point that 
showed the US was weaponizing outer space and stimulating an arms race in space.      
In 1997, the US Space Command published its Vision for 2020 under the Clinton 
Administration. This Vision for 2020 argues that an increased dependence upon space 
capabilities for “commercial, civil, international, and military interest and investments” 
could lead to increased vulnerabilities of the national security of the United States. Because 
of this, “dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect US national 
interests and investment… [and] integrating space force into war fighting capabilities arcos 
the full spectrum of conflict”147 is critical. This proposal to develop US space military power 
was not granted support at the time. Only later did the Bush Jr. Administration again pledge 
to deploy missile defenses. The “Rumsfeld (Space) Commission”148 issued a report about a 
possible “Space Pearl Harbor” which foresaw potential hostile attacks against the US due to 
the weaponization of outer space by other states. At that time, numerous countries 
possessed ballistic missiles and became interested in developing space-assisting systems to 
improve their space security capability. In that regard, US military decided to transform its 
space capabilities in the areas of assured access to space and on-orbit operations, space 
situation awareness, earth surveillance from space, global command, control and 
communication in space, defense in space, homeland defense and the projection of power in, 
from and through space.149  
President Obama unveiled a plan for European missile defense. By 2005, 28 countries 
already possessed ballistic missiles that could reach low-Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, and all 
had the technical capability to develop an LEO anti-satellite system by modifying their 
missiles (Graham, 2005).150 China held a successful ASAT test by destroying a Chinese-
owned dysfunctional orbital satellite with a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV) warhead in January 
2007. By doing so, China became the third state that has tested ASAT weapons, after Russia 
and the US. The act particularly stimulated the security concern of the US. On February 21, 
2008, the US destroyed a malfunctioning satellite to counter-demonstrate its ASAT 
capabilities, though the kinetic hit has now become less considerable. In fact, the other 
countries that possess ASAT capability still all need to test the effectiveness of their 
potential ASAT weapons. China’s ASAT test can therefore be said to have evoked a great 
potential of the ASAT test proliferation. India, for example, claimed to develop a hit-to-kill 
ASAT system based on a laser sensor and exo-atmospheric kill vehicle originally planned for 
ballistic missile defense purposes.151 An expanding ASAT weapons competition is in 
prospect.  
 
2.2. SPACE SAFETY  
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Scientists and engineers developed artificial satellites that can orbit around the Earth with 
different kinds of payloads to transmit radio signal of telecommunication, navigation and 
remote sensing information data. To these utilities, the Universe is not as infinitive as we 
imagined. The safety related issue regarding the scarcity of limited outer space resources 
for all is the problem of attribution of the orbital slots and radio spectrum frequency for 
each orbiting and stationing satellite. First, just like car driving in the highway, when the 
individual satellites have no sufficient safe distance between them, they risk collide each 
other and cause damage. Second, when two satellites have an insufficient interval between 
them, their radio transmissions interfere with each other. In a time that people depend 
heavily on those space systems for telecommunication, navigation and remote sensing 
utilities for global financial markets and bank transactions, military and civilian aviation, 
search and rescue operations, and land, water and air situation observation, any brief black-
out of can cost people’s life and cause an irreversible loss of assets. Thus, making a global 
plan that delimits the orbit slots for every single satellite to avoid collision and to prevent 
radio signal transmission interference is one of the governing issues in “space for safety”.  
 
2.2.1. SPACE RESORUCE SCARCITY: SATELLITE ORBITAL SLOT & RADIO SPECTRUM   
The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) has since 1963 been required by the UN 
to manage such space resource attribution issues as satellite orbital slots and related radio 
frequencies. A logical rationale of the UN was, since the ITU was already the international 
regime for radio frequency attributions, and the delimitation regarding the interval distance 
between individual satellites is co-related with the avoidance of satellite signal transmission, 
the ITU should elaborate two connected issues within one management plan. Therefore, the 
ITU Master International Frequency Register (MIFR) or the Master Register was established 
to oversee satellite access to geostationary and other orbits. At that time, only a few 
countries possessed and operated space systems with orbiting satellites. There was more 
than enough room to place this small number of satellites. So, the ITU adopted the “first-
come, first-served” rules to attribute access for state and private applicants for the 
requested orbital slots with related radio frequency spectrum.  
The “first-come, first-served” rule evoked an equity concern that developing countries will 
be limited with very few opportunities to compete with spacefaring nations and their 
private sector to have access to the limited orbital resources. Another problem is that the 
increasing inquiries from states and from private-sector actors to the access for placing 
their satellites evoked the problem of Hardin’s “The Tragedy of the Commons”152 which 
described the problems of the public use of the limited common resources, or in a word, the 
problem of common resource scarcity. These two problems called the ITU rules into 
question.  
In response to the first problem, the ITU established an a priori system that provides a 
preferred access opportunity, but without either orbital slot registration or a legal right, to 
any Administration attributing allotments per geographical region. States with or without 
any space capability have legal shares of GEO satellite slots. This a priori system has 
generated some “paper satellites”, or more precisely cases of “reservation of capacity 
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without actual use”.153 In practice, those states lacking of space capability can trade their 
allocated orbital slots with satellite frequencies with other spacefaring states or satellite 
operators for significant financial advantages or exchanging space capability development 
assistance. One well-known case is Togasat. After the equity-stressed allocation system 
created in 1985 and 1988, the Kingdom of Toga attempted to register sixteen orbital slots 
between 1988 and 1990. Toga ultimately acquired six orbital slots and relevant radio 
frequencies. A nationally funded satellite firm Togasat hence undertook the launch of the 
virtual satellites. But actually, Togasat proceeded to rent out an allotment to Unicorn, a 
Colorado company, and afterwards auctioned off its remaining slots for $2 million per year 
for each orbit.154 In 2014, a Chinese firm also appeared to bid in Togasat’s auction.155 These 
paper satellites eventually made satellite orbital slots and radio frequency allocations more 
intricate. In addition, the orbital slots trading also engendered the complication for liability 
determination if harmful radio interference problems and disputes occur.    
Figure4. Regions for purposes of orbital slots and frequency allocation, ITU 
 
                                                          Source: International Telecommunication Union 
 
Another challenge for the ITU to overcome in limited space resource management is to 
make its inquiry procedure more efficient and economical. The ITU grants seven years as 
proceeding period before the expiration of an allotment registry for an orbital slot register 
request. This lengthy process is regarded, particularly by spacefaring countries, as an 
irrational and inefficient way of governing limited space resources. Such non-spacefaring-
friendly rules respond to claims from developing nations for priority access to an orbital 
slot, despite having no practical capability to finance the construction, launch, and operation 
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of a satellite within the seven-year timetable.156 In the meantime, many exploitable orbital 
slots and relevant radio frequencies have to remain unused. Since 1994, Article 44 of the 
ITU Constitution prescribes157 that the limited radio frequencies and the geostationary-
satellite orbit natural resources must be used rationally, efficiently and economically.158  
 
  2.2.2. FREQUENCY OVERLAY & SIGNAL JAMMING 
The more countries depend on the services provided by satellite supported systems to 
communication, disaster management, meteorology, distance education, e-health, and 
managing natural resources, the less useable or safe satellite orbital places and radio 
frequency bands are available for everyone. The growing lack of available space resources 
has not only generated the equal common public goods (re-)distribution problem, but is 
also closely connected with safety issues. As the good functioning of all space systems 
depend on the continuity of the satellite radio signal transmission, the ITU is responsible for 
making safe and efficient radio frequency bandwidth allocations for all inquiries as well as 
for protecting the ITU MIFR registered assignments from harmful interference. The 
interference issue is vital for the continuity of all civilian purposes services, and is even 
more especially important for dual-use GNSSs services.  
In general, when satellites transmit their signals, it is the Super High Frequency (SHF) 
bandwidth (between 3GHz and 30 GHz) that is the most suitable radio frequency. The 
technical solution is to allocate fixed positions and define their relevant radio frequency 
spectrum before sending any single satellite into orbit. The allocation of satellite orbital 
slots as well as their radio frequency bands has become intricate since the increase of 
multiple satellite services providers and users would wish or have to co-exist in the same 
range of the radio frequency bandwidth. It is even more complicate for GNSSs because 
within the SHF bandwidth, the GNSS satellites constantly need two or more frequencies in L 
band to transmit positioning-navigating-timing (PNT) signals that contain ranging codes 
and navigation data to allow the users to compute the travelling time from satellite to 
receiver and the satellite coordinates at any moment. As navigation frequencies occupy 
such a fairly small neighborhood on the radio spectrum, all GNSSs contend with each other 
to use the same radio spectrum. Once the number of GNSSs and user population grew, the 
individual needs for frequency increased as well. If there is a requested frequency overlay, 
this needs to be settled or regulated. Otherwise, different GNSSs’ radio signals can interfere 
with each other and then diminish the operation quality of the GNSS services concerned. 
The ITU should be the global regulating mechanism for such issue. Nonetheless, the ITU is 
only entrusted to register the MIFR but not to arbitrate any dispute. So the ITU has no 
regulating power with GNSSs signal overlays because the disputes cannot be resolved as the 
matter of satellite signal interference. The military have more problems because overlay 
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makes it impossible intentionally to jam another network without jamming one’s own 
frequency. The issue can only be resolved between concerned parties. All in all, as space 
security matters are implicated in such disputes, national interest naturally overwrote the 
general interest. It made the governance more complicated. More details regarding the 
GNSS governance will be further discussed in the Chapter VI. 
Figure 5. Satellite Signals Interference 
 
                                             Source: International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
 
Intentional satellite signal jamming cases are not infrequent, like the Eutelsat vs. Iran case 
in 2011. Five international television and radio broadcasters called on the ITU to address 
the issue of intentional satellite signal interference in January 2011. According to the five 
satellite user companies, their Persian-language broadcasting program into Iran and other 
countries were being jammed with Iranian satellite beaming159. In retaliation, a year later 
Eutelsat agreed with the media services company Arqiva to remove the program from the 
official Broadcasting Service of the Islamic Republic of Iran to reinforce EU sanctions aimed 
at punishing human rights abuses.160 The ITU claimed it is effectively powerless to do 
anything about this measure taken by the EU side.161  
 
2.3. SPACE SUSTAINABILITY 
Space Sustainability or the “long-term sustainability of outer space activities” is one of the 
latest elaborated governing realms after the space security and space safety issue areas. For 
instance, the UN COPUOS governing efforts relating to space sustainability are space debris 
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mitigation, nuclear power source applications in outer space, and the “long-term 
sustainability of outer space activities”.  
Taking the short-term operational management measures first, outer space is facing 
traditional security threats caused by the military build-up of major space powers such as 
ASAT-caused space debris, spectrum interference, targeted electromagnetic jamming, 
malware weaponization and directed energy weapons.162 As for long-term risk prevention 
objectives, they are more related to political and socio-economic threats such as the 
growing space capacity gap between the spacefaring countries and non-spacefaring 
countries. The impacts of and the measures for both short-term and long-term threats have 
been assessed and solutions based on an incremental approach suggested. It is obvious that, 
instead of efforts to further space science and technological progress, maximize the space 
technologies applications to improve people’s lives, and gradually bridge the gap between 
spacefaring and non-spacefaring nations by transferring space capacities in respecting 
difference bio-chemical and social environments 163  for future generations, many 
spacefaring nations are afraid of losing their dominant positions, and aim to preserve their 
dominance or leadership under the banner of national security or the national interest. For 
instance, we can identify issues such as terrestrial environment and sustainable 
development, and space debris and nuclear power resources (NPS) in outer space as the 
most concerned sustainable issues.      
 
2.3.1. ON EARTH 
2.3.1.1. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 
The use of space technology applications, such as remote sensing, has been developed from 
the very beginning of the satellite age but mainly for the purpose of military reconnaissance 
and surveillance. Aside from its military utilities, civil-use related international cooperation 
issues like meteorology, the development of international atmospheric observation and 
telecommunication networks, and the promotion of research, were quickly assigned as 
some of the missions of the World Meteorology Organization (WMO). The WMO Space 
Programme now promotes the availability and utilization of satellite data and products for 
weather, climate, water and related applications of WMO Members. It aims to leverage an 
“end-to-end system” for weather and climate services. This ranges from capturing of data 
and over calibration to quality control, dissemination and user training. 164  Other 
applications of remote sensing, together with satellite communications and global 
positioning, navigation and timing systems (GNSS) have increasingly facilitated activities 
aimed at achieving of sustainable goals and targets set by the UN. At least three UN work 
areas have been emphasized: 1) protecting the Earth’s environment and natural sources 
management (Agenda 21)165; 2) disaster risk reduction (Hyogo Framework for Action: 
                                                             
162 Martinez, Larry. (2012) Is There Space for the UN? Trends in Outer Space and Cyberspace Regime 
Evolution. ESPI Perspectives 56. (January 2012). European Space Policy Institute. p4.    
163 von Prittwitz, Volker, (2011) Space as Environment: On the Way to Sustainable Space Policy? ESPI 
Perspectives 50 (August 2011). European Space Policy Institute.   
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Sustainable Management of  Forest were adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and Development, 
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Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters)166; and 3) the Millennium 
Development Goals167. Concretely, satellite remote sensing technology has been used to 
monitor and forecast weather for farmers and to monitoring crop development to help 
predict agricultural outputs in advance. Such information is crucial in assessing 
vulnerability and managing food security. Likewise, space-based information provides 
effective and efficient tools for disaster management and emergency response. An 
“International Charter for Space and Major Disaster” was activating in 2000 and signed by 
national space related agencies168 to coordinate satellite data providers’ response to major 
space and terrestrial disasters.  
2.3.1.2. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 
As for the sustainable development of space capacity applications, it has been noted in a UN 
resolution169 that the UN Members States recognize the importance of global mapping as a 
necessary element in developing global environmental observation systems, also noting 
data collected by developing countries. The short-term cooperation can start from collecting 
and sharing data beneficial in building up long-term global environmental observation 
systems. That can immediately be helpful for disaster mitigation or humanitarian aid, or 
risk assessment for adequate measures on climate change issues. Once these systems are 
operational, scientific communities, governments, NGOs and the private sector would use 
such global environmental observation systems to assess then design the best planning, 
programs and operational projects for sustainable purposes.  
Challenges that come with building up such global environmental and sustainable 
observation systems remain and obtaining accurate geographical information is related to a 
dual use for both environmental and military purpose. Both space-faring and non-space-
faring still shares common concerns. Space-faring countries compete with each other for 
bidding the positions of maintaining global data sources whereas non-space-faring 
countries prefer develop their own data collecting systems or at least not to authorize full 
access to the data collecting or to share collected data in consideration of their vulnerability 
in terms of national security and interests.   
 
2.3.2. IN OUTER SPACE 
2.3.2.1. SPACE DEBRIS 
Since 1999, the UN Committee of peaceful use of outer space (COPUOS) recognized that 
some space debris has the potential to damage spacecraft, leading to loss of missions, or loss 
of life in the case of manned spacecraft, and also assessed that for manned flight orbits, 
space debris mitigation measures are highly relevant due to crew safety implementations. 
The UN has adopted the “Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines” in 2007 which defined “space 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992.      
166 World Conference on Disaster Reduction, 18-22 January 2005.  
167 The Millennium Development Goals, UN Millennium Declaration, Millennium Summit, 2000.   
168 Argentina, Algeria, Brazil, Britain, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Japan, Korea, Nigeria, Turkey, 
USA, ESA, and EUMETSAT.  
169 Paragraph 274, GA resolution 66/288 of 11 Sept. 2012. “The future We Want”. 
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debris” as all man-made objects, including fragments and elements therefore, in Earth orbit 
or re-entering the atmosphere, that are non-functional. Knowing that the main causes of 
man-made space debris are from launching operations (every launching leaves at least one 
part of rocket in orbit), unexpected break-up during space operational phase, accidental 
collision (against other spacecrafts or space debris) in orbit, as well as intentional 
destruction and harmful activities (like ASAT), post-mission dysfunction or break-ups. The 
Guidelines took two categories of measures to reduce future space debris and to remove 
existing debris. The Chinese ASAT test was criticized by the US and other states for the 
space safety concern because the massive debris generated by the test were dispersed in 
orbit and dangerous to all the spacecrafts.  
The challenges remain on the angles of technological capacities, political willingness and 
notably economic concerns for such responsibility sharing. Those who possess more assets 
in orbit have more concerns on space debris issues and have the capacities and the means 
to reduce and remove space debris. However, they expect all space catchers including non-
space-faring countries and related space industries to share the operational costs for the 
benefit of the future generations. For space catchers and non-space-faring countries or 
companies, it is understandable that space debris may not be listed on their development or 
operational priorities since the efforts and means tend to be more devoted to space capacity 
building or other domestic socio-economic issues rather than space debris mitigation. 
Furthermore, in spite of the awareness that ASAT tests create massive space debris, as was 
the case with China’s ASAT test in 2007, space catchers remain eager to continue to develop 
such efficient military means to either demonstrate national power, or deploy national 
defense measures. Little hope for reaching a static equilibrium amongst these competitive 
and cooperative dynamics looks likely to be observed in future global governance on space 
debris issue.   
2.3.2.2. NUCLEAR POWER SOURCES (NPS) 
Due the general fear that a likely third world war would be resulted in a mutual destruction 
nuclear warfare, the USSR-US-UK have attained the Partial test ban treaty in 1963. Much 
later, the UN Comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty was concluded in 1996 which prohibits 
the nuclear tests and any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere or in space. Hence, the 
nuclear power resources (NPS) for use in outer space have been developed and used where 
specific space mission requirements and constraints on electrical power and thermal 
management are precluded. The NPS safety in the atmosphere and in space concerns are 
mainly concerned in the case of an nuclear fallout, the presence of radioactive materials or 
nuclear fuels in space and their potential for harm to people and the environment in Earth’s 
biosphere requires that safety should always be an inherent part of the design and 
application of space NPS. In this regard, the UNCOPUOS, together with International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA), published the UN-IAEA Safety Framework for NPS applications in 
outer space in 2009. The focus of the Safety Framework is the protection of people and the 
environment in Earth’s biosphere from potential hazards associated with the launch, 
operation and end-of-service mission phases of space NPS applications. As unsafe NPS 
technologies can have harmful long-term impacts, the major concerns are therefore to 
prevent accidental nuclear disaster and to avoid intentional aggression and harmful 
operations which will cause irreversible consequences to people and to the environment. 
There are remaining risks that several emerging space nations, often in conflict with other 
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states, had no chance to test their “space weapons” with or without nuclear warheads. As a 
result, the restraints of international law may not be sufficient to dissuade their attempt.  
   
2.3.2.3. LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY OF OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES (LST) 
The 1992 UN Declaration on Environment and Development (known as the “Rio 
Declaration”) launched the idea that “human beings are at the centre of concern for 
sustainable development. They are entitled to a healthy and productive life in harmony with 
nature” (Article I). And “the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations” (Article III). With 
the generational concerns, international cooperation efforts should be devoted to “ensure 
that all humanity can continue to use outer space for peaceful purposes and socio-economic 
benefit”170 by bridging the gap between the space-faring and non-space-faring countries. In 
sum, general ideas surrounding environmental concept may be applied to space policies of 
respecting difference between bio-chemical and social environments.171  
The idea of developing “Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities” (LST) was 
discussed within the framework of the UNCOPUOS in 2004. In 2008, the French delegation 
announced it would submit an official proposal to the UNCOPUOS to add a sustainability 
item to the agenda. This led to its inclusion on the agenda of the Scientific and Technical 
Subcommittee (STSC) in 2010 and the establishment of an official UN LTS working group on 
the topic.172 The Working Group’s goal is to examine and propose measures to ensure the 
safe and sustainable use of outer space for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of all 
countries.173 Decoding this objective, at least two time-wise approaches, short-term 
operational management and long-term risk preventive approach, were suggested to deal 
with space sustainability concerns on Earth and in outer space. Focused challenges 
undertaken by the LTS Working Group include defining the term “sustainability”, “space 
surveillance awareness” (SSA), “space-faring”, and “safety”, in order to established common 
agreed terminologies in the future outcome; whether new regimes, e.g. UNGA resolutions or 
guidelines would limit the established space nations’ freedom of act in space; whether new 
regimes would impose unacceptable barriers to new entrants in the space arena; and if 
there will be legal and economic implications to be considered.174 The Working Group is 
tasked with producing a consensus report containing voluntary (non-binding) best-practice 
guidelines for all space actors to attain the objective. The official working plan called for 
finalizing the candidate guidelines by 2016, followed by referral to the UN General 
Assembly.              
                    
                                                             
170 Secure World Foundation. (2010). Space Sustainability – A Practical Guide. Washington D.C..: Secure World 
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2.4. SPACE COMMERCE  
It was President Ronald Reagan, while welcoming the return of the test space shuttle 
Columbia on 4 July 1982 at Edwards Air Force Base, who inaugurated a new era of space 
commerce which would move forward to capitalize on the limitless potential offered by the 
new frontier. The Reagan administration pushed hard to help the private industry and 
capitalize on the commercialization of the US space industry. President Reagan believed 
that would not only stimulate domestic technological innovation and boosting American 
high-tech production, but also create opportunities for the US to compete with Europe and 
Japan. Three decades later, an embryonic private spaceflight industry continues to emerge, 
seeking to capitalize on new advancements, reliable, reusable, and relatively affordable 
launching technologies to suborbital trajectories and into low Earth orbit. This has 
stimulated global trade interests in the space commerce sector and engendered competition 
as well as tension among governments and the private sector on both aspects, national and 
sector, trade interests and security concerns.  
Space commerce has primarily covered the sectors of communication and transportation. It 
covers satellite manufacturing and launch services, advanced navigation products and the 
provision of satellite-based communications. According to The 2013 Space Report,175 the 
global commercial space economy continues to thrive, with estimated annual revenues 
(commercial revenue and government budget) in excess of $304 billion, up 6.7% from 2011 
and 37% since 2007. Individual consumers are a growing source of demand for these 
services, particularly satellite television and personal GPS devices. In addition to orders for 
satellite fleet replenishment, manufacturers and launch providers are looking to the robust 
demand for new space-based services to spur new satellite orders. Such commercial 
activities would support increased access to space products and services.  
A popularization of space capacity building, such as lower launch costs for commercial 
satellites, has enabled greater accessibility to space, particularly by developing countries 
that in the past found space access prohibitively expensive. Yet increased access to space 
affects international space commercial activities both positively and negatively. As more 
entities, both governmental and private, are able to reach space, the benefits of the 
resources spread, ideally in an equalizing manner. Increased access to space also translates 
into a more congested market environment, making effective regulatory mechanisms for 
the allocation of scarce resources more urgent. Therefore, improving the regulations and 
mechanisms of global space governance related to space commerce is envisaged as the next 
great challenge. Again, as many foreseen space commerce issues are still beyond current 
scientific and technological capacities, an integrating approach is often applied to look for 
short-term functional regulations on Earth, and long-term preventive measures might 
happen in space and other celestial environments in the future. 
2.4.1. SPACE COMMERCE ON EARTH 
There are challenges or tensions in three areas where coordination as well as 
comprehensive measures and regulations are needed, namely imagery data of remote 
sensing; radio-frequency market liberalization and export control regulations. Since the 
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issue on radio-frequency was already briefly discussed in the previous section, we will focus 
on the issues of remote sensing imagery data and export control regulations of space 
commerce. 
2.4.1.1. IMAGERY DATA OF REMOTE SENSING 
The remote sensing technology is overall a powerful instrument for military surveillance 
and operation planning. The remote sensing satellites using very high-resolution (VHR) 
capabilities were formerly exclusively used by the military. Since the end of the Cold War, 
VHR data have become available on the civil market and for commercial purposes. However, 
the commercial use of such data can be restricted when national security is at stake. A few 
years ago, Earth-imaging data was only available to a select number of governments. Today 
any individual or organization with access to the Internet can use these services at no cost. 
Google Maps and Google Earth are just two examples of the various widely available online 
mapping applications. These remote sensing applications serve public authorities by 
improving environmental policies, meteorological services as well as crisis management 
and civil protection actions. Likewise, remote sensing data is useful for private users in 
forestry exploitation, agriculture or cadastral uses. However, the different destinations of 
the utilized imagery have created tensions between the support of public policies and that 
for private utilization.  
At the global governance level, it was not until 1986 that the UN Principles on Remote 
Sensing was adopted by consensus. The US resolution opening access to remote sensing 
data established the right of user countries to obtain access to data on an open and non-
discriminatory basis. 176  The “Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters” (the 
Aarhus Convention) in 1998 reinforced this right by allowing free access for the public to 
these environmental information through public authorities, yet also established the 
obligation for public authorities to ensure an adequate and transparent flow of information 
about activities that may significantly affect the environment. Such right to information is 
not commercially supported and leads to debates on Intellectual Property (IP) 
considerations, and some would suggest be exempted by public security considerations. For 
the imagery data companies, intellectual property rights are an important consultation 
when regulating applications for satellite imagery as they allow generators of RS 
information to reap benefits for their investment. 
 
2.4.1.2. EXPORT CONTROL REGULATIONS 
In principle, export activities are by nature trading activities and are subject to trade rules 
and economic considerations. Yet, the strategic use of space related to technological 
applications and services also involves national security concerns. That explains why 
governments, notably that of spacefaring countries such as the US, often face a dilemma 
between selling more to gain more profits but at the same time also limiting sales to protect 
their short term market dominance and long-term cutting-edge leadership. Additionally, 
there are especially serious security concerns such as preventing space catchers obtaining 
core technologies or know-how thus limiting their ability to develop counter- or 
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competitive appliances which could compete against the existing space club monopoly as 
well as the military space technologies cartel. This has resulted in a business as usual 
approach since the end of the Cold War as two ideological camps engage in a other global 
products’ standardization war. Nonetheless, such practices are contradictory to the rules of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), one of the most important global trade governance 
mechanisms. A case which clearly demonstrates this kind of tension is that between the US 
“International Traffic in Arms Regulations” (ITAR) and the WTO “Agreement of Government 
Procurement” (GPA) which is based on the principles of openness, transparency and non-
discrimination.  
The US ITAR governs transfers of arms but can apply to business activities far removed 
from what one might consider to be arms exports (the shipment from the US of, for instance, 
missiles, tanks, military aircraft, and warships). The “arms” to which the ITAR applies are 
identified on the US Munitions List (USML). In addition to those commodities clearly listed 
as weapons on the USML, common electronic devices such as infrared focal plane array and 
lasers that are specifically modified or configured for military applications, as well as all 
spacecraft (including research and communication regarding commercial products 
specifically for a military (or space) application will be taken as the modified product to 
apply the USML in the US. Such regulations were obviously designed to protect the national 
security and economic interests of the US while few spacefaring nations were still 
dominating the global space market. But in the context of the complex global space 
commerce flow and continuous relocation of production activities, the US seemed to have 
no choice but to keep extending the ITAR list and perpetuating the non-conformity of the 
ITAR to the non-discrimination principle of the GPA under the WTO. The ITAR remains as 
an important issue that should be covered within the discussion for global space 
governance.            
2.4.2. EXPLORATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES OF CELESTIAL BODIES 
The rise of emerging global powers and the competition for energy and rare minerals has 
resulted in a global battlefield upon which many States, especially the developed countries 
and emerging powers, are dependent on these natural sources. Various science-fiction-like 
solutions have been thought of and proposed when knowledge and technological capacity 
become available. These technologies include collecting solar energy through solar panels in 
space then sending them to the Earth and Moon or Mars mineral resources exploitation. The 
recent NASA Mars Mission and President Obama’s asteroid retrieval plan177 to catch 
potentially hazardous asteroids has triggered the imagination somewhat as to whether a 
new prospecting for natural resources in outer space is about to start. Once asteroid 
capture operations become available, man can start bringing back mineral resources from 
these celestial bodies to the Earth. However, these exploration exercises remain costly and 
inefficient at the current stage. However, given that energy and natural resource scarcity 
has become a global issue, and countries do possess ambition to develop feasible 
technologies in that regard, such issues may become another topic in the governance of 
space commerce.  In November 2015, the U.S. Congress passed the Commercial Space 
Launch Competitiveness Act in which it give the right to mine asteroids, extends America’s 
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commitment to the International Space Station (ISS). The new law aims to facilitate the 
start-up of private space companies domestically. It also requires that US authorities specify 
the way that asteroid mining will be regulated and organized which will surely become 
sooner or later a new international issue because the issue is related to the 1967 OST and 
the ‘failed’ Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (known as the Moon Treaty) that turns jurisdiction of all celestial bodies over to the 
international community. So, all activities must conform to international law, including the 
UN Charter.  
3. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
We have showed that there is a continuous “space race” on the military space capability 
primarily between the two Cold War powers, and then added by a number of spacefaring 
and emerging countries, toward a global course for national space capability building. 
Further to this popularization of space activities and the liberalization of the space economy, 
the issues of global space governance have simultaneously expanded its primary security-
focused issue area toward other issue areas, such as space for safety, space for economy and 
development, and space for environmental and generational sustainability. We note that the 
growth and the shifts of focus on different space related issues over time have been highly 
politicized. In a word, although the vital input for progress in human space activities comse 
from the scientific community and from industry, it has depended on the will of states to 
gather massive means and personnel to develop some focused areas, and particularly for 
military uses. This strategic mindset has affected space rulemaking when states, due to their 
functional necessity, initiated or were compelled to establish international space laws and 
institutions. In the space security arena, e.g. the segmented nuclear proliferation regimes 
related to space security and safety, and the long-lasting terminological debates regarding 
the “peaceful use”, “militarization”, and “weaponization” of outer space, were initiated when 
the space powers had exhausted their technical tests then changed their interpreting 
stances toward these vague legal terms. They were compelled to change their strategic 
attitude when the general safety issue prevailed, for example after the Chinese ASAT test 
that generated massive space debris in orbit. The legitimacy of protection general interests 
overwrote individual state interests. However, this did not cause any state to cease the 
course of their competition on the military space capability. For both military capability and 
space commerce, states were compelled to create an international institution to settle 
attribution matters on satellite orbital slots and radio frequency. Nonetheless, the rules 
were not perfectly conformed with other space governing principles, such as free access to 
outer space for all states. From the early space age onwards, such legal inconsistencies178 
have often resulted in international space rules and institutions being inapplicable and 
dysfunctional. The nuance embedded in the legal inconsistency and the lack of verification 
or implementation tools has also engendered hurdles for the later established regimes. 
More details will be discussed in Chapter III.  
Further to the situational changes after the Cold War, such ambiguity has not been reduced. 
In contrast, the situational changes strengthen this governing ambiguity because of the 
intensified dual-use of outer space. The dual-use of space technologies and their 
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applications stimulated more and more states and non-state actors to take part in space 
activities and also to influence the international space rule making. It sparked more issue-
linkage in the use of outer space and the intensified the interconnection between the space 
related regimes complex toward other issue-areas governing realms for safety, economy 
and development, and ecological and generational sustainability in which they also 
respectively consist of numerous international regimes dedicated to their individual 
focused issue-areas.  
Figure 6. The evolutionary interconnection between space issue area toward other issue areas    
 
                                                                                                                                                          Source: Author’s creation 
Figure 6 is a visual tool to summarize the shifting interconnecting trend of the different 
major space governing issues over time. Space security issues (red circle) continue to 
occupy a completely dominant position that embedded the space economy (blue circle with 
dashed border line) and space safety (yellow circle with dashed border line) issues in its 
coverage. After the Cold War, although the situation had changed this did not destabilize the 
dominance of the space security issue within the entire space governance framework. 
Nonetheless, both space safety and space economy moved to expand their coverage toward 
its broadened safety and economy rather “space for economy” (blue circle) and “space for 
safety” (yellow circle), for example search & rescue, aviation navigation, and space for 
economy, for example e-education, e-health and enabling industrialization. The new 
governance domain that became interconnected with space governance issues is space for 
sustainability. The issue linkage between space and this issue-area have grown due to the 
rise of ecological and generational sustainability concerns. 
Figure 7 demonstrates a holistic model that the growing issue-linkages between different 
issue-areas governance constellations, e.g. A. regime constellations for space related 
regimes, B. safety related regime constellation, C. development and economy issues 
governing constellation, D. sustainability issues, etc., in the general global governance 
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dimension. The respectively A, B, C, etc… continuously grew their own governance 
architectures toward each other. The institutional interactions among A, B, and C also 
increased over time. When the overlap occurs, different types of institutional interplay can 
be expected according to regime complex theory. In our case study, it is essential to first 
complete the puzzle of the jungle where those small woods of different issue area naturally 
or artificially grew, embedded, interconnected with each other. Afterward, we would be 
able to see where the forest of the space regime complex stands.   
Figure 7. The growing overlapping regime constellations of different issue areas 
  
                                                                           Source: Author’s creation 
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CHAPTER III THE LEGAL GOVERNING PRINCIPLES & 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE TREATIES 
Abstract: Chapter III is dedicated to highlighting the role of the legal governing principles 
prescribed in the UN resolutions as well in the international treaties with which the entire 
global space governance architecture was founded and able to be developed. These legal 
principles and international conventions with the emphases on the “non-appropriation of”, 
“free access to”, and then the undefined “peaceful use of” outer space were mostly 
negotiated and concluded under UN auspices in the hostile circumstance in the Cold War. 
The existence of these legal regimes counter-proved the sui generis of human space 
activities because they have progressed in an ambiguity where states, primarily especially 
the powerful ones and then the ones who seek power, continued to maximize their space 
capabilities for both military and civilian utilities, to exploit such strategic and public 
common goods for their own national interest, and to choose either compete, cooperate or 
both with other states to avoid conflicts. To satisfy all different states’ concerns, these legal 
instruments were all expected to be concluded in sequence yet often resulted in political 
compromises that created the derived regimes, which do or do not correspond to its 
original ideal. This generated a legal inconsistency content-wise, and a path-dependence 
whenever new rules were mooted. In addition, because of the popularization of human 
space activities and the liberalization of space-related trade exchange after the Cold War, 
these legal frameworks became outdated vis-à-vis the changing international politics, the 
rapid progress in space technologies and the new socio-economic perspectives for now and 
for the future. To update and upgrade these legal regimes is necessary yet requires 
thorough work to review and to elaborate all the relevant legal texts. And mostly 
importantly, it requires the political willingness of all states to agree on both the content 
and the procedure for any revision of the existing legal regimes. Otherwise, creating 
substituting regimes are also explored as alternatives. These subsequently provoked the 
expansion and fragmentation of the global space governance architecture into a regime 
complex.  
                                  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the human space activities only began in the 1950s, the endeavors to improve the 
space technologies and the applications have been intensified to satisfy people’s desires to 
conquer the “High Frontier” of the sky, air, or outer space. Historically, the discovery of the 
orbital dynamics following Nicolaus Copernicus’s De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (1543) 
made the exploration of space imaginable. Then Johannes Kepler was the first to 
successfully model planetary orbits to a high degree of accuracy, publishing his laws in 
1605. In 1687 Isaac Newton published more general laws of celestial motion in his 
Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica. As from the first successful manned flight, 
Gliders, conducted by German engineer Otto Lilienthal between 1891 until his fatal flight in 
1896, a new era to explore the third dimension – airspace – finally began. Hence, individual 
and collective scientific and engineering efforts supported by industries continued to 
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improve aviation engineering designs, navigational instruments and radio communication 
technology.  
During World War II, states, particular the Western countries increased their interests to 
innovate the aviation vehicles, radio communication instruments and computing 
technologies for military utilities. These sophisticated instruments were developed to go 
higher, farther, faster and with better accuracy in order to destroy the targets. After World 
War II, many outstanding German scientists and engineers moved to the US or the Soviet 
camp and continued improving the technologies they had developed during the war.179 
These scientists contributed to building the space capability for both the Soviet Union and 
the US toward their space powers. Hence, building space capability also became one of the 
national policy goals. And as a matter of fact, only states possess the political authority and 
sufficient means to mobilize thousands of specialists, allocate capital-intensive financial 
supports to construct large and costly infrastructure to build up adequate space capabilities, 
naturally mainly military.  
As the course of technological progress brought human activities from the land, to the sea, 
and then to the air, the delimitation of the national boundary where states can exercise and 
control these activities have always been the utmost concern for countries. The same 
concerns arose from human space activities. In this regard, the issue of national “space 
sovereignty”, or the ownership of outer space, and the question how to use outer space in 
peacetime, were the main concerns for all states. Since the military use of the air extended 
to “space” or “outer space”, powerful states had a particular interest in establishing 
international rules and operational standards in order to avoid mutual harmful interference 
in peacetime. The immediate internationalization of space rulemaking after the launch of 
the Soviet Sputnik in 1957 was one of the discernible evidences. In another word, the 
governance realm of space rulemaking is also an arena or an instrument with which states 
try to maximize their power and interests. 
Since 1963, the UN has adopted several space-related resolutions and then succeeded in 
concluding a number of international treaties. The Declaration on Legal Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (known as the Declaration of 
Legal Principles)180 in 1963 and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (often 
shortened to Outer Space Treaty - OST)181 concluded in 1967 were the two fundamental 
legal regimes that led the entire space governance architecture to its expansion and for its 
consolidation. These legal regimes, on the one hand, showed a bright side that states 
demonstrated their belief or good will to reduce conflict in the human space activities 
throughout the rule of law. On the other hand, the existence of these legal regimes counter-
proved the sui generis that the human space activities have always been progressed in an 
ambiguity in which states, especially the powerful ones and then the ones who seek power, 
continued to maximize their space capabilities for their national security and interest to 
exploit such “strategic goods” also “public goods” for their own interests, and often 
deliberately chose the method, either compete, cooperate or both to interact with other 
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states for such conflict reduction. In this Chapter, we will outline the foremost legal regimes 
created to solve the key areas of conflict in international human space activities. We also 
pinpoint that many of them were imperfect due to lacking of authoritative definition on the 
key terms and the absence of verification and control instrument to implement them. 
Because of these imperfections, the legal inconsistence continuously appeared when 
developing further implementing instruments and regulating institutions.       
 
2. THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES OF SPACE GOVERNANCE 
 
2.1. THE QUESTION OF NATIONAL SPACE SOVEREIGNTY 
When effective aviation technologies became available for cross-border military and civil 
operations, the international lawyers also became interested in the issue of air governance, 
or more precisely the governance of air space. Basic questions were raised: who owns the 
air space above the states? And, how should the owner use this air space? The same type of 
questions were equally raised when states began to develop space activities. 
In a pioneering study182 the French lawyer Paul Fauchille in 1901 argued that the air 
(airspace), like the high seas, is free, a res nullius not subject to effective occupation and 
control by the subjacent state and as res communis open to everyone’s use. Fauchille 
claimed that the “freedom of air (air space)” – including traffic and radio communication – 
was to be considered to be in the public and commercial interest of all nations. The 
Englishman Westlake further defined the state’s sovereign right in the use of such common 
subject should be viewed based on a rather functional and technical approach. Westlake also 
refined the subject ‘air’ that its basic element of concern should not be air (aer, in Greek, 
means more the air we breathe) but the air space (coelum in Latin) of the state. He induced a 
future delimitation of air(-space) based on the doctrine of cujus est solum ejus est usque ad 
coelum (et inferos) that private rights attached to real estate also extend above (and below) 
the surface of the earth, so that the territorial power of the state extended ‘from heaven to 
hell’.183 The argument allowed the ownership of airspace to be attributed to states 
according to their terrestrial boundaries. The primordial need is obviously to assure 
national sovereignty and security by assuming the superjacent airspace. And he elaborated 
the “freedom of air” or “res communis” into the cases of innocent passage of aircraft (similar 
to the innocent passage of navigation in the sea) over the state. In other words, certain 
airspace should be viewed and used neutrally. 
During the two World Wars, the belligerent states mutually destroyed adversary aircraft. 
These aircraft, lacking a technical legal definition, could be used for military or civil 
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purposes depending on their operators’ and users’ desires.184 Thus, protecting the national 
airspace as the national “complete and exclusive sovereignty” raised the concerns from both 
the belligerent countries and the neutral states. Complete and exclusive national airspace 
sovereignty naturally protects the belligerent’s own controlled national superjacent 
airspace, yet restrains their flights going to and passing through the airspace of other 
countries. Neutral states, often lacking sufficient capacity to control their own airspace, 
naturally preferred the legal protection of their airspace sovereignty for their national 
security and territorial integrity via the legal protection of the national airspace (Zollmann, 
1927;185 Jessup & Taubenfeld, 1959;186 Schick, 1961187). The ‘sovereign airspace’ was 
adopted in both the “Convention on the regulation of Aerial navigation” signed in Paris in 
1919 (often abbreviated to “Paris Convention”) and the “Convention with Other 
Governments Respecting International Civil Aviation” signed in Chicago in 1944 (the 
Chicago Convention). It was stated in article 1 of both air conventions that “the contracting 
state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air-space above its territory”.188  
There is an ambiguity, or a legal inconsistency, in both the Paris and the Chicago Convention. 
The two treaties were primarily initiated to establish rules for commercial air navigation, so 
the res communis doctrine should be privileged. However, both treaties explicitly emphasize 
national airspace sovereignty and demonstrate the preference of the states for the 
sovereignty doctrine. Yet the legal delimitation of the national airspace is fundamentally 
vital for civilian aviation traffic control and aviation safety management. Whereas both 
treaties have also incorporated – without legal qualifications or authoritative definition – 
the countervailing res communis principle by stipulating that “international aerial 
circulation is free” with the condition that “each contracting state undertakes in time of 
peace to accord freedom of innocent passage above its territory to the aircraft of the other 
contracting states”. 189  Pépin 190  and Shawcross 191  noted, the res communis doctrine 
translated as “freedom of air traffic” only aimed at mitigating disputes in the realms of civil 
use of airspace. In practice, knowing that radio communication, aviation, and then 
communication satellites and remote sensing technologies operating through the interface 
of the airspace – res communis could harm a country’s military and economic security, the 
questions about when and how to refine the use from the ‘res communis-sovereign air space’ 
or ‘civil-military’ nexus merely depends on states’ goodwill rather than the international 
agreements which were often without a means of verification and enforcement. Indeed the 
reality is, a country may, by international agreement, assume responsibility for controlling 
parts of international airspace, such as those over the oceans. For example, the US still 
provides air traffic control services over a large part of the Pacific Ocean, even though the 
airspace is international. As for wartime and peacetime, countries in conflicts have not 
hesitated to challenge or “violate” each other’s sovereign airspace. 
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When the use of outer space became an international issue, the principal question of a 
state’s national vertical sovereignty over “air until space” was naturally raised. The 1963 
Declaration of Legal Principles resulted in outer space being classified as a new medium as 
res communis to be explored and used “for the benefit and in the interests of all mankind” 
(Principle 1). Outer space is “free for exploration and use” (Principle 2), and especially “not 
subject to national appropriation” (Principle 3). A legal answer with technical definition 
over the national “space sovereignty” was given though kept more questions in practice.       
 
2.2. NON-APPROPRIATION OF OUTER SPACE 
The 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space (Declaration of Legal Principles)192 attained one of the space 
governing principles on “non-appropriation of outer space”. This legal principle noted 
reached based on opinio juris generalis because it was not ought to be in its nature, but in 
the general consensus that states subsequently denied their sovereign rights over outer 
space.193 The two space powers desired mutually restrain their national power expansion 
toward the use of space. The others, with no space capability, agreed to renounce their 
sovereignty over outer space. This question about the ownership of, or the rights to use 
outer space was minor important due to the fact that most of the states have no capability to 
exercise such sovereign rights.  
Legally, the exclusive sovereign use of outer space provides jurisdiction protection to 
protect state’s national security and the national integrity. But it remains difficult to obtain 
political consensus on demarcating where the exclusive sovereignty effectively starts and 
stops though a physical boundary between the atmosphere and outer space has been 
practically accepted as the Kármán line lies at an attitude of 100 above the Earth’s sea level. 
Technically speaking, besides of the spacecraft in geostationary orbit, other spacecraft 
orbiting in the low level orbit are continuously flying over the subjacent territory of states, 
the extension of national sovereignty to outer space would therefore have neither the same 
effect, nor the same way for assessment as the terrestrial sovereignty effects. In this line, the 
exclusive space sovereignty has less effective means, and especially the great majority of 
states remain incapable of protecting their outer reaches of space superjacent to their 
territory. The question on “whither exclusive and complete sovereignty” in the international 
space laws therefore seemed little relevant to the practical and technical levels of global 
space governance. 
Nowadays, with all the growing interests in (re)conquering the Moon, exploring Mars, and 
mining comets, the “right of exploitation of outer space” is thrown into question. To a 
certain extent, states’ agreement on the principle of the non-appropriation of outer space 
indicated their preference to preserve outer space as a sanctuary free from any occupation 
rather than controlled by a few space powers. The non-appropriation principle seems to be 
challenged by the lately updated US commercial space legislation, the Space Act of 2015,194 
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passed in November 2015. The full name of the act is Spurring Private Aerospace 
Competitiveness and Entrepreneurship Act of 2015. By arguing that the legal principle of 
“non-appropriation” was only applicable to “states” in the international space treaties, this 
updated US law explicitly allows “US citizens to engage in the commercial exploration and 
exploitation of 'space resources' [including ... water and minerals].” The right does not 
extend to biological life, so anything that is alive may not be exploited commercially. The Act 
further asserts that "the US does not [(by this Act)] assert sovereignty, or sovereign or 
exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the ownership of, any celestial body.” It would be 
interesting to see further reactions from other space powers, namely Russia, China and the 
European Union, that have not explicitly expressed their stances yet might share the same 
view on the advantages about competitiveness when their individual space mining 
capability will attain the same level as the US.    
         
2.3. PEACEFUL USE OF OUTER SPACE 
In the previous chapter, we have already addressed the issue of the “peaceful use of outer 
space” as one of the long existing problematic issues of global space governance. From the 
legal regime aspect, the “peaceful use of outer space” has also been criticized for its 
absence of authoritative definition, lacking of international verification and control 
capability. The cleavage between the Soviet Union and the Western camp at that time was 
sharply clear through these comments. The debate reported in the fifteenth session of the 
UN General Assembly in 1961 on the issue of the placement of weapons in outer space 
pinpointed this lack of political willingness to solve the problem.   
The US delegate observed that ‘the primary obstacle in the way of disarmament 
negotiation, including the use of outer space for peaceful purpose only, in the past 
fifteen years had been the profound difference in purposes between the Soviet 
Union and the Western nations, and the resulting distrust.’  
A Polish delegate stated that ‘his delegation could not understand why the 
Western powers had not responded to the appeal by Soviet Premier Nikita 
Khrushchev, who had stated his willingness to accept any Western suggestion 
concerning control, if the Soviet Unions’ proposals on disarmament were accepted 
as well’.  
Ten years after the US skies disarmament proposal, the “peaceful use” was legally inked in 
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, notably in Article III and Article IV. Article XI. ‘States Parties to 
the Treaty shall carry on activities in exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the 
United Nations, in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting 
international cooperation and understanding’. The interpretations of this legal term of 
“peaceful use of outer space” were, as was discussed in Chapter II, divided, with if being 
read as “non-militarization” by the Soviet side, but as “non-aggression” by the US. The OST 
eventually provided one way to concretize the peaceful use of outer space defined in its 
article IV to prohibit the states parties to ‘place in orbit around the Earth any objects 
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carrying nuclear weapons or any kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons 
on celestial bodies, or station such weapons in outer space in any manner’. But the “space 
weapon” stimulated another terminological debate. All in all, since the term “peaceful use of 
outer space” was launched and then codified, no progress has been made in resolving the 
problem of legal inconsistency. Nonetheless, all states have incorporated the term into their 
political discourses and emphasize the term to justify their declarative acts whenever they 
are involved in dealing with space-related issues. 
 
2.4. THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE TREATIES 
Prior to the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles, a series of preparatory resolutions relating 
to global space governance were gradually endorsed by the General Assembly of the UN. 
They were the UN resolution 110 on the “measures to be taken against propaganda and the 
inciters of a new war”195 in 1947, and the UN resolution on “principles of international 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space”196 in 1961. The declarative UN resolutions 
were not legally binding, but rather represented a collective affirmation of the guiding 
principles to which the member states proposed to adhere. Four years after the adoption of 
the 1963 Declaration of Legal Principles, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”, OST) was endorsed in 1966 under UN auspices. It entered into 
force in 1967 .  
The Outer Space Treaty reaffirmed the principles of “non-appropriation”, “free access and 
use of outer space for all states”, “the rule of law governing method”, and concretely 
prohibited to place in orbit around the Earth or station on the Moon and other celestial 
bodies any objects carrying nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, 
the OST bans neither the use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other 
peaceful purposes, facilities necessary for peaceful exploration, nor the use of any equipment 
or facility necessary for peaceful exploration of the Moon and other celestial bodies (Article IV, 
OST). Technical guidelines for international cooperation in outer space, like astronaut 
rescue assistance, the state’s responsibility for national activities in outer space, 
requirement for the information regarding State’s space activities, avoidance of harmful 
contaminants and also adverse change in the environment of the Erath, were set out in the 
OST. Nonetheless, the OST remained imperfect in the views of some states. The OST marked 
the beginning of an era that saw a significant amount of political will aimed at the adoption 
of formal legal instrument.197 Hence a series of international treaties were gradually 
established and endorsed by the UN. The legal regimes step by step defined the legal space 
governing principles, norms and rules, and attributed the institutional labor division (see 
Chapter VI) under the auspices of the UN.  
In parallel with the positive side, a year later than the entry into force of the Outer Space 
Treaty, the Soviet delegation already expressed their disappointment regarding the slow 
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progress of the Legal Sub-committee of the COPUOS in providing a ‘definition of outer space’ 
which was deemed vital ‘to harmonize the principle of state’s sovereign rights over its 
airspace and its security needs with the desirability of easy access to outer space for peaceful 
purposes of exploration and development’. In addition to the Soviet critics, the French 
delegation expressed their reservation about a lack of verification and sanction to prevent 
the excesses or abuse of the freedom in the utilization of outer space. The fact was judged 
hard to understand. 198  
After the Outer Space Treaty, other generic treaties were soon established by the UN 
General Assembly. These were the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of 
Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Rescue Agreement”, 
1968).199 The Rescue Agreement elaborates on elements of Article 5 and 8 of the OST, 
provides that states shall take all possible steps to rescue and assist astronauts in distress 
and promptly return them to the launching state, and that states shall, upon request, 
provide assistance to launching States in recovering space objects that return to Earth 
outside the territory of the launching state.200 The Convention on International Liability for 
Damage Caused by Space Objects (“Liability Convention”, 1971)201 entered into force in 
September 1972. The Liability Convention elaborating on Article 7 of the OST provides that a 
launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its 
space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft and liable for damage due to its faults 
in space. The Convention also provides for procedures for the settlement of claims for 
damages.202 The Rescue Agreement and the Liability Convention were concluded and had 
minor impact on international politics, especially since at the moment of negotiating and 
concluding these treaties, there were only a few states that possessed spacecraft or had 
ongoing manned space missions. Nowadays, the two space treaties have become more 
important for non-state actors since they continue increasing their weight in the human 
space activities in the trends of the popularization of space capability and the liberalization 
of the global space economy. The Liability Convention has been criticized with 
complications.203 As a matter of fact, over the years only 9 or 10 states with sufficient space 
launch capability have launched other states’ spacecraft and commercial payloads into orbit. 
Mostly, these launching states have made a bilateral or multilateral agreement with the 
client states and companies about liability issues. The issue was often resolved via 
international or private arrangements. Nonetheless, the definition of launching state 
remains a legal lacuna. 
After the OST, the Rescue Agreement and the Liability Convention, a mechanism that 
provided states with a means to assist in the identification of space objects was created as 
the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space (“Registration Convention”, 1976)204. 
The Registration Convention was considered and negotiated by the Legal Subcommittee 
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from 1962 onwards. It was only adopted by the General Assembly in 1975 and entered into 
force on 15 September 1976. As launch registration was closely connected with national 
security and commercial secrecy, states were bound to register their launches yet might 
well time the moment of registration in light of particular national security and commercial 
petition concerns. Because of this, it took almost a decade after the 1967 OST for parties to 
negotiate and ratify it. The Registration Convention expanded the scope of the UN Register of 
Objects Launched into Outer Space which had been established by resolution 1721B(XVI) in 
December 1961 and addressed issues relating to states parties responsibilities concerning 
their space objects. The Registration Convention evoked serious military and commercial 
concerns from governments, the private sector and also scientific communities.  
After President Kennedy’s famous “Moon speech” in 1962, the US invested tremendous 
efforts into funding and developing the Apollo program between 1962 and 1972. The US 
Moon program, happening as it did during the Cold War, not only demonstrated the 
superpower status of the US but also signaled a victory in the international astropolitical 
arena. The Agreement on Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (“Moon Agreement”)205 was signed in 1979 and only entered into force in 1984 for 
the ratifying parties. The Moon Agreement aimed to prevent the Moon from becoming an 
area of international conflict due to the benefits which may be derived from the exploration 
of the natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies. The other ambition of the 
Moon Agreement was to establish an international regime for human activities on the Moon 
and other celestial bodies. The Moon Agreement, following all principles of the previous 
treaties, had no jurisdiction definition on the nature of the Moon or other celestial bodies, 
but provided principles about how to use them. Up to now, only thirteen States have ratified 
the Agreement, and four have signed but not ratified. In 2012 Turkey became the 8th 
country to accede and the 17th party to the Agreement. Following the end of the Apollo 
Program, no further Moon exploration activities took place. NASA only recently successfully 
landed the Mars rover “Curiosity” in 2012. However, as mentioned formerly, space 
capabilities have been moving towards “space mining” activities on the Moon, Mars and on 
comets or other celestial bodies, which could potentially pose new challenges to the existing 
Moon Treaty.        
 
3.5. OTHER UN ADOPTED RESOLUTIONS & DECLARATIONS  
Apart from the above UN-endorsed space treaties, the UN General Assembly has adopted 
resolutions that support the existing body of international space law. These UN resolution 
consist of the Principles Governing the Use by States of Artificial Earth Satellites for 
International Direct Television Broadcasting (Broadcasting Principles)206  in 1982 was 
undertaken after the successful trials of direct broadcasting by satellite (DBS) made 
broadcasting satellite services (BSS) operational in some space-faring countries. Queries to 
establish international rules to regulate the forthcoming commercialization of BSS were 
raised. As BSS are transmitted by satellite in specific frequency bands, a need to allocate 
frequency zones by region was urged. Actually already in 1977, the International 
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Telecommunication Union (ITU) had adopted an international BSS Plan under which each 
country was allocated specific frequencies at specific orbital locations for domestic service 
segmented by regions. The UN Broadcasting Principles in addition dealt with the principle of 
non-intervention on the allocated frequency by all parties, as well as human rights, namely, 
the rights to freedom of expression and information. It also took consideration of the 
possible political, social, and economic impact further to BSS commercialization. 
Maintaining international peace and security interests as well as assistance with 
educational, social and economic development to developing countries were all included in 
the resolution with respect to the political and cultural integrity of all states. 
In 1986 the UN General Assembly also adopted a resolution on the Principles Relating to 
Remote Sensing of the Earth from Outer Space (Remote Sensing Principles).207 The resolution 
of Remote Sensing Principles was aimed at strengthening international cooperation in the 
use of this technology for the purpose of improving the management of natural resources, 
land use and the protection of the environment, and was to benefit and be in the interests of 
all countries, while also taking into consideration the needs of developing countries. The 
principle of non-discrimination with regard to data sharing was stressed to reach the goal of 
protecting the Earth’s natural environment and mankind from natural disasters. It was the 
first time, more than two decades on from the Declaration of Legal Principles in 1963, that 
the environmental protection issue appeared explicitly in an agreement relating to outer 
space.  
With the fear of the radioactive fallout from the atmosphere and space from the use of 
nuclear weaponry in outer space, the USSR, the US and the UK reached an international 
agreement on the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) in 1963. The LTBT prohibits nuclear tests 
and any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere or in space. Hence, the nuclear power 
sources (NPS) for use in outer space are supposed to be developed and used when specific 
space mission requirements and constraints on electrical power and thermal management 
are precluded. Further to the accidents at Three Mile Island (1979) and Chernobyl (1986), 
the UN in 1992 adopted a resolution on the Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power 
Sources in Outer Space (Nuclear Power Source “NPS” Principles).208 The aim of the NPS 
Principles was to “protect individuals, populations and the biosphere against radiological 
hazard” (Principle 3.1(a)). Like all other UN resolutions, it was, in a word, soft law. It was 
not until the year 2009 that the COPUOS, together with International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), published the UN-IAEA Safety Framework for NPS applications in outer space. As 
mentioned in Chapter II above, there are remaining risks that several emerging space 
nations, often in conflict with some other states, have had no opportunity to test their 
“space weapons” with or without nuclear warhead. Because of this, the legal restraints of 
international law may not suffice to dissuade their attempt. 
The Declaration on International Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for 
the Benefit and in the Interest of All States, Taking into Particular Account the Needs of 
Developing Countries (Benefits Principles209 or International Cooperation Principles)210 was 
adopted in 1996. It urged all member countries to fairly and reasonably undertake 
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international space collaboration to bridge the gap between space-faring and non-
spacefaring countries. The concerns about the legitimate rights and interests of the parties, 
namely intellectual property rights were emphasized. It also mentioned that international 
space cooperation could be conducted by countries through governmental, non-
governmental, commercial and non-commercial, global, multilateral, regional or bilateral 
mechanisms in the effective and appropriate modes. The Benefits Declaration promoted the 
international space cooperation to further develop space science and its applications, 
fostering relevant and appropriate space capabilities in interested countries, and facilitating 
the exchange of expertise and technology among states on mutually acceptable basis. 
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS    
This chapter outlined the legal principles on governing the space relating issues established 
either in form of the non-binding UN resolutions or the international treaties with law force. 
The declarative UN resolutions were not legally binding, but rather represented a collective 
affirmation of the guiding principles to which the member states proposed to adhere. These 
governing principles with the emphases on “space sovereignty”, “non-appropriation of”, 
“free access to”, and then the “peaceful use of” outer space, were negotiated and agreed in 
the hostile circumstance of the Cold War. These resolutions and space treaties were decided 
when there were only a few powerful states with space capability and owned strong 
influence when these space rules were decided. The rest of the world possessed no physical 
capability but only meaningful legal right to the space activities. Subsequently, these legal 
regimes demonstrated the entire space governing legal framework has been progressed in 
an ambiguity where states, primarily especially the powerful ones and then the ones who 
seek power, continued to maximize their influence n space rule-making and to deliberately 
choose either compete, cooperate or both with other states to avoid conflicts. To satisfy all 
different states concerns, these legal instruments could only be negotiated and concluded in 
a sequential progress yet often resulted in political compromises. As a result the derived or 
the following regimes did not correspond to the original ideals, presenting a problem of 
legal consistency between these related legal regimes. 
Further to the conclusion of the OST and the other space treaties, the problem of legal 
inconsistency continued to appear with the absence of legal definitions over the same terms, 
such as “peaceful use”, that led to further debates on state “militarization” and 
“weaponization” of outer space. The reality of “free access” of states to outer space 
remained that most of the countries depend on only a few states with space launch 
capability to launch their national spacecraft into orbit. The unrealistic definition of the 
“launching state” created various legal complications when the liability of the responsible 
state required to be clarified if the launch follows the legal procedure of registration. To 
resolve such continuous legal inconsistence, as well as to deal with the new situations, e.g. 
the growing popularization of the human space activities and the liberalization of space 
related trade exchange after the Cold War, these out-of-date legal frameworks and their 
implementation institutional instrument were inquired for reform, change or to be 
substituted. This subsequently led the global space governance architecture not only to its 
expansion but also fragmentation – regime complex. 
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CHAPTER IV THE INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL 
SPACE GOVERNANCE 
The aim of Chapter IV is to present the existing institutional architecture of global space 
governance. Because of the dual-use nature of space activities, since the establishment of 
the UN Committee on the peaceful use of outer space (COPUOS) in 1958, the “labor division” 
of global space governance was artificially split into two distinct governing dimensions, 
space security and the “peaceful use” of outer space. The former aimed at reducing the 
political tension to prevent war by focusing on the avoidance of an arms race in and through 
the states’ space activities. The latter put forward the “peaceful” applications of the space 
technologies which can benefit all mankind in the domains of safety, socio-economic, 
cultural heritage preservation, and assuring ecological sustainability. The discussions and 
negotiation about space security governance have been undertaken outsides of the UN 
multilateral forum, such as the Conference on Disarmament, and very often between the 
space powers themselves, for example the Limited Test Ban Treaty between the Soviet 
Union and the United States. By contrast, the governing issues about the “peaceful use” were 
structurally attributed to be discussed and negotiated in the different UN specialized 
agencies, such as the ITU, the WMO, the ICAO, the IMO, the ICG, the IAEA, and, the FAO, the 
UNESCO, and others. The COPUOS plays the key role to propose the targeted task labor 
division and coordinate the inter-institutional coordination. Many of these multilateral 
mechanisms were not directly related to matters of space governance primarily but have 
become gradually connected with space activities because the progress of space 
technologies and the applications increasingly affected their mandated governing missions. 
For example, when creating the COPUOS, the ITU and the WMO were explicitly mandated by 
the UN General Assembly to oversee the technical regulating issues relevant to the radio 
frequency allocations and the international cooperation on weather research respectively. 
The ICAO, the IMO, and the ICG are connected due to the navigation safety issues. The FAO 
and the UNESCO were also involved when the satellite communication and remote sensing 
technologies are increasingly used for smart farming and cultural heritage preservation. 
The inter-institutional interactions have intensified after the Cold War in the popularization 
of space activities and the liberalization of space economy. The intensified inert-
institutional linkages through space activities are constructive if the structural mission 
labor division and the inter-institutional coordination attain its adequacy. Otherwise, the 
fragmentation of the entire governing structure can affect the good functioning of the 
connected institutions caused by respective mandates of, the overlapping membership in, 
and the distinct policy decision-making procedure between different relevant institutions. 
Consequently, the inter-institutional interactions weaken the governing outcomes and 
ought to be harmonized. 
In this chapter, we follow the artificial labor division made from the early space age, and 
will firstly decipher the inter-institutional interactions in the governing dimension of the 
“peaceful use” of outer space where the functional necessity and organizational factors have 
a more significant impact on the evolution of international regime change. However, it does 
not mean that states’ political and strategic calculations have no effectiveness on leading 
these regime changes. Space security governance will be discussed in Chapter V.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
As the use of outer space is a particularly sensitive subject and covers wide ranges of human 
activities and related political issues, e.g. security and national defense, safety, socio-
economic development, environmental protection, and scientific research and technologic 
innovation, it has created unique governance challenges for the international community. 
Because of this, issues relating to space governance were immediately internationalized by 
global consensus. Since the creation of the ad hoc UN Committee on the peaceful use of 
outer space (COPUOS) in 1958, the history of global governance of outer space use has been 
marked by the splitting of the “space security” and the “peaceful use” of outer space due to 
the dual-use nature of space technologies and applications.  
Space security issues continued to be negotiated mainly in the Geneva-based non-UN 
Conference on Disarmament (CD) as well as in the First Committee of the United Nations, in 
which the UN member states discuss disarmament and international security matters. The 
CD and the UN First Committee are distinct international regimes which have overlapping 
member states and distinct decision-making procedures. Splitting the space security 
matters from the “peaceful use” of outer space issues has hardly reached satisfactory 
outcomes over time. The powerful space nations’ national security and strategic interests 
continuously dominated the policy discussion and international agreement negotiations. 
Actually, it has often been impossible to get certain issues on to the agendas of the 
multilateral forums. Because of this, states continuously proposed new initiatives to either 
retail the general space security issue to numerous sub-categories in order to complete the 
entire package at the end, or to elaborate the old and new issues, namely space arms race 
avoidance, space “militarization”, space “weaponization”, “ASAT weapon” issues, and the 
lately raised safety problems caused by space debris, into a comprehensive deal. We will 
discuss this in more detail in the following chapter.  
Regarding the issues of the peaceful use of outer space, the COPUOS became the unique 
platform at the global level to monitor and to discuss issues concerning the international 
cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, studying space-related activities that could be 
undertaken by the United Nations, encouraging space research programs, and studying 
legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space. The COPUOS was instrumental 
in the creation of the five treaties and five principles of outer space. Yet, as from 1962, other 
UN specialized agencies, such as the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) were respectively entrusted with 
international cooperation on atmosphere science, and the safety regulation and source 
allocation related to satellite use. Hence, such inter-institutional interactions were even 
formally created. These long-established international regimes do not deal with space 
affairs only but have their own missions. As specialized agencies of the UN, they share a 
certain degree of membership overlap but do not share either the same governing approach 
or the same vision on these interconnected issue governance. Furthermore, they have 
different decision-making procedures from each other.  
After the Cold War, the popularization of national space capability development and the 
liberalization of space economy, the governance dimension has been expanded toward the 
ever larger connections with other global issue areas related to safety, to socio-economic 
development, to ecological and generational sustainability, and also international trade. The 
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issue-linkages by nature involved a myriad of established and new specific international 
regimes to jointly deal with the new situations related to space governance. Accordingly, the 
entire architecture of global space governance became even more diffuse and fragmented. 
The architectural expansion and fragmentation of the entire global space governance 
scheme should not be necessarily destructive. However, it can be constructive if the 
technical labor divisions can be coordinated and harmonized with political good will. So far, 
this has not often been the case alongside the global space governance construction. 
 
2. UN AGENCIES RELATING TO THE “PEACEFUL USE” OF OUTER SPACE 
 
2.1. THE COMMITTEE ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF OUTER SPACE (COPUOS)  
At the global space policy-making level, it is the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer 
Space (COPUOS) that deals with non-military outer space-related issues. At the thirteenth 
General Assembly in 1958, the UN established an eighteen-member Ad Hoc Committee on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).211 The Ad Hoc COPUOS become a permanent 
committee since 1959 and serves as a particular body to discuss international space 
cooperation related issues and provides recommendations to consolidate international 
cooperation in the line of peaceful outer space uses. COPUOS was requested by the General 
Assembly to address the question of the nature of legal problems which may arise in the 
carrying out of programs to explore outer space at the time. Several priorities, like 1) 
freedom of exploration and use in outer space; 2) liability for injury or damage caused by 
space vehicle; 3) allocation of radio frequencies; 4) avoidance of interference between space 
vehicles and aircraft; 5) identification and registration of space vehicles and coordination of 
launchings; 6) legal problems involved in the re-entry and landing of space vehicles were 
reported to the Assembly. COPUOS also designated “non-priority” questions on the matter 
of where outer space begins and sovereign airspace ends; protection of public health and 
safety, safeguards against contamination; questions relating to exploration of celestial 
bodies; and avoidance of interference among space vehicles. The studies of COPUOS paved 
the way for the establishment of several UN space treaties. The Committee reports to the 
Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, which adopts an annual resolution on 
international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space.  
Between 1959 and 2015, COPUOS membership has grown from its original 24 to 77 and it is 
now one of the largest Committees in the UN.212 COPUOS has 34 Permanent Observers 
(OOSA, 2015)213 from space-related intergovernmental organizations, regional space-
related forums and organizations, NGOs, multilateral entities and space law institutions. The 
principal focus of COPUOS is on non-binding, technical approaches to security in space. With 
the two subcommittees, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee and the Legal 
Subcommittee, the missions of COPUOS are to review the scope of international cooperation 
                                                             
211 UN General Assembly, Resolution 1348 (XIII), December 13, 1958. 
212 UN Office for Outer Space Affairs, Cit. 
213 http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/members/copuos-observers.html 
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in peaceful uses of outer space, to devise programs in this field to be undertaken under UN 
auspices, to encourage continued research and the dissemination of information on outer 
space matters, and to study legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space.214 
 
2.2. UN OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE AFFAIRS (UNOOSA)  
The UN Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA) is the United Nations office responsible for 
promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space. UNOOSA serves as 
the secretariat for COPUOS and deals exclusively with international cooperation in the 
peaceful uses of outer space. The Office has two sections: the Space Applications Section, 
which organizes and carries out the UN Program on Space Applications, and the COPUOS, 
and the Committee (COPUOS), Policy and Legal Affairs Section, which provides substantive 
secretariat services to the COPUOS, its two COPUOS subcommittees and its working groups. 
The Policy and Legal Affairs Section also prepares and distributes reports and publications 
on international space activities and on international space law. It prepares and distributes 
reports, studies and publications on various fields of space science and technology 
applications and international space law.  
The UNOOSA is located at the United Nations Office at Vienna, Austria and responsible for 
implementing the Secretary-General's responsibilities under international space law and 
maintaining the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into Outer Space. Through the 
UN Programs on Space Applications (UNISPACE I, II, II), UNOOSA conducts international 
workshops, training courses and pilot projects on topics that include remote sensing, 
satellite navigation, satellite meteorology, distance education and basic space sciences for 
the benefit of developing nations. It also maintains a 24-hour hotline as the United Nations 
focal point for satellite imagery requests during disasters and manages the UN Platform for 
Space-based Information for Disaster Management and Emergency Response (UN-SPIDER). 
Additionally, UNOOSA is the current secretariat of the International Committee on Global 
Navigation Satellite System (ICG). 
 
2.3. UN BODIES RELATED TO THE SPACE ACTIVITIES FOR SAFETY  
Although the COPUOS is considered as the only UN body dealing with the space relevant 
issues, it actually needs to coordinate and cooperate with other UN specialized agencies on 
specific matters, or vice versa. Because of this, the major mandate overlaps and institutional 
interconnection lie mainly in the areas of international cooperation for safety, socio-
economic develop and cultural heritage preservation via space activities. To these 
categorizations, there are UN specialized agencies for safety, such as ITU, ICG, ICAO, IMO, 
are respectively dedicated to space resource attribution and the avoidance of radio 
interference, inter GNSSs interoperability and compatibility, aviation and maritime traffic 
controls and safety measures, and IAEA for nuclear safety regulations.  
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    2.3.1. THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU) 
Space resources like radio frequencies and satellite orbital slots are indispensable but 
limited resources for all space systems operations. Without adequate an interval between 
orbiting satellites, the safety of states’ space assets and the operations of the space systems 
will be at stake. In 1959, the International Telecommunication Union amended its Radio 
Regulations to add definitions for earth stations, space stations and initial space services, 
thereby beginning to address space communications matters. In 1963, the ITU convened its 
first space conference – the Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference to Allocate 
Frequency Bands for Space Radiocommunication Purposes – to start the process of 
allocating spectrum to radio services. In this Conference, the ITU decided that 
administrations, naturally including GNSS service providers, would obtain access to 
spectrum and orbital resources on a per request basis, subject to following the provisions of 
the Regulations and not causing harmful interference to stations of other countries duly 
recorded in the Master International Frequency Register (MIFR) or the Master Register. 
Hence, the ITU oversees satellites access to the geostationary and other orbits through 
management of the coordination process, maintenance of the MIFR, and the allocation of 
radio spectrum to radio services.  
The ITU, which was established in 1932 and distantly originated in the International 
Telegraph Union founded by Napoleon III of France in 1865, became one of the UN’s 
specialized agencies in 1947. The ITU is governed by a series of conventions that are 
reviewed at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences every four years. These conventions 
determine the general ITU policies. By 2015, the ITU has a membership of 193 countries 
and almost 800 private-sector entities and academic institutions.215 Since 1963, the ITU 
started its mandates of the allocation of global radio spectrum and satellite orbits, 
development of the technical standards that ensure networks and technologies seamlessly 
interconnect, and commitment to improving access to ICTs for under-served communities 
worldwide. Precisely, it is the Radiocommunication Sector of the ITU (ITU-R) was entrusted 
to coordinate the assignments of orbital and radio frequency spectrum amongst operators, 
and to set up and implement “rational, equitable and efficient”216 regulatory rules to the 
concerned parties. 
Retrospectively, the geostationary orbital (GSO) allocation issue was not the mandate of the 
ITU but a part of the Outer Space Treaty (OST) negotiation handled through the UN COPUOS. 
The geostationary orbit (GSO) is an area at an altitude of around 36,000 km from the 
equator of the earth and has a radius of 42,000 km in space. The GSO allows a satellite to 
remain in orbit over a single point on the earth’s surface because of the gravitational pull of 
the Earth, the Moon, and other planets. The radius of GSO is expansive, yet it only allows a 
limited number of satellites to be hosted. This limitation is because, while occupying a slot 
in space, a satellite requires a specific radio frequency in the electromagnetic spectrum. 
These radio frequencies must be different and the satellites must be a certain distance apart 
so that there is no interference between the different transmissions. The GSO became vital 
when most telecommunications, broadcasting, weather, and navigation satellites must park 
in an orbit over a specific point of the earth. In order to avoid interference among these 
satellites, the issue of orbital slot allocation became connected with the issue of the satellite 
                                                             
215 International Telecommunication Union (ITU), http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx, 
2015/12/24. 
216
 ITU, http://www.itu.int/ITU-R/index.asp?category=information&rlink=itur-welcome&lang=en 
72 | P a g e  
 
radio frequency spectrum. With the increase of national authorities and commercial firms 
that all require available orbital slots and satellite radio frequencies, the governance also 
faces significant challenges to ensure space sustainability and security.   
The 1985 and 1988 sessions of the Space World Administrative Radiocommunications 
Conference (WARC) established a system built around the principles of equity and 
efficiency to manage geostationary (GEO) satellite slots and radio frequency allocations. In 
practice, this is based on the “first-come, first-served” request/acquisition order but also 
with an a priori allotment system that every ITU member state is granted for an allotment of 
nominal orbital position and relevant satellite frequency. In the 1992 ITU Plenipotentiary 
Conference in Geneva, the ITU established the radiocommunication sector (ITU-R) to adopt 
the detailed rules, procedures, and standards for ensuring interference-free use of radio 
frequencies and orbital positions and their routine implementation. As was discussed in 
Chapter II above, the ITU’s “first-come, first-served” rules and the “a priori” allotment 
system for the satellite slot allocation have evoked considerations that the developed 
nations have already established a virtual monopoly in the occupation of geostationary slots, 
leaving very few opportunities for the upcoming developing countries (Rao, 2003).217 While 
developing countries have alternate means of providing services related to communication, 
disaster management, meteorology, education, health and management of natural resources, 
many of them however can solely depend on their own or available space assets for these 
vital applications. The ITU has been pursuing reforms to address slot allocation backlogs.  
Signal conflict and interference is another issue for the ITU to regulate. Intentional satellite 
signal jamming cases have been known, for example the Eutelsat vs. Iran case in 2011.218 
Nonetheless, the disputes concerning the government restricted frequency overlay between 
the different global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) such as the stand-off between the 
US GPS M-code and the European satellite Galileo Public Restrict Signal (PRS)219 and the 
frequencies disputes since 2010 between China’s BeiDou (Compass) and the EU’s Galileo 
PRS, the ITU has claimed for its lack of effective mandate to intervene.   
 
2.3.2. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE 
SYSTEMS (ICG) 
The GNSSs are the most popular use of outer space, for purposes that range from farming to 
banking. The GNSSs technologies and applications can improve a country’s infrastructure 
for urban areas, rural and remote areas and people’s daily lives with e-education, e-health, 
e-government, and other e-services via satellites. Possessing capabilities of manufacturing 
GNSS-relevant products and being able to operate GNSS services also help countries to stay 
on the track of continuous industrial and commercial modernization, so to economic growth. 
For this, the UN COPUOS in 2001 established the Action Team on Global Navigation Satellite 
Systems with the voluntary participation of 38 Member States and 15 organizations. The 
                                                             
217 Rao, U.R. (2003) Space benefit Security. Pugwash Meeting 283, Pugwash Workshop on Preserving the Non-
Weaponization of  Space, 22-24 May 2003.   
218 Space News. Broadcasters Call for ITU Action on Satellite Jamming by Peter B. de Selding, 9 December 2011; 
Associated Press, EU Sanctions Prompt Eutelsat To Block Iranian Broadcasts. 15 October 2012.    
219 Space News. EU, China Schedule December Meeting on Navigation Dispute by Peter B. de Selding, 9 
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Action Team on GNSS subsequently led to the establishment of the UN International 
Committee on GNSS (ICG) to promote the enhancement of universal access to and 
compatibility of space-based navigation and positioning systems in order to improve the 
efficiency and security of transport, search and rescue, geodesy and other activities.  
The origin of the ICG establishment was addressed at the Third UN Conference on the 
Exploration and Peaceful uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE-III) in 1999 that the world should 
seize significant opportunities for human development through advances in space science 
and technology. Thus, the UN General Assembly endorsed “The Space Millennium: Vienna 
Declaration on Space and Human Development” adopted by UNISPACE-III specifically for 
enabling space technology providing PNT services.220 The Vienna Declaration called for 
action, notably to improve the efficiency and security of transport, search and rescue, 
geodesy and other activities by promoting the enhancement of, universal access to and 
compatibility of space-based navigation and positioning systems. Consequently, the UN 
invited GNSS and augmentation system providers to consider establishing an international 
committee on GNSS in order to maximize the benefits of the use and applications of GNSS to 
support sustainable development in 2004.221 In 2005, the UN established a separate body 
completely devoted to GNSS – the International Committee on GNSS Navigation Satellite 
(ICG) for which UNOOSA acts as Executive Secretariat.222  
In this dissertation, we use the governance of GNSSs as a case study, and more detailed 
discussion on this topic will be undertaken in Chapter VI. 
 
        2.3.3. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO)  
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is the UN agency promoting the safe 
and orderly development of civil aviation worldwide, developing international air transport 
standards and regulations and the medium for cooperation in all fields of civil aviation. With 
Annex 10 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation (1944 Chicago Convention), ITU 
has been dedicated to setting standards for the communications, navigation, 
surveillance/air traffic management (CNS/ATM) system and utilizes satellite technology for 
its ICAO CNS/ATM Systems and to bear the compelling importance of the Aeronautics 
Telecommunications Network (ATN). ICAO applies satellite technologies to distribute 
meteorological data, supports communications in remote and oceanic air spaces, also used 
for support of search and rescue services, and global navigation coverage for all phases of 
flight. Therefore, ICAO is involved in the UN Inter-Agency activities such as implements the 
World Area Forecast System in co-ordination with WMO, enhances aircraft emergency 
locator systems in co-ordination with the International Satellite Systems for Search and 
Rescue (COSPAS-SARSAT)223 and International Maritime Organization (IMO), develops 
                                                             
220 Resolution 54/68, UN General Assembly, December 6, 2001.  
221 Resolution 59/2, UN General Assembly, July 31, 2004. 
222  UNOOSA (2011) 10 Years of  Achievement of  the United Nations Global Navigation Satellite Systems, New York: 
United Nations.  
223 The COSPAS-SARSAT Program Agreement was signed in 1979 by Canada, France, the former USSR 
Russia and the US and declared operational in 1985. The program aims at providing accurate, timely, and 
reliable distress alert and location data to help search and rescue authorities assist persons in distress. 
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Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) in co-ordination with IMO, and works on 
spectrum issues in co-ordination with ITU and IMO. 
As for directly space-related issues, the ICAO Assembly adopted Resolution A32-19 in 2001, 
the Charter on the Rights and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services (GNSS Charter) 
which originated from a proposal at the ICAO Council in 1995 to set up a legal Framework 
(of conduct) with regard to GNSS. The current ICAO policy is that the GNSS should be 
implemented as an evolutionary progression from existing global navigation satellite 
systems, including the United States' global positioning system (GPS) and the Russian 
Federation's global orbiting navigation system (GLONASS), towards an integrated GNSS 
over which Contracting States exercise a sufficient level of control on aspects related to its 
use by civil aviation.224 As global space power balance changes, an International Civil 
Aviation Organization for Outer Space has already taken place in the academic discussions. 
It noted that the GNSS Charter would not be totally destitute of effect in establishing certain 
obligations for States to perform. It becomes, however, a reckonable force in international 
relations, if not at international law, particularly since ICAO resolutions are highly 
persuasive and carry much political leverage and could pave the way for an international 
convention that is binding on States’ Parties (Abeyrante, 2004:198).225 
A future issue that ITU may be concerned with is space flight safety standard setting. 
Viewing the rapid international commercialization of outer space, in particular in the field 
of telecommunication, there is more and more interest and activity regarding navigation 
and launch services from the private sector of commercial human spaceflight, such as the 
American SpaceX, Russian International Space Station (ISS) cargo and space travelling 
shuttles and facilities, and ambitious space tourism projects such as Virgin Galactic or the 
alleged Mars One expedition recruitment project. The widening range of financial 
commitments and business risks will make outer space more crowed, congested and 
competitive. There seems great promise about the further commercial potential of outer 
space for the world economy. The safety risks will also become real and growing. 
International cooperative efforts are, therefore, required to balance the multiple 
commercial interests in outer space with internationally agreed and nationally enforceable 
safety and risk-mitigation standards. That would be necessary to develop technical space 
standards for global use to deal with the commercial space safety issues, like launch and 
ground-processing hazards, orbital and suborbital flights safety such as avoiding orbital 
debris, space traffic management and accidents in outer space that impact other spacecraft, 
and additionally, risks from spacecraft re-entering the atmosphere and landing. It noted 
that ICAO is for instance better placed to merging air space and outer space security and 
safety issues, along with commercial and trading issues including market access and 
competition (Abeyratne, 1997:192). 226  It appears that the International Standards 
Organization (ISO) had attempt to develop space standards for global use to deal with the 
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commercial space safety issues. So far, the ISO mission is aimed to develop industrial 
standards to facilitate international commerce but not safety.227   
 
2.3.4. INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) 
The International Maritime Organization (IMO)228 originated from the Inter-Governmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization (or IMCO) within the United Nation on the basis of a 
convention adopted in Geneva in 1948. The IMO Convention entered into force in 1958, 
which led to the formal establishment of the Organization a year later. IMO changed its 
name from IMCO in 1982. It provides a machinery for co-operation among Governments in 
the field of governmental regulation and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds 
affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and encourages and facilitates the general 
adoption of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime safety, 
efficiency of navigation and prevention and control of marine pollution from ships. 
In 1973, IMO decided to establish a new maritime communication system based on satellite 
technology. In 1976, the IMO Council adopted the Convention on the International Maritime 
Satellite Organization (IMSO), together with an Operating Agreement. The Convention 
defines the purpose of setting up an International Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) 
as being to improve maritime communications, thereby assisting in improving distress and 
safety of life at sea communications, the efficiency and management of ships, maritime 
public correspondence services, and radiodetermination capabilities. The Operating 
Agreement set an initial capital ceiling for the Organization of US$ 200 million. Investment 
shares were determined on the basis of utilization of the Inmarsat space segment. Inmarsat 
began operations in 1982. The 1994 amendments changed the name of the International 
Maritime Satellite Organization (Inmarsat) to the International Mobile Satellite 
Organization (IMSO). The change reflected evolution since the organization was formed and 
the extension of its services from the maritime sector to other modes of transport.  
In 1998, Inmarsat's Assembly of member Governments agreed to privatize Inmarsat from 
April 1999. The new structure comprises two entities: Inmarsat Ltd229 – a public limited 
company which forms the commercial arm of Inmarsat. The company has taken on all the 
commercial activities of Inmarsat and was completely privatized in 2003. The other entity 
became International Mobile Satellite Organization (IMSO)230 – an intergovernmental body 
established to ensure that Inmarsat continues to meet its public service obligations, 
including obligations relating to the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS). 
IMSO is an observer at IMO meetings. IMSO aims at guaranteeing that services are provided 
by Inmarsat Ltd. free from any discrimination and in a peaceful way to all persons living or 
working in locations that are inaccessible to conventional, terrestrial means of 
communication. IMSO also ensures that the principles of fair competition are observed.   
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2.3.5. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA)  
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was created in 1957 in response to the 
deep fears and expectations resulting from the discovery of nuclear energy. Its fortunes are 
uniquely geared to this controversial technology that can be used either as a weapon or as a 
practical and useful tool. The IAEA's genesis was US President Eisenhower's “Atoms for 
Peace”231 address to the General Assembly of the United Nations on 8 December 1953. 
These ideas helped to shape the IAEA Statute, which 81 nations unanimously approved in 
October 1956.232 As for the year 2015, total IAEA membership attains 168 countries. The 
(IAEA) has a mandate to develop nuclear safety standards and, based on these standards, 
promotes the achievement and maintenance of high levels of safety in applications of 
nuclear energy, as well as the protection of human health and the environment against 
ionizing radiation. To the same regard, IAEA is the UN entity to regulate nuclear safety in 
outer space. Practically, IAEA also uses satellite data to observe nuclear infrastructure 
(Balogh, 2012: 204-205) for security concerns.  
In space, a primary risk on board the satellite comes from the material that composes the 
different forms of nuclear power sources (NPS), basically plutonium and uranium. These 
sources of energy contain large amounts of radioactive material and require adherence to 
stringent safety requirements (Bouvet, 2004:210).233 The risk involved in the use of this 
source of energy for space mission, from the time of the launch, through the injection into 
orbit, and during the life of the spacecraft around the Earth, or during its trip into deep 
space. The first mission that launched a spacecraft powered by radioactive material into 
space took place in 1961 by the US Navy. The former Soviet Union, now Russia, and France 
have also conducted experiments and operations with the same technology. Nowadays, 
nuclear sources have often been used to serve space mission requirements that cannot be 
covered by other sources of energy, namely solar energy. The current Mars Rover “Curiosity” 
depends on nuclear energy sources instead of solar power to fuel its mission of the first two 
years as well as to drill rocks in the red planet.  
There were two well-known space nuclear accidents in 1978. The Soviet satellites Cosmos 
954 and Cosmos 1402 caused no impact near human presence, but dispersed radioactivity 
in the high atmosphere over the ocean. A working group was established within the 
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of COPUOS soon after the Soviet Cosmos 954 
accident in 1978 that pushed two space nuclear safety conventions that were adopted on 
September 26, 1986: the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 
(Notification Convention) and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear 
Accident or Radiological Emergency (Assistance Convention). The Conventions assign IAEA 
a mandate to be notified of an accident and to communicate the accident to those States 
which are, or may be, physically affected, and coordinates emergency assistance amongst 
those States. The space nuclear safety issue continued to raise concerns and led to the 1992 
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Principle Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space (NPS Principles) 
under the form of a UN Resolution, a non-binding legal document” (Bouvet, 2004:203).234 
 
2.4. UN BODIES RELATED TO SPACE FOR SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The space technologies and their applications, in particular satellite telecommunication, 
satellite navigation, and remote sensing technologies, became vital to support the UN socio-
economic development goals and targets, such as the Sustainable Development (Rio+20), 
Millennium Development Goals235 and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC). The services provided via different types of space systems support the 
applications to improve the essential human daily activities from farming to banking. The 
satellite telecommunication is practical to support the e-education, e-health and e-
government and e-commerce activities in the remote geographical regions. The satellite 
remote sensing technologies became indispensable to monitor environmental situations, so 
are vital to protect the Earth’s environment, support natural resources management 
(Agenda 21),236 mitigate disaster risk (Hyogo Framework for Action: Building the Resilience 
of Nations and Communities to Disasters)237 and bridge the socio-economic gaps between 
developing and developed countries.  
There are for instance twenty-six various UN agencies and entities, listed in the “Directory 
of Organizations of the UN Coordination of Outer Space Activities”,238 applying space 
facilities under different banners of the UN goals. The following UN specialized agencies are 
increasingly dependent on space systems to attain their missions related to “space for socio-
economic development”: the World Meteorology Organization (WMO), the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nation 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the World Bank, the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). With their respective organizational missions, 
their member states negotiate and lead collective actions with space applications.  
 
2.4.1. WORLD METEOROLOGY ORGANIZATION (WMO) 
The World Meteorology Organization (WMO) was one of the two UN specialized agencies 
that were assigned to deal with the atmosphere research matters together with the COPUOS 
and the ITU since 1958. WMO includes 191 member states and territories, in pursuit of its 
normal tasks regarding the atmospheric sciences, has become involved in space-related 
activities in 1950 and has been mentioned in virtually all the UNGA resolutions on space. Its 
tasks have included the application of meteorology to weather prediction, the development 
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235 The Millennium Development Goals, UN Millennium Declaration, Millennium Summit, 2000.   
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of international atmospheric observation and telecommunication networks, and the 
promotion of research. Weather and atmosphere information depending on Earth 
observation (EO) technologies is crucial for farming and fishery activities, aviation and 
maritime navigation safety, for ordinary peoples’ daily convenience, and indispensable for 
military operations and national defense.     
In 2009, WMO endorsed a Space Program with a 2025 Global Observation System (SOS) 
vision plan.239 The vision plan includes a nominal configuration and a global contingency for 
EO satellites. It promotes availability and utilization of satellite data and products for 
weather, climate, water and related applications for WMO members and to create a Global 
Observation System (GOS). It aims to leverage an “end-to-end system” for weather and 
climate services, which ranges from capturing of data, over calibration to quality control, 
dissemination and user-training. To realize this global plan for operational GEO and LEO 
satellites, WMO undertakes consultations among its members and satellite operators within 
the Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites (CGMS) by calling for global 
collaboration on the enhanced data sharing, interoperability and integration; data 
homogeneity and traceability. Success of such GOS vision plan will depend on the good will 
of all stakeholders as well as close coordination with ITU and its members since the 
technical integration of the potential GOS are again linked with radio frequency spectrum 
and satellite slot allocation issues240 for which only ITU has the mandate with its own 
member states and policy decision-making procedure. 
 
2.4.2. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION (FAO) 
The UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) was founded in October 1945 with a 
mandate to raise levels of nutrition and standards of living, to improve agricultural 
productivity, and to better the conditions of rural populations to the growth of the world 
economy. The intergovernmental organization has 194 Member Nations, two associate 
members and one member organization, the European Union. The FAO has its headquarters 
in Rome and is present in over 130 countries.241  
FAO started using space technology applications in the early 1970s and has its own 
Environmental and Natural Resources Service (SDRN). The SDRN contains remote sensing, 
geographic information system (GIS), agrometeorology, environment, and energy programs. 
The ultimate mission of the FAO SRDN is to assist member states in developing necessary 
capacity to ensure the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of earth observing technologies for 
inventorying, managing natural resources, monitoring of environment and impact 
assessment at various levels for food security and sustainable agriculture. Under the 
aforementioned UN goals, FAO has involved the World Bank for a Regional Environmental 
Information Management Projects in Central Africa since 1996 for environmental 
monitoring programs. For climate change issue, FAO participated the World Climate 
Program since 1979, became a member of the Inter-Agency Committee on the Climate 
Agenda and works actively with international bodies such as United Nations Framework 
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Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Inter-governmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and WMO. As for its use of the Earth observation data, FAO has been participating in 
the work of the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) as an associate member. 
FAO is, jointly with UN Environmental Program (UNEP), UNESCO and WMO, a founding 
member of the Global Terrestrial Observation System (GTOS) to provide policy makers, 
resources managers and researchers with decision support tool and access to the data 
needed to detect, qualify, locate, understand and warn of changes (especially reduction) in 
the capacity of terrestrial ecosystems to support sustainable development. UNEP and FAO 
are using Earth Observation data to assess the status of Earth environment and to monitor 
food security (FAO, 1999242). 
The new FAO mission is to achieve food security for all to make sure people have regular 
access to enough high-quality food to lead active, healthy lives. As stated in the contribution 
of COPUOS to Rio+20 on the topic of harnessing the use of space-related geospatial data for 
sustainable development, the Committee pointed out to the space-related geospatial data 
would strengthen decision-making in many sectors, including in agricultural and food 
security. Selected areas where the UN entities use space technology for agricultural 
development and food security cover monitoring agricultural production, biodiversity, 
water and irrigation, oceans and mariculture, land use mapping, forestry and forestry 
monitoring, vegetation fires, desertification, droughts, floods, adverse weather conditions, 
disasters, food security, and humanitarian operations (IAMOS, 2013). 243  
With the deployment of operational telecommunication satellites and the launches of 
civilian Earth observation (EO) satellites which have been used to monitor and forecast 
weather for farmers and to monitor crop development to help predict agricultural outputs 
in advance, EO information becomes crucial in assessing vulnerability and managing food 
security. 
It is worth mentioning that the data retrieved from the satellite remote sensed geographic 
information system (GIS) over the territories or water of countries are equally important 
information for military operations, and for natural resource mining exploration. This 
information is legally protected to a certain extent, though it remains available for a fee. The 
space data sharing and data commerce issue can be at large related to the IPR issues or to 
the international trade matters. 
 
2.4.3. UN EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO) 
The mandate of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) is to foster international cooperation in the fields of education, science, culture 
and communication, and to assist in narrowing the gap in those areas between the 
developed and developing countries. This organization has 195 members and 10 associate 
members. The UNESCO headquarters is in Paris. 
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UNESCO promotes the free flow of ideas by word and image and, as a strategy, focuses on 
the application of communication and information technologies for development, 
democracy and peace. UNESCO’s space related activities aim to bring the benefits of space 
technologies to developing member states. In 1972, the UNESCO General Conference 
proclaimed a Declaration of Guiding Principles on the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the 
Free Flow of Information, the Spread of Education and Greater Cultural Exchange.244 In 
1974, UNESCO and the World Intellectual Property Organization jointly convened the 
conference on the Convention relating to the distribution of program-carrying signals 
transmitted by satellite (also known as the 1974 Brussels satellite Convention). The 
Brussels Satellite Convention put forward the problem in the Field of Copyright and of the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations Raised 
by Transmission via Space Satellites held at Nairobi (Kenya) from 2 to 11 July 1973. The 
Convention Relating to the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by 
Satellite was opened for signature on 21 May 1974 in Brussels and entered into force on 25 
August 1979. As of 2014, the convention has been ratified by 37 states; there are 10 other 
states that have signed it but have not yet ratified it.245 
Nowadays, UNESCO demonstrates that space can significantly contribute to science, 
education, culture and communication. They are also designed to create awareness among 
member states by showing the full potential of space technologies for the well-being of 
humanity. UNESCO recent space activities are mainly committed on three areas: 1) supports 
the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) building, 2) enhances the Earth Observation 
capacity building and 3) implements the Open Initiative on the Use of Space Technologies to 
Support the World Heritage Convention.      
1) In 2009, the Global Ocean Observing System (GOOS) is created to become the over 
arching coordination tool for the observation systems. The implementation of GOOS is 
through Joint WMO-IOC 246  Technical Commission for Oceanography and Marine 
Meteorology (JCOMM) which works with national agencies coordinating deployment of 
instrumentation systems. JCOMM has an operational office in Toulouse, France and WMO 
partner offices in Geneva, Switzerland. The data and information needs of GOOS are 
satisfied by the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Data and Information Exchange, which is 
headquartered in Oostende, Belgium. UNESCO is supporting the ocean science research in 
this inter-agencies program.     
2) In 2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development and the G8 launched in 2002 a 
call for action in order to create an infrastructure that will interconnect a diverse and 
growing array of instruments and systems for monitoring and forecasting changes in the 
global environment. The Group on Earth Observation (GEO) was launched in response to 
this call with the aim of coordinating efforts to build the Global Earth Observation System of 
Systems (GEOSS), the structure that proactively links together existing and planned 
observing systems around the world and support the development of new systems where 
gaps currently exist. It promotes common technical standards so that data from the 
thousands of different instruments can be combined into coherent data sets. UNESCO has a 
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close collaboration with the GEO and is currently a member of two committees established 
by GEO to guide the implementation of the 10-Year plan: the Science and Technology 
Committee and the Capacity Building Committee.  
3) Space technologies, implemented by a large network of UNESCO space partners, are 
assisting the famous World Heritage sites. For some of these sites the monitoring is 
extremely complex: the sites are very large, some are impossible to access, for this purpose 
Earth Observation from space is a valuable added tool to assist heritage managers in these 
very complex monitoring tasks. It was in 2001 that the European Space Agency (ESA) and 
UNESCO began working on an international call to all space agencies, space research 
institutions and the space private sector, to assist the World Heritage Convention. In 2003, 
at the Paris Air Show in Le Bourget (France), UNESCO and ESA signed an agreement to 
encourage the use of Earth observation satellites to monitor cultural and natural World 
Heritage sites. The Open Initiative Convention aims to develop a framework of co-operation, 
open to all types of space partners, in order to assist developing countries in managing and 
protecting their natural and cultural heritage with the benefits of space technologies. Its 
objective is to use space technologies and the data they can provide to monitor these sites, 
thus allowing local authorities to identify potential threats, such as land use changes that 
could place the sites in danger, in time for them to elaborate and implement mitigation 
strategies. The Open Initiative has today over 50 space partners mainly space agencies, 
space research universities and private sector space companies. 
 
2.4.4. UN BODIES DISTANTLY RELATED WITH SPACE TECHNOLOGY & 
APPLICATIONS 
There are also UN entities that play a supportive role or are distantly related to space 
applications within the UN system, such as the World Bank. The World Bank has the world's 
largest source of development assistance and uses its financial resources, highly trained 
staff, and extensive knowledge base to help each developing country onto a path of stable, 
sustainable, and equitable growth in the fight against poverty by means of the use of space 
applications and building capacity for space technologies. 
The World Health Organization (WHO) uses remote sensing space technologies to trace 
trans-border epidemics, as well as satellite communication to provide e-health medical 
facilities to remote areas and to coordinate international health work.  
As was mentioned above, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and UNESCO 
jointly convened the Conference on the Brussels Satellite Convention in 1974.  WIPO is 
responsible for the promotion and protection of intellectual property throughout the world 
through cooperation among states and, where appropriate, in collaboration with other 
international organizations, and for the administration of various treaties dealing with 
intellectual property rights related to space technologies.  
There is an emerging regionalization on space capability development cooperation inspired 
by the successful joint force between the EU and the European Space Agency. The Japan-led 
Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF), the China-sponsored Asia Pacific 
Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO) has become increasingly important in building 
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and consolidating the foundation of global space governance. Nonetheless, they are also 
considered as the new instruments for certain states to demonstrate their power in regional 
geopolitics and astropolitics. We will discuss this further in Chapter VI.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The establishment of COPUOS was the historical milestone that states agreed to 
institutionalize the international cooperation related to space activities of a dual-use nature. 
The appearance of COPUOS, pinpointed the organizational logic by which states and the 
international institutions themselves – UN, ITU, WMO – pushed the comprehensive 
governance structure toward fragmentation. Due to the individual strategic calculations of 
the two space powers, the UN member states could not attain a general agreement on 
creating a comprehensive regime over all space-related issues. The resulting institutional 
compromise chosen was to split up the space-relevant governing issue area into two sub-
categories, that of “peaceful use” of outer space and that of security-related issue areas. This 
primary politicized organizational choice was developed on the following institutional labor 
division within the UN space governance structure.  
By nature, the institutional choice of promoting the “peaceful use” of outer space 
throughout international cooperation has advanced some steps toward a number of UN 
targeting goals, namely in the domains of space for safety, socio-economic development and 
environmental sustainability as we presented in this chapter. Yet, the sounding labor 
division did not change the dual-use nature of the space activities. It did not modify the 
competitive character of such strategic instruments, perhaps because states are all keen to 
deploy them to maximize their interests. As a result, promoting the popularization of space 
capability toward all countries, particularly the developing countries, remains in 
accordance to the good will and concrete space capability supports from the space powers 
and the spacefaring nations. Concretely, these space powers, spacefaring countries and 
emerging space nations only support other countries’ space capability development if their 
strategic and economic interests and functional necessity can be fulfilled. COPUOS and other 
UN specialized agencies related to space issues have no political power, financial means or 
technical capability but organizational scheme to promote these costly and highly technical 
targeted goals. Such point will be further developed in our GNSS governance case study in 
Chapter VI.      
As regarding the subcategorized governing dimension on the “peaceful use” of outer space, 
although COPUOS became the unique platform at the global level to monitor and to discuss 
the issues about the international cooperation in peaceful uses of outer space, the other UN 
specialized agencies, namely the ITU and the WMO, remain autonomous from each other 
and COPUOS with their respective institutional mandate and issue focuses and strategic 
approach, different decision-making methods from each other. The same pattern continued 
in the interconnection between COPUOS and OOSA and a number of existing and newly 
established UN specific institutions that have become connected with the space matters 
over time. Figure 8 shows the general landscape in the global space governance architecture 
under UN auspices.  
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As Figure 8 shows, the institutional architecture of UN space governance was split up to two 
governing issue areas, that of disarmament and security, or effectively the “space security” 
issues, and the other, the socio-economic dimension, or the international cooperation on the 
“peaceful use” of outer space. In the realm of disarmament and security, it is the First 
Committee that is mandated under the UN auspice. Yet most of the space security have been 
discussed and negotiated in the non-UN Conference on Disarmament (CD). By contrast, in 
the realm of “peaceful use” of outer space, since the foundation of the COPUOS and OOSA  
(olive green pillar) which are specialized in dealing with space issues, the regimes 
constellation continued to expand its scale by involving other UN specialized agencies from 
the pillar of “space for safety“ (orange pillar) that consists of ITU, ICAO, IMO, ICG and the 
IAEA, the pillar of “space for socio-economic development” (apple green pillar) that made 
connection with WMO, FAO, UNESCO and WHO, the pillar of economic governance (blue 
pillar) which implicated the institutions, namely WIPO and World Bank. There are naturally 
other pillars, such as the two issue areas that are increasingly connected with space 
governance, namely “space commerce” and Earth Observation (EO) for environmental and 
sustainable development.  
Figure 8.  An architectural overview on the global space governance institutions  
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achievement to their targeted goals will depend upon the use of space technologies and 
applications. Therefore, the two governing dimensions, shown as “clouds”, are included in 
our figure of UN institutional governing architecture. 
As the main focus of this chapter and the entire dissertation was to prepare an introductive 
“analytical narrative” to our further in-depth case studies, we have here only highlighted the 
discernible institutional interactions between those institutionalized UN specialized 
agencies connected by their common involvement in issues relating to space governance. 
Without having sufficient time to deepen our discussion of the complications or the causes 
of each institutional interaction, we could not identify if the architectural fragmentation has 
been affected because of the particular patterns, such as “membership overlap”, “forum 
shopping”, “mission creep”, “nested, parallel and overlapping regimes”, and so forth, 
according to the regime complex theoretical framework. By contrast, it was evident that, 
within an established governance scheme such as the UN auspice, the organization logic has 
led the institutional labor division on the basic of technical criteria of space related affairs 
governance. Such labor division, considered natural and necessary, constantly affected not 
only the expansion of but also the fragmentation of the entire space governance. As noted 
formerly, the creation of and the role COPUOS plays is a counter proof to such a viewpoint. 
COPUOS is a significant and veritable intermediary to conciliate the world of space for peace 
and that of space for security. The existence of COPUOS demonstrated the efforts and 
political willingness of space powers and spacefaring nations can be effective under the UN 
scheme, particularly and explicitly in the realms of “peaceful uses” of outer space for safety, 
socio-economic and environmental sustainability. Although on the basic of vague governing 
principles, establishing governance institutions to negotiate and implement technical and 
operational regulations and standardizations are possible. This labor attribution of 
“peaceful use” space governance looks absolutely constructive. However, COPUOS is neither 
by nature nor by law a world space regime for all space issues. It has constantly borne the 
burdens and challenges of harmonizing cooperation and coordination between all the UN 
agencies that have become involved in the overarching space governance arena. In these 
cases, COPUOS ought to depend on the core yet partly responsible space governing bodies, 
such as ITU, ICG, ICAO, IMO and IAEA to come to technical arrangements. In another word, 
such labor attributions are perfect in its organization meaning, but imperfect in the 
practical sense. Finally, COPUOS has no mandate when it comes to security issues in space. 
As most of the space governing challenges came from its dual use nature, in many cases, the 
success of governance is heavily dependent on the political willingness of a few states to 
combine their strategic calculations and functional necessity. An ideal collective governing 
goal has often totally failed or was derived from its origin design. These points will be 
further discussed in the next two chapters.                              
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CHAPTER V REGIME COMPLEX OF SPACE SECURITY 
GOVERNANCE 
Abstract: In this chapter, we will study the space security regime complex by first 
reviewing the changing meanings of ‘space security’, which has shifted from its initial 
military aspect to its current broadened reading elaborating security, safety and 
sustainability senses. By recognizing that the evolution of space security governance has 
been heavily influenced by the four key space powers’ strategic mindsets over time, we 
briefly introduced the respective space security policy line and capability building path of 
these space powers to illustrate their views and desires about space security and the 
governance on this issue. The different national readings on “space security” subsequently 
led these powers to institutionalize space security regimes by differentiating the governing 
tasks to the particular focused categories, such as nuclear proliferation in space, “space 
militarization”, “space weaponization”, and more recently space security at large. Over time, 
various regime institutionalization initiatives were proposed, either under UN auspices, or 
at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) but hardly successfully due to the tension between 
the space powers. Some regimes were established without adequate verification and 
enforcement measures. In order to repair the existing regimes, states chose to resolve these 
imperfections by proposing new overlapping or parallel regimes. It consequently thrust the 
entire global space security governance architecture toward expansion and fragmentation – 
a regime complex. In the second part of this chapter, we will analyze the morphogenesis of 
such space security regime complex based on the notion that a regime complex was led by 
intersecting strategic, functional and organizational driving forces. In our analytical 
narrative overview, we briefly indicate some discernible regime interplay cases according 
to the regime complex theoretical framework. Finally we present some policy reflections 
that aim to improve the inadequacy in the space security regime complex. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The early focus of human space activities was on developing military space capabilities, 
namely by the two Cold War space powers that paradoxically aimed to maintain 
international peace and security. The two military space powers also foresaw that the 
internationalization of regulating space issues was necessary or inevitable because the 
human space activities, especially the satellite and its technological applications, would 
surely become greatly applied for military and civilian telecommunication, TV broadcasting, 
weather forecasting and navigation. So, the space governance framework was established 
through the United Nations with an artificial division of the uses of outer space for security 
and for peace.  
In the realm of international cooperation for the “peaceful use” of outer space, as we have 
discussed, the construction of the global space governance scheme has been undertaken 
under the UN auspice driven by a strong labor division mindset. By contrast, the governance 
on space for security was not included in the UN framework and has constantly met failures 
and regular standoffs in its slow progress. It was clear from an early stage that the two 
space powers and the spacefaring countries desired to keep their powers and controls over 
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space matters for their own national security and interests. It was beneficial if they held the 
power on space capability transfers and to influence the orientations international space 
governance progressed. By their own or with the oligarchy of a few states, better with their 
political and security allies, the arena of space for security or “space security” governance 
developed. Further to the popularization of general space capabilities and the liberalization 
of the space economy after the Cold War, space activities became even more congested, 
contested, and competitive 247  between space powers and spacefaring countries and 
expanded from the space for security toward the issue area of space for economy. To this, 
the “space race” continues among the key space actors, namely the US, Russia, China and the 
European Union, and a few emerging nations. They do not merely compete with each other 
in the realm of the physical space capability superiority but also in their respective 
interpretation about “space security” and its focused substances which ought to be 
translated into the governing policies and practices of the relevant international regimes. 
These space regimes, often in forms of bilateral arrangements, international treaties and 
multilateral forums within or autonomous from the United Nations auspices248, are 
respectively entrusted by their member states to carry some specific part of the global 
space governing issues.     
To make our analytical narrative on the space security governance discernible, we are 
inspired by the theoretical framework of ‘regime complex’249 that refers to “an array of 
partially overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area 
(Raustiala and Victor 2004: 279) or more completely, it is viewed as “a network of three or 
more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; [that]exhibit[s] 
overlapping membership; and generate[s] substantive, normative, or operative interactions 
recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively (Orsini et 
al. 2013:29)250.  While applying the regime complex analytical framework, we put forward 
particular methodology suggested by the colleagues from the Ghent Institute for 
International Studies (GIIS) that the development of a regime complex is essentially steered 
by intersecting strategic, functional and organizational driving forces over time.  
In the morphogenesis of the regime complex of global monetary governance251 and energy 
governance,252 for example, states constantly pursued their individual power and interests 
by exploring international regimes to include and exclude other nations, established 
particular beneficial issue linkages, and designed tailor-made decision-making rules of the 
international regimes in favor of their respective advantages. The three driving forces 
intersected the global governance architecture by continuously triggering new creations, 
reforms, sometimes disappearances of international regimes of their kind, and 
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subsequently expanded and fragmented the constellation of international regimes toward 
its complex form. In the realms of global space security governance, an innovation driving 
force needed to be added. Innovation is encouraged and even believed by the interested 
states to either preserve their space leadership and superiority, or to offer opportunities, 
namely for non-spacefaring countries, to reshape the existing global and regional 
astropolitical order. Furthermore, the rapid and tireless space technology innovation 
creates new issues and requires more additional rules or new international regimes for 
governance. This equally caused the increasing number of international regimes and 
exacerbated the fragmentation of the space security regime complex. 
In this chapter, we will study the space security regime complex by firstly identifying the 
key states actors and their respective national “space security” policy. Their different 
readings on national space security policy directly reflect their positions toward their 
desired space security governing focuses. Their different political or strategic 
understandings of space security were naturally expected to be translated into the agenda 
and the negotiating process to institutionalize the specific governing regimes. Over time, the 
emphasized space security issues were about namely the nuclear proliferation in space, 
“space militarization” (related to the race between Soviet ICBMs and US anti missile defense 
systems), “space weaponization” (on banning the placement of weapons in space), and 
“space security” at large (focused on broadened security definition that include safety and 
sustainability, notably after China’s 2007 ASAT weapon test). Finally, we highlight the 
evidence of how the three driving forces affected the morphogenesis of the space security 
regime complex.  
 
2. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SPACE SECURITY GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE                                                      
   2.1. DIFFERENT READINGS ON “SPACE SECURITY” OF KEY STATE ACTORS 
Space for security and national defense as such, or “space security”, has always been a 
highly politicized issue in national policy making, in the international space political arena, 
and in the realm of global space governance, even after the large utility expansion from 
military toward civilian and commercial purposes. Up to now, there is still no conventional 
definition but numerous competing interpretations of what is meant by “space security”.253 
At the current stage, there is no authoritative legal definition in the realms of “space 
security” governance, even though the importance of the topic is widely recognized. In this 
dissertation, we have no intention to discuss or to define the meaning of “space security” 
per se. We will follow a general understanding of the issue as space for “security” as such or 
at large. Nevertheless, what interests us the most is to identify different key state actors’ 
national visions or priorities relating to “space for security” or “space security”. These 
different interpretations of key space actors have been the core issue that made clear 
impacts on the entire space security governance construction. Furthermore, the states’ 
different interpretations and focused priorities have not been consistent but often changed 
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over time. Some obvious cases were, for example, the divergent interpretations of “peaceful 
use” of outer space favored by the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, 
the question about the “militarization” and the “weaponization” of outer space (see Chapter 
III above). After the Cold War, the US expanded its pursuit of military space power for 
national security toward “the foreign policy and economic interests, and to US scientific 
knowledge”.254 In a similar line, the EU started promoting its comprehensive approach to 
interpret “space security” with its proposal for a non-binding International Code of Conduct 
for space activities (ICoC) that elaborated a trinity of security (as such), safety, and 
sustainability255 to deal with space relevant issues. As for the other two space powers, 
Russia and China, they remain with the traditional per se security mindset that excludes the 
broadened meanings of safety and sustainability. 
         
2.1.1. THE US SPACE SECURITY STRATEGY  
The US is renowned for its full range of space capabilities but also its dependence on space 
systems for both military and civilian utilities. The US has now repetitively stressed that the 
increasingly congested, contested, and competitive256 human space activities have become a 
new threat and challenge for its military superiority and civil space capability leadership. So, 
space security means protecting US national security and preserving American interests. 
Apart from all efforts the US made throughout its National Aeronautic and Space 
Administration (NASA) since 1958, it merely marked the sharp division between the US 
military and civilian space exploration and research programs, each enjoying distinct 
financial supply and administrative mechanisms within the US national policy areas. During 
the Cold War, American national security concerns were focused on a space arms race with 
the Soviet Union. To be competitive with the Soviets’ sophisticated intercontinental ballistic 
missiles (ICBMs), President Reagan (in office 1981-1989) in 1983 proposed the historic 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, better known as Star Wars) to develop a comprehensive 
anti-missile defense system, including laser ASAT weapons placed in orbit. The SDI was also 
considered an instrument of re-industrialization to boost the American economy by 
stimulating the space industry sector. President Reagan also released the military-operated 
US Global Positioning System (GPS) for civilian aviation purposes. President Bush Jr. (2003-
2008) forged an even closer link between US national security and space, particularly by 
endorsing a national strategy of space dominance. The space dominance strategy allowed 
the use of weapons in the event of a “Space Pearl Harbor”257 striking the US, so placing 
weapons in space could be a response. Hence, the US adopted two concrete stances 
regarding space security. Space is an instrument useful for defending national security, and 
outer space itself became a vulnerable physical asset to be secured.  
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As addressed in the US National Space Policy in 2006, the US needs to ensure “the 
sustainability, stability, and free access to, and use of, outer space in support of the nation’s 
vital interests.” The National Space Policy of President Obama in 2010 followed the similar 
line that space security became a subject that the US should “develop capabilities, plans, and 
options to deter, defend against, and if necessary, defeat efforts to interfere with or to attack 
US or allied space systems.”258 The National Security Space Strategy259 appeared in 2011 and 
proposed to maintain and enhance the national security benefits that the US derives from 
its activities and capabilities in space while shaping the strategic environment and 
strengthening the foundations of the American enterprises. In the policy approach, as the 
US depends more heavily than other countries, the US defends space security merely based 
on its national security and interests. In practice, the American space security approach 
overlaps with the European comprehensive space security yet only if no conflict with the US 
national security and interest. 
 
2.1.2. THE SOVIET AND RUSSIAN SPACE SECURITY FOCUSES  
Similar to the US, the Soviet space capability has also been developed for military goals and 
geostrategic requirements. For this reason, the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, was in fact a 
by-product of the ICBMs designed to negate US strategic nuclear weapons which could be 
carried by US forward-based aircrafts and missile deployment stations in Europe and 
Asia.260 By the early 1970s, Soviet space activity had surpassed that of the US in both 
number of launches and total payloads orbited. In the period 1968-1975 particularly, the 
use of reconnaissance satellites during major international conflicts demonstrated that 
space systems had become an integral part of Soviet crisis monitoring and war planning 
systems.261 Therefore, the use of outer space was claimed to support defending Soviet 
security and also to ensure international peace and security. After the Cold War, Russia 
followed the Soviet line to continue developing its space power with particular focuses on 
the launchers for ICBMs and for spacecraft launches. However, as Arbatov noted, Russia had 
gradually reduced the dependence of its conventional military operations on space systems. 
Only reconnaissance and communications systems are of some value.262 Facon and Sourbès-
Verger observed that Russian strategic forces continued to be indoctrinated with the 
launch-on-warning (LOW) concept in the development of the early-warning satellite for its 
ICBM deployments. Additionally, the satellite telecommunications and navigation, such as 
Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema or Global Navigation Satellite System 
(GLONASS), are becoming more important for Russian military-civilian (dual-use) 
utilities.263  
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Nowadays, Russia has put forward its national space policy priority on boosting its existing 
space industry and commercial activities.264 This could not mean that space security issues 
have become less important. It was claimed that only major provocation might change 
Russia’s policy on the issues, such as a potential US deployment of space-based ASAT 
system threatening Russian early-warning satellites, or a massive US deployment of space-
based Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) intercept or support systems which would threaten 
Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence capability.265 In the global space security governance 
arena, Russia and China have been campaigning together for a treaty on preventing the 
placement of weapons in outer space, the threats or use of force against outer space objects 
(known as PPWT) since 2008 through the Conference on Disarmament (CD), an ostensive 
counteraction to the US space dominance strategy. In 2015, Russia’s Defense Ministry 
established the Russian indigenous Aerospace Monitoring Forces (AMF), which aim to 
provide security to spacecraft and the International Space Station (ISS) and to enforce 
international rules of space conduct. The AMF is expected to use an extensive network of 
satellites and ground stations to track those who break international law, especially space 
traffic regulations.266 It might be asked whether Russia is likely to adopt a broadened space 
security approach. It looks as though Russia still has no intention to align itself with the line 
of comprehensive space security. Yet, viewing its active space security and safety capability 
development, Russia certainly shares the concerns about the realities of environmental 
space security and would probably shift its declaratory stance until it attains sufficient 
space security capability. 
 
2.1.3. THE EU’S COMPREHENSIVE SPACE SECURITY APPROACH 
Europe has a long but stable general space capability building path. Alongside its long 
regional integration, the EU has slowly achieved its substantial space capabilities, 
particularly through all the spacefaring states, such as, France, Germany, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom. The merging in 1975 of the European Launchers Development 
Organization (ELDO) and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) into the 
European Space Agency (ESA) paved the way for a de facto European Space Union for 
developing non-military space capabilities. ELDO was created through an international 
convention of 9 European countries in 1962 with the charge of developing and constructing 
satellite launchers. ESRO was also set up in 1962 but under another international 
convention with 11 member states. ELDO was mandated to manage programs for the 
construction and application of satellites. From its creation, ELDO had been suffering from 
constant dispute between the UK and France over control of various aspects of the 
program.267 The problem of organization came to a head in 1972 with the failure of the first 
test launcher leading to the abandonment of the development of the ‘Europa’ missile, and 
the NASA’s rejection of ELDO’s offer to collaborate on the construction of a space 
laboratory.268 
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In the dimension of space for security, the US-led North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
offered the European states a convenient security framework for reducing considerable 
budgetary burdens. Because of this, Europe has lacked an immediate need and political 
motivation for defending its general security, and accordingly has no explicit stress on space 
security in its well-developed space programs. Consequently, Europe had been taught by 
the cross-Atlantic alliance in which the US has strong power to influence European security 
autonomy. For example, Washington disapproved of the European project for a global 
navigation satellite system known as GALILEO started around 2003. The US had equally 
heavily exploited its influence on some NATO states to discourage the EU-China partnership 
at the starting phase of the international European GNSS consortium (see further discussion 
in Chapter VI).  
In 2005, the EU Council accepted the recommendation made by the Space and Security 
Panel of Experts (SPASEC) convened by the European Commission (EC)269 to give “a high 
relevance on its security applications of space”. The EC SPASEC report pointed out the 
underdevelopment of the EU on the security aspects for the use of space in comparison with 
other EU policy areas. Afterwards, the EC and ESA jointly drafted a European Space Policy 
and released it in 2007. A subsequent Space Council resolution of September 2008270 
defined “space and security” as one of four new priority areas. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009 
reinforced the legal basis for EU’s involvement in space matters as a competence shared 
with the EU Member States. The former EU High Representative Aston recognized in her 
Final Report of October 2013, entitled “Preparing the December 2013 European Council on 
Security and Defense”, that the role of networks (including space) in today’s globalized 
world “cannot be overestimated” and that “security of space is crucial for modern societies”. 
A study conducted by the DG for External Policies of the European Parliament271 stressed 
that an independent, reliable and responsive access to space depending on ‘security from 
space’ – for the autonomous launch systems – and on ‘security in space’ – with a 
comprehensive space system including ground infrastructure – are vital to European 
security and to worldwide peaceful and sustainable activities in space.  
The rather late European policy linkage between space and security seized an opportunity 
to leap to the forefront right after the Chinese ASAT test blew thousands of pieces of debris 
into orbit in 2007. Brussels took a solid stance on space security by exploring the extensive 
coverage of the issue. The EU proposed that space-based assets and entire space systems 
have become indispensable for human safety, economic growth and social development, 
environmental sustainability, and naturally also security as such. Thus space security forms 
an integral part of EU Space Policy. In the same line, the European Union in 2008 proposed a 
draft International Code of Conduct for Space Activities (ICoC) to promote comprehensive 
space security for security, safety and sustainability concerns. Hence, space security has not 
only become part of European Union space policy, but also was put forward as an action of 
the EU’s foreign relations. 
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2.1.4. CHINA’S GROWING SPACE SECURITY INTERESTS 
Now ranked as the fourth space power, after the US, the EU and Russia, and followed by 
Japan and India,272 China has pursued its space-capability building to support its national 
development strategy in the objective of preserving the country’s independence from 
foreign powers regarding sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, and political 
system.273 
Although the Chinese government had already published national scientific and technology 
development guidelines in 1956 that explicitly aimed to develop indigenous atomic bombs, 
ballistic missiles and artificial satellites (兩彈一星) and had started its space program in 
1965 with the Chinese Defense Ministry’s Fifth Academy, it was only in the 1970s that China 
started developing its space orbit program. When Deng Xiaoping succeeded Mao in 1978, 
military space considerations were even less of a priority.274 After the impressive US space 
system coordinated the Desert Shield/Desert Storm Operation in 1991, China’s armed 
forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), started a range of tasks and missions that would 
correspond to aspects of counter-space activities.275 
In parallel with China’s rapid development of a civil space program marked by the first 
Chinese space walk in 2008, unmanned space station (Tiangong 1) in 2011, and Moon 
unmanned rover (Yutu) in 2013, Chinese analysts increasingly argue that space will be the 
center of gravity in future wars and see space as something that must be seized and 
controlled.276 The concept was similar to the US ‘space control’ doctrine. In other words, it 
combines the two readings of space security that space is useful for defending national 
security, and outer space itself has become a vulnerable physical asset to be secured. As a 
matter of fact, China tested its anti-satellite (ASAT) capability by destroying its own 
dysfunctional satellite in 2007 and continues to improve its ballistic missile defense system. 
In the Chinese National Defense White Paper released in 2015, the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) for the first time explicitly stated that it would be expected to build air-space 
capabilities in order to conduct “active defense” operations, namely for strategic early 
warning, air strike, air and missile defense, information countermeasures, airborne 
operations, strategic projection and comprehensive support in the course of developing 
China’s Armed Forces.277 
In the arena of global space security governance, Beijing kept seeking to transform the 
international system to better suit its interests. It probed taking a more active role on the 
stage of global space governance as well as in the Asia-Pacific regional space governance 
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theater in order to create a more favorable environment for itself vis-à-vis the global 
competitor, the US, and its main regional competitor, Japan. To restrain US space strategic 
dominance, China and Russia in 2008 co-proposed a PPWT at the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) in order to ban the placement of weapons in outer space, and threats or 
use of force against outer space objects (PPWT). The drafted treaty, nonetheless, does not 
cover ASAT tests of the type that China and perhaps other countries are still experimenting 
with to attain their mature capability. 
To sum up, although not all space powers have explicitly stressed the comprehensive notion 
of space security in their national space policy or their governing stance, they in practice 
recognize the importance that the two readings of space security should coexist: that space 
is useful for defending national security, and outer space itself has became a vulnerable 
physical asset to be secured. However, states decide which reading suits them better on the 
basis of their individual temporary strategic considerations as well as their specific space 
capability maturity. 
 
2.2. THE KEY ISSUES OF GLOBAL SPACE SECURITY GOVERNANCE     
There are several long-standing issues in the realm of space security governance that are 
raised and debated by the three space powers and the EU again and again. These were 
nuclear proliferation and the “peaceful use of outer space” before the Outer Space Treaty 
was concluded in 1967. After the OST, the undefined “peaceful use” evoked some states’ 
particular concerns about the interpretations and implementation of the avoidance of 
“space militarization”, and “space weaponization”. Lately, notably after the Chinese and the 
US ASAT weapon tests in 2007 and 2008 respectively, the European Union proposed a 
comprehensive draft ICoC that elaborates “space security” with a broadened definition 
covering security (as such), safety and sustainability. The interpretative question raised by 
different states’ stances regarding these space security issues has already been discussed in 
Chapter II above, and will not be repeated here. Instead, we highlight the evolutionary 
timeline of these long-standing issues.  
Figure 9 outlines the evolution over time of the governing focuses on space security and 
negotiation topics. It started in the late 1950s with the early space security governing focus 
on nuclear proliferation in outer space. The issue was an aspect of the general disarmament 
discussions on nuclear proliferation. The LTBT signed in 1963 ended the nuclear test issue 
in its legal sense. The question remains if the emerging space nations will in practice follow 
the rule or not (yellow rectangle with arrow line). From the 1960s until the late 1970s, the 
Soviet ICBMs achieved greater sophistication and both the USSR and the US intensively 
tested their kinetic energy or hit-to-kill ASAT weapons. The concerns about space 
militarization were greatly increased. The question remains without authoritative answer, 
after those military space experiments, whether the final utility of these devices and 
vehicles stay as a part of military property or to be deployed for aggression purposes 
(purple rectangle with dashed arrow line). As from the 1980s, the US developed its Ballistic 
Missile Defense systems including laser ASAT weapons vis-à-vis the rapid sophistication of 
Soviet ICBMs. In response to this ASAT weapon that fell outside the banned category of 
“space weapon” in orbit, Russia and China developed a “space weaponization” argument to 
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restrain American military space capability development. This issue is still under debate 
though with a concrete Russia-China PPWT proposal (red rectangle with dashed arrow line). 
Further to the post-Cold War popularization of space capability development and the 
liberalization of the global space economy since the 1990s, the increase of national and 
private space asset possessions and the growing dependence on space systems to support a 
wide range of continuous real-time operations and services, the successive Chinese and 
American ASAT weapon tests in 2007 and 2008 awoke the world to the vulnerability of 
their space systems vis-à-vis the problem of space debris and harmful radio interference. 
Therefore, the elaborated approach covering security per se, safety and sustainability was 
requested (green rectangle with dashed arrow line). Finally, we return to our visual model 
introduced in Figure 3, Chapter I (page 31), the blue cone with dashed border line to 
highlight that over time the governing issues about space security were increasingly 
diversified toward all the fragmented items mostly without closed ends.  
                                  Figure9. Long lasting space security governing issues over time 
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3. MORPHOGENESIS OF THE SPACE SECURITY REGIME COMPLEX   
The growing regime complex of global space security governance is marked by the 
increasing number and specialization of the various regimes related to space security that 
have over time expanded and fragmented the governance architecture. These international 
space security regimes appeared in the forms of “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules 
and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given 
area of international relations”278 – such as space security that concretely resulted in the 
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establishment of international treaties, international organizations, or informal 
intergovernmental forums related to space security governance. Under UN auspices, the 
General Assembly and the First Committee on disarmament and security, and the UN-
supported international space treaties, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) and the Moon 
Treaty, are the formal general governing instruments for space security. Within this 
framework, since 2005, Russia, China and other countries have kept proposing the 
establishment of transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for space 
activities. The joint proposal resulted in the establishment of a Group of Governmental 
Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space Activities (GGE-
TCBMs) and a report released by the GGE-TCBMs in 2013. In 2015, a Russia-led279 UNGA 
resolution on an Arms Ban in Outer Space – ‘No first placement of weapons in outer space’ 
(NFP) – acquired 126 yes votes, 4 no votes and 46 abstentions. The NPT was considered an 
important intermediate measure on the way towards PPWT.280  
In parallel with UN auspices, most of the technical discussions and negotiations about space 
security governance have taken place at the non-UN Committee on Disarmament (CD). At 
this multilateral disarmament forum, the attempts to create an international agreement on 
the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), and a draft Treaty on the 
prevention of the placement of weapon in outer space and of the threat or use of force against 
outer space objects (PPWT) were raised in 1985 and in 2008 respectively. By contrast, the 
EU-proposed draft International Code of Conduct for space activities (ICoC) chose a unique 
path by undertaking the new space-security regime-making through three rounds of “Open-
ended Consultations” to promote such non-binding voluntary regime.  
 
3.1. THE UN AND GLOBAL SPACE SECURITY GOVERNANCE 
After the first successful Soviet Sputnik I satellite orbit flight in 1957, the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) became the main international forum for countries to discuss space-
related issues. This international forum deals with general and specific space-related 
questions, such as space security, international cooperation for space explorations and 
space science, and so on. By adopting the General Assembly resolutions, the UN created 
mandates for the UN agencies, established special ad hoc UN committees, and set up 
national experts panels to seek solutions to outer space issues. For space security matters, it 
is the First Committee on disarmament and international security which deals with 
disarmament, global challenges and threats to peace. The First Committee considers all 
disarmament and international security matters within the scope of the UN Charter or 
relating to the powers and functions of any other organ of the United Nations; the general 
principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security, as well as 
principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments; promotion of 
cooperative arrangements and measures aimed at strengthening stability through lower 
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levels of armaments. The Committee works in close cooperation with the UN Disarmament 
Commission and the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament. It is the only Main 
Committee of the General Assembly entitled to verbatim records coverage.281  
As to the UN resolutions and international treaties related to space security, as already 
presented in Chapter III, they were mostly established in the line of “peaceful use” of outer 
space at an early stage. Furthermore, there has been hardly any successful regime change 
since then.  We will here only focus on the recent initiative under UN auspices.  
 
3.1.1 THE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON TRANSPARENCY AND 
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES 
Due to a constant absence of consensus resulting in a failure to establish any form of 
operable space security regime, in 2005 the Russian Federation began proposing a UNGA 
resolution on transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) for space activities. 
The TCBM is supposed to be an efficient diplomatic tool to bring adversary states closer to 
each other. Transparency, here, refers to “the degree of openness in conveying information 
and a device of strategic negotiations signaling the trustworthiness of the actor in 
negotiation”.282 The Russia-sponsored space security TCBMs proposal has attracted wide 
support in the UN General Assembly yet has been rejected yearly by the US from 2005 to 
2008. In between, the UN Secretary-General issued a report in 2007 compiling the views of 
member states on TCBMs in space.283 In 2009 the US Obama Administration shifted to 
abstaining instead of voting against the proposal.  
In 2010, Russia and China sponsored an initiative through the UN First Committee, and on 
January 13, 2011, this was endorsed by the UN General Assembly as Resolution 65/68.284 
Because of this, the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon in 2011 convened a Group of 
Governmental Experts on Transparency and Confidence-building Measures in Outer Space 
Activities (GGE-TCBMs) to examine and report on methods for improving cooperation in 
space, and on reducing the risks of misunderstanding, mistrust, and miscalculations. 
Actually, there was already a similar GGE was convened between 1991 and 1993 to examine 
confidence-building measures in outer space activities, and produced a report.285 The GGE-
TCBMs established in 2011 delivered its final report by consensus in July 2013 to the UN 
Secretary General. 286  The GGE report proposed a set of TCBMs for space security, such as 
exchange of information between countries about their space policy and activities, risk 
reduction notifications and visits by experts to national space facilities. Establishing 
increased coordination between the Office for Disarmament Affairs, the Office for Outer 
Space Affairs, and other appropriate UN entities was equally recommended. The UN General 
Assembly endorsed the report at its 68th session in late 2013, and encouraged UN Member 
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States to review and implement the proposed measures through relevant mechanisms on a 
voluntary basis.287 
The TCBMs initiatives sponsored by Russia and China were constantly resisted by the US. 
While the US has since publicly declared its support for the GGE-TCBMs process, it 
abstained from voting on the resolution, objecting to its mention of the Chinese-Russian 
draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the 
Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT). Additionally, the composition of 
the TCBM GGE was also criticized for failing to give fair representation to the actual 
stakeholders.288 The GGE constituted a group of experts nominated by 15 nations. These 
were the permanent five (P-5) of the UN Security Council, plus Brazil, Chile, Italy, 
Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Romania, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Ukraine. Not all of these are 
spacefaring nations, while India, despite being an important emerging space nation had no 
expert in the group. 
 
3.1.2. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION RELATED TO SPACE SECURITY 
Nuclear proliferation and space security are linked because orbiting ballistic missiles with 
nuclear warheads can be either “weapons through space” or ASAT weapons. More broadly, 
there is the trauma caused by the dropping of atomic bombs on Japan, and the dilemma of 
how to use nuclear power to maintain international peace and security. In the mid 1960s, 
when the countries with nuclear capabilities were still limited to the US, the UK, the USSR, 
France and China, there was a strong incentive for any power to avoid starting a nuclear 
war. However, as more nations achieved nuclear capability, particularly developing nations 
that lay on the periphery of the balance of power between the two Cold War superpowers, 
this balance risked being disrupted and the system of deterrence would be threatened. 
Moreover, if countries with volatile border disputes became capable of attacking with 
nuclear weapons, then the odds of a nuclear war with truly global repercussions increased. 
This made the nuclear states reluctant to share nuclear technology with developing nations, 
even technology that could be used for peaceful applications. All of these concerns led to 
international interest in a nuclear non-proliferation treaty that would help prevent the 
spread of nuclear weapons.289 Subsequently, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
was opened for signature in 1967 and entered into force as from March 1970. Among the 
190 NPT signatories, nine possess nuclear weapons: the five nuclear weapons states 
recognized under the NPT (US, Russia, China, UK and France), three non-NPT nuclear 
weapons states (Israel, India and Pakistan), and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
(DPRK), which withdrew from the NPT in 2003. 
Apart from the NPT, Moscow and Washington continued to test their respective nuclear 
space weapons until they signed the Limited Treaty Banning nuclear weapon Tests in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water (LTBT, also known as Partial Test Ban Treaty, 
PTBT). The LTBT, primarily negotiated between the UK, the US and the USSR, resulted in a 
Soviet-US-led bilateral treaty. More than 120 nations signed the LTBT in 1963 to prohibit 
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nuclear explosion tests in the atmosphere, the ocean and space, allowing them only 
underground. Hence, none of the LTBT signatories is allowed to conduct nuclear weapon 
tests in space though the peaceful use of nuclear power sources (NPS) for peaceful space 
missions remain unbanned. In 2009, the UNCOPUOS and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) jointly published a ‘Safety Framework for Nuclear Power Sources 
Applications in Outer Space’. There seems, though, to be no discussion of whether the 
peaceful use of NPS implies potential security concerns. 
Further to the LTBT, there was the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiated 
within the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and opened for signature in 1996. The 
relevance of the CTBT to space security issues was actually not because of the nuclear 
proliferation, but because of the packaged bloc-binding negotiations between CTBT, FMCT 
and PAROS at the CD. We will discuss this institutional relevance below. Finally, it is worth 
mention that almost all the UN member states ratified the CTBT though it is not yet in force 
due to its specific conditions. Actually, the CTBT was designed to enter into force 180 days 
after the 44 states listed in Annex 2 of the treaty had ratified it. The “Annex 2 states” are 
those that participated in the CTBT negotiations before 1996 and possessed nuclear power 
reactors or research reactors at that time. As of 2015, still eight Annex 2 states have not 
ratified the CTBT. Among them, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel and the US have signed but not 
ratified the treaty. India, North Korea and Pakistan have not signed the treaty.  
 
3.2 THE CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT 
The Geneva-based CD originated from the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), 
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1962–68) and the Conference of the 
Committee on Disarmament (1969–78). In 1979, the UNGA appointed the CD as the sole 
multilateral negotiating forum for international disarmament agreement to eventually ban 
nuclear weapons, destroy chemical weapons and strengthen the prohibition on biological 
weapons. Formally, the CD is not a UN organization although it has a special link to the UN. 
A personal representative of the UN Secretary-General works as the CD Secretary-General. 
With this linkage, the UNGA often requests the CD to consider specific disarmament matters. 
In turn, the CD reports its annual activities to the Assembly. The CD has a limited 
membership of 65 states. Furthermore, as the negotiation tasks are related to states’ 
national security interests, the CD works strictly on the basis of consensus. Such a decision-
making procedure grants any country a veto right to single-handedly block progress. The 
CD has been dedicated to dealing with the questions relating to the militarization of outer 
space.290  
 
 3.2.1. ATTEMPT ON PREVENTING AN ARMS RACE IN OUTER SPACE (PAROS)   
In 1981, the UNGA mandated the CD to explore possibilities for an international agreement 
on preventing an arms race in outer space (PAROS). There was a difference regarding the 
exact focus of this agreement. The first resolution (A/RES/36/97), sponsored by the 
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Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG), sought the CD to focus on negotiating “an 
effective and verifiable agreement to prohibit anti-satellite systems”. The second resolution 
(A/RES/36/99), sponsored by the Eastern European and other states, wanted the CD to 
focus on negotiating a treaty to prohibit the stationing of weapons of any kind in outer 
space. While some states within the neutral and non-aligned group urged that the two 
resolutions be amalgamated to avoid presenting the CD with two sets of instructions, the 
lead sponsors of the resolutions demurred, saying that each resolution has its own identify 
and approach and should be handled separately. Thus it can be said that differences of 
perspective and priority have colored the CD’s consideration of PAROS from the 
beginning.291  
The CD established an ad hoc Committee on the Prevention of an arms race in outer space 
(PAROS) in 1983. The ad hoc PAROS Committee met annually from 1985 to 1994, and each 
year failed to move forward in any agreed pathway. The ad hoc PAROS Committee ended its 
work in 1994 and was not re-established. From 1995 onward, although with the support of 
all other UN member states, the constant vetoes and abstentions of the US and Israel in the 
CD General Assembly rejected the re-establishment of the PAROS committee. As for the 
attempt to put the PAROS on the UNGA agenda, the US has vetoed all the major resolutions 
and papers to limit and control space weaponization introduced at the CD.  
In the years following the ad hoc Committee’s demise, Canada, China and Russia kept their 
interests in PAROS at the CD. In 1998, Canada proposed a new ad hoc committee to 
negotiate the non-weaponization of space. In 1999, China proposed the establishment of an 
ad hoc negotiation committee to prevent the “weaponization of space”, while Pakistan and 
others have used the term “militarization” which could include satellites used for military 
purposes. In 2000, China submitted a working paper proposing that the ad hoc Committee 
can be revived with a mandate to negotiate a “new international legal instrument 
prohibiting the testing, deployment, and use of weapon, weapon systems and components 
in outer space”. In 2003, 174 UN member states voted in favor of a resolution to prevent an 
arms race in outer space. Only the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, 
Israel and the US abstained. The US cast a negative vote in 2005.292 Israel has since reverted 
to abstaining. 160 UN member states have voted for the resolution. In 2006, 2009 and 2011, 
informal debates on PAROS were held to unblock the deadlock. The US continues to argue 
that “as long as the potential for such attacks [on satellite] remains, the US continues to 
consider the possible role that space-related weapons may play in protecting our assets”. 
The US justified their stance because their concept of ‘peaceful uses’ includes “appropriate 
defensive activities in pursuit of national security and other goals.”293 The attempts to put a 
formal PAROS discussion on the CD agenda still has no success up to now.  
The failure to get the tentative PAROS on to the CD’s agenda was due to many reasons. First, 
the differences among states regarding the fundamental questions of whether or not new 
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legally binding measures were required vis-à-vis the existing space treaties (the OST, for 
example), what threats (conventional nuclear and mass destructive weapons in space vs. 
new types of ASAT weapons) were actually real and present dangers, and whether the 
Committee should continue discussions or instead develop a negotiating mandate.294 In the 
course of the PAROS discussions, each state had its own strategic concerns. China insisted 
that there should be negotiations on PAROS. The US agreed only to discuss the matter295 
since it believes that “it is not possible to develop an effectively verifiable agreement for the 
banning of either space-based “weapons” or terrestrial-based anti-satellite (ASAT) 
systems.”296 China was reluctant to put a cap on its own strategic nuclear capabilities until 
the US was willing to put a cap on its national missile defense plans. India was unlikely to be 
left out of the PAROS debate without gaining posture by possessing or at least testing any 
Indian ASAT weapon capability prior to the negotiations. Other nations, such as Pakistan, 
Iran and North Korea, may also consider their ASAT options as they further develop their 
long-range missile and space launch capability.297 
The other complexity is that a likely PAROS was included in the three-deal package for the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The other two parts of the CTBT deal were 
the formation of an ad hoc committee to discuss the future of nuclear disarmament, and a 
universal Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) to cut off the fissile material production for 
nuclear weapons programs. For the FMCT deal, two South Asian countries and Israel were 
believed to be continuing to produce fissile materials for their stockpiles.298 India, on the 
basis of a regional geopolitical mindset, will not sign the FMCT without China joining in. 
Pakistan will not sign unless India does. As the FMCT deal falls in the same disarmament 
package as a PAROS, there will be no PAROS deal until an FMCT deal is struck. The CTBT 
finally opened for signature in 1996, but has still not entered into force. As for the attempt 
to put the PAROS on the UNGA agenda, the US has vetoed all the major resolutions and 
papers to limit and control space weaponization introduced at the CD. Since 1995, the US 
and Israel consistently abstained in votes calling on the CD to re-establish an ad hoc PAROS 
committee in all its aspects.  
 
3.2.2. RUSSIA-CHINA-SUPPORTED PPWT 
Further to the failure of the PAROS agenda-setting and the continuous development of the 
US ground and sea-based missile defense systems which could be used as space weapons, 
Russia and China299 jointly proposed a working paper to the CD in 2002 entitled Possible 
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elements for a future international legal agreement on the prevention of the deployment of 
weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects. This working 
paper served the basic document for a draft Treaty on the prevention of the placement of 
weapons in outer space and of the threat or use of force against outer space objects (PPWT) 
also co-submitted by China and Russia in 2008 at the CD.  
The PPWT seeks to outlaw space weaponization by means of an international legally 
binding treaty because ‘modern international space law does not prohibit deployment in 
space of weapons which do not belong to the category of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)’. ‘The PPWT can prohibit the deployment of weapons of any kind in space, and the 
use or threat of force against space objects.’300 The 2008 PPWT version was criticized, 
namely by the US, for its ‘significant flaws’ (for example that the PPWT will be 
unverifiable301) and was rejected by many states. Further to this criticism, a consolidated 
version was submitted in 2014. The US countered that ‘arms control proposals and 
concepts should only be considered by the international community if they are equitable, 
effective, verifiable, and enhance the security of all.’ To them, the PPWT does not meet the 
necessary criteria, namely, it lacks an effective verification regime to monitor compliance, 
and terrestrially based anti-satellite systems, that pose the greatest and most imminent 
threat to space systems, are not included.”302 In 2015, a Russia-led303 UNGA resolution on an 
Arms Ban in Outer Space – ‘No first placement of weapons in outer space’ (NFP) – acquired 
126 yes votes, 4 no votes and 46 abstentions. The NPT was considered an important 
intermediate measure on the way towards PPWT.304 Georgia, Israel, Ukraine and the US 
were the four countries opposed to the draft resolution.  
 
3.3. EU-LED INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT FOR OUTER SPACE ACTIVITIES  
In 2008, the European Union proposed a draft International Code of Conduct for space 
activities (ICoC) in response to UN General Assembly Resolution 61/75 (2006)305 and 62/43 
(2007),306 which had invited all members to submit concrete proposals on international 
outer space TCBMs in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and 
promoting international cooperation and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The 
aim was a voluntary set of principles and guidelines regarding space security matters, such 
as space debris and the operation of spacecraft or satellites in space. Therefore, the ICoC 
developed its three principles on the basis of 1) all countries’ inherent right to use space for 
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peaceful purposes; 2) protection of security and reliability of space objects in orbit; and 3) 
consideration for states’ legitimate defense interests. 
The primary ICoC draft was rejected by most significant space nations including the US, 
China, Russia, and India, because of the EU decision to keep the ICoC outside the purview of 
the CD. To respond to such criticism, an argument based on the same institutional approach 
was given that neither the CD nor the COPUOS has the fully mandated competence to 
accommodate the request to discuss and negotiate the comprehensive approach of the EU’s 
ICoC.307 Because of this, a third way could not be unlawful and should even be considered 
logical. Had the EU made an effort to reach out to all the established spacefaring states, 
Rajagopalan noted, the impact of the Code could have been different.308 This view relates to 
some states demonstrating their concerns regarding a lack of transparency and 
disappointment about the EU’s insufficient consultation with other states.309 As a result, 
many Asian and African states objected to “an otherwise acceptable document.”310  
Otherwise, most countries saw the ICoC draft as an innocuous measure because it listed a 
few desirable steps to be taken by states that would ensure the sustainable use of outer 
space and avoid possible accidental and intentional mishaps.  
During 2011-2012, the US Obama administration had debated whether to endorse the EU 
code, pending a Pentagon assessment as to whether it would have an operational impact on 
the military's uses of space. Most officials believed that it would not, as its provisions concur 
with all US space plans and policies. The US and the EU had engaged in four rounds of 
consultations about the code, after which the EU incorporated suggested US language, such 
as on the right to self-defense in space. However, in February 2011, thirty-seven 
Republicans noted that they were "deeply concerned" about the code because inadequate 
Obama administration briefings led to the mistaken belief that it could constrain missile 
defenses or ASAT weapons. 311 Ultimately, on February 17, 2012, Hillary Clinton, Secretary 
of State for the Obama Administration, formally endorsed the code on behalf of the US. 
Hence, Canada Australia, Japan, India had also endorsed the Code. 
Beijing, Moscow and some others312 kept pointing to the security references in the draft, 
notably the reference to “self-defence”. Russia, China, Thailand, Brazil, Ethiopia, Ukraine and 
Belarus argued that the ICoC aimed at dealing comprehensively with the issues of the safety 
and sustainability of the space environment, and that the issues of stability and security in 
outer space were inadequately developed. In their view, the ICoC actually only deals with 
“peaceful uses” of outer space, so, a change of ICoC title sounds desirable to an 
“international code for peaceful uses in space”. In parallel, a common African position 
focused on whether the Code would limit or make it more difficult for those non-spacefaring 
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states to be part of future space activities, so they asked to improve the ICoC with greater 
inclusivity. It seems to us, the inclusive-sounding procedural approach remains as idealist 
and vague as other existing language and terminology repeated in the development path of 
the entire space security governance dimension, such as “peaceful use” of outer space. The 
important relative soft force of such constructive argument is unquestionable. It reduces the 
tension caused by states’ security-interest centered stances and facilitates their engagement 
in bilateral and multilateral dialogues. Nonetheless, it remains doubtful whether the major 
space states would unconditionally join an inclusive project. Over the course of space 
governance development, the fulfillment of states’ functional necessity, such as nuclear 
safety concerns, seems more often to have attained its goals so is probably more attractive.          
            
3.4. THE US INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC IN ARMS REGULATIONS (ITAR) 
As a greater number of countries become interested in military space capabilities, acquiring 
critical know-how and components through international trade to satisfy their national 
security objectives and their economic interests, this generates dynamics pushing countries 
strategically to choose their security allies and business partners in international 
astropolitics. This also creates significant impacts on the global governance of space 
security. Since the US SDI program opened the doors for American industry to capitalize on 
space by boosting the US domestic high-tech innovation and productivity to compete with 
their European and Japanese competitors, the US expanded its export barriers to preserve 
American leadership and its space capability advantage.  
The US created an important export control mechanism that also has impacts on global 
space security issues. The US International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), enacted in 
1976, was actually a part of the US Munitions List (USML). The ITAR together with the US 
Arms Control Export Act (ACER) continued the multilateral embargo policy made by the US-
led Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCoM) to export critical 
technology toward the Soviet-led Eastern Bloc and China.313 ITAR governs the transfers of 
arms and applies to business activities that are far removed from what one might consider 
to be arms exports. It is not only applicable to the activities to sending or taking any ITAR-
controlled commodities or information out of the US territory but also the transfers of ITAR 
listed commodities or information to non-US employees of US companies. In particular, 
ITAR has extraterritorial applicability over a listed commodity of information wherever it is 
located in the world. As a result, transfers of the commodity or data outside of the US also 
require prior State Department approval.  
In consequence, ITAR has been an efficient instrument to preserve the US arms and space-
tech leadership and military space power vis-à-vis the Soviet Bloc countries in the past, and 
nowadays Russia and China. China has been and still is an ITAR-listed country under a sat-
tech embargo since China was found to be receiving technical data from US satellite 
manufacturers. After the latest China-US Joint Commission for Commerce and Trade in 2012, 
the Chinese government press agency Xinhua criticized Washington for breaking its own 
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pledge on Sino-American partnership by upholding restrictions on satellite exports to China 
while relaxing them for other countries.314 Nonetheless, it has also created disadvantages 
for the US and NATO allies and for the American companies when it comes to the export of 
satellites and satellite components.315 For example, the EU Galileo navigation system, 
promoted as an alternative to the US GPS service, is not entirely free of US regulatory 
authority since it includes US-built subsystems.  
ITAR also has perverse impacts on US international cooperation and global space 
cooperation for civilian purposes. A France-China cooperation project in space-based 
astronomy and biomedical research has been slowed by continual US redefinition of what is 
and what is not allowed for export to China.316 In 2014, the US Government finalized a draft 
regulation that removes some satellite hardware and technology from the USML as well as 
from ITAR. Nevertheless, exports of space-related items to China and certain other 
countries remain barred. European industries that need to sell telecommunications and 
Earth observation satellites independent of US technology could not escape from the US 
ITAR even if technology made in Europe is intended for their companies.317  
To sum up, Figure 10 offers a visual overview of the expansion and fragmentation of the 
space security institutional architecture. In this evolution, space security governing 
institutional architecture was firstly split up between the UN (covered by blue cone with 
dashed frame at the top) and non-UN dimension, the Conference on Disarmament. In the 
non-UN dimension, it was the issue area on nuclear proliferation (yellow zone) viewed with 
the mostly successful regime institutionalization, such as the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty 
(LTBT), and the 1967 Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (despite the failure in 2003), and the 
1996 Comprehensive Test ban Treaty (CTBT). The institutionalization of these regimes 
(framed with solid line) almost followed a step-by-step move to gradually complete the goal 
of ending nuclear proliferation.  
By contrast, the less successful is on the issue area of preventing an arms race in outer 
space (purple zone). States continuously attempted to propose various initiatives in order 
to update the outdated exiting regime, i.e. the OST, to prohibit either ASAT weapons, or 
placement of weapon in space. PAROS was 1985-1994 (framed with dashed line), which 
was bound to the CTBT-FMCT-PAROS package deal. From the late 1990s, other Russia-
China sponsored PPWT (also with dashed line) continued their goal of prohibiting the 
placement of weapons in space. The EU started another pillar of space security discussion 
over a comprehensive approach elaborating security, safety and sustainability. The UN also 
had initiated twice to request the TCBMs (white rectangles) policy recommendations 
without concrete following actions afterwards. All in all, in addition to the regime complex 
                                                             
314 Xinhua News, China Voice: Cold War mentality fuels U.S. satellite export prejudice by Wang Aihua, Gui Tao. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-01/08/c_132088119.htm   
315 The Space Review, Key Space Issues for 2013 by Jeff  Foust, December 31, 2012. 
www.thespacereview.com/article/2211/1   
316 Space News, U.S. Export Rules Complicate Sino-French Cooperation by Peter B. de Selding, Sep. 18th 2014. 
www.spacenews.com/article/civil-space/41907/us-export-rules-complicate-sino-french-cooperation 
317 Space News, U.S. Satellite Export Regs Remain a Frustration for European Industry by Peter B. de Selding, 
Feb. 7th 2014.  www.spacenews.com/article/satellite-telecom/39414us-satellite-export-regs-remain-a-
frustration-for-european-industry ; Space News, European Satellite Still Heavily Dependent on U.S. parts by 
Peter B. de Selding, January 29th 2015. http://spacenews.com/european-satellite-still-heavily-dependent-on-u-s-
parts/ 
105 | P a g e  
 
that consists of all general international regimes related to space issues discussed in 
Chapter II, and Chapter III, the (sub-)regime complex of space security governance (RC of SS) 
gradually got its form, in the lines with all the regime institutionalization initiatives with 
similar general goals yet distinguished by their different issue focuses according to the 
proposal sponsoring states’ security and interest centered calculations.     
Figure 10. The Regime complex of space security governance 
 
     1950                  1960                  1970                  1980                  1990                  2000                  2010      
                                                                                                                                                                          Source: Author’s creation 
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overlapping and non-hierarchical institutions governing a particular issue-area (Raustiala 
and Victor 2004: 279)318 or more completely, as “a network of three or more international 
regimes that relate to a common subject matter; [that]exhibit[s] overlapping membership; 
and generate[s] substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially 
problematic whether or not they are managed effectively (Orsini et al. 2013:29).319 
The GIIS colleagues proposed that the intricate morphogenesis of such a regime complex is 
generally cross-formed by strategic, functional and organizational driving forces over time. 
First of all, states are motivated to create or to choose to join certain international regimes 
to fulfill their pursuit of power, leadership and interest, rather than to pursue the common 
interest. Hence, states create new international regimes, or reform or sometimes desert 
existing multilateral institutions with the attempts to align or convert the functions of these 
international regimes to their power stance and national interests.320 The strategic logic of 
interest attribution leads states to create or choose particular international regimes through 
which they maximize their own advantages and achieve their own policy agenda. Secondly, 
states equally select the issue areas in which they possess a dominant capability position 
and so gain greater weight to influence the rulemaking in these governing issue areas.321 
The issue linkage is noted as the functional driving force that stimulates states desire for 
regime change. Thirdly, the different structural and relational frameworks of international 
regimes on their membership, policy decision-making process through secretary agenda 
making and voting procedure subsequently turned to organizational burdens that do not 
only limit the individual state’s margin of manoeuver to influence the institutional choices 
toward their preferences so as path dependence, but also affect the regime interplay when 
common issue brought different regimes to compete, cooperate or coordinate with each 
other. These different driving forces intersected in the construction course of the space 
governance architecture and fragmented the entire structure with legal inconsistence in the 
governing principles and norms as shown in Chapter III, and the regime interplay, e.g. the 
nested, overlapping and parallel regimes in this chapter.  
In addition, we note that innovation played a particular role in the realm of space 
governance, perhaps not as a general driving force but a particular enabling force that 
reinforced the three intersected driving forces to accelerate the fragmentation of the space 
governance architecture. This enabling force was intentionally suppressed by the two space 
powers during the Cold War but became evident when the emerging space nations (again) 
arose. The innovation can be viewed in its material, e.g. space capability, and its immaterial 
sense, e.g. moral pressure. The innovation force resulted in the popularization of space 
capability development and liberalization of space economy especially led by Asian 
countries like China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan, and Arabic states, e.g. United Arab 
Emirates, hence injected new factors and created new challenges which did not previously 
exist in the governance realm. The innovation by generating moral pressure, e.g. the 
“peaceful use”, the “special regards toward developing countries”, and “space sustainability” 
were good examples. The innovation enabling force is different from the three discerned 
compelling forces that states were passively acted and reacted to the situation and the 
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momentum within the existing political, legal and social-economic framework. Innovation 
enabling force is bring in active choices that innovating states introduced themselves as 
new actors with new concepts that offered leverage for them to change the rules and 
naturally created new governance challenges into the realm of space governance. In 
consequence, it also stimulated and accelerated regime changes, so fragmented the 
governance architecture.  
                       
4.1. STATES’ STRATEGIC DISPERSION IN DIFFERENT SPACE SECURITY REGIMES     
Countries pursue their relative power and individual interests when deciding to create or 
enter different space security regimes where they tried to steer the design and the functions 
of any interested international regimes in favor of their leverage power, or choose the 
moment of entrance to these international regimes that most suits their interests.  
Along the evolution path of nuclear proliferation governance building, the USSR and the US 
only signed the LTBT (1963) after they had both exhausted all their tests of nuclear 
weapons in space to understand the effectiveness and cost-effect benefits of such powerful 
weapons. However, the LTBT preserved some leeway by not prohibiting underground 
nuclear testing, enabling the P-5 nuclear powers to continue their nuclear power capability 
leadership. This only changed when another international regime, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (1967), opened decision-making powers in global nuclear governance to the rest of 
the world.322 Likewise, multilateral debate and bilateral negotiations regarding space 
weapons only started in the late 1960s after the US and the Soviet Union had tested their 
first anti-satellite system in 1959 and 1968 respectively.323 The different interpretations of 
the “peaceful use” of outer space between the American version and the Soviet provide 
another vivid example. Each interpretation led the respective camps to continuously 
proposed regime creation initiatives to prohibit “militarize” in avoidance an arms race in 
outer space or “weaponize” outer space with placement of “weapons” in outer space. More 
recently, China became interested in a PAROS in the 1990s because that was when the US 
was imposing limits on Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities. After the failure of the PAROS 
attempt came the Russia-China co-sponsored PPWT initiative and the EU-led ICoC proposal, 
the former motivated by the Russia-China coalition to restrain US space power, and the 
latter based on the new strategy of the European Union to gain more space autonomy and to 
explore the EU’s space diplomacy. In the eyes of many, none of these strategic actions was 
considered feasible to consolidate unanimity of global space security governance, but 
exacerbated the fragmentation of the space security regime complex over time. 
  
4.2. THE FUNCTIONAL ISSUE-LINKAGE TO MEET STATES’ INTERESTS   
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323 Jasani, Bhupendra (Ed.) (1987) Space Weapons and International Security – The Arms Control Dilemma. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.  
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The broad ranges and the growing diversity of the military, civil and commercial uses of 
outer space have confronted states with political, technical and sustainability issues related 
to space security. They are forced to look for collective rules and solutions for necessity. 
Nevertheless, states often tactically put forward their favorite and downplayed their 
undesired issues in order to advance or slow the negotiation. Hence, numerous functional 
international regimes, imperfect as they are, are constantly created, modified, or abandoned 
over time in order to meet the interests and needs of collective or particular groups of 
states. 
The tactical issue linkage of the troika which aimed to make a package deal on PAROS, CTBT 
and FMCT at the CD at the same time showed that, concluding such packaged deal of three 
issues sounded legitimate and good for all parties. Nevertheless, states all proposed their 
own version of linkages to hold their political stance. The Western CTBT and FMCT and the 
Russia-China sponsored PAROSUS were put together as a sine qua non package deal. These 
issue linkages failed in the end because they met neither China’s own strategic interest, nor 
that of two other mutually hostile countries, India and Pakistan. The two hostile countries 
equally tried to make their own sine qua non issue-linkage by attaching their deal to China’s 
decision. Ultimately, the CTBT was concluded on paper, but with no chance of having 
concrete effects in reality. The PAROS failed and even triggered more initiatives, such as 
PPWT, to negotiate new deals in similar fields. Making particularly focused sectorial 
arrangements seemed a circuitous tactic to overcome entrenched positions, yet 
subsequently all the sectorial negotiations will still turn back to its conflicting origins that 
cannot accelerate any progress but rather create even more interconnected issue areas. The 
seemingly successful deals all failed to meet their initial goals and generated architectural 
fragmentation that spilt over between two regime constellations of space and nuclear 
proliferation.  
 
4.3. ORGANIZATIONAL PATH-DEPENDENCE LIMITS INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES    
The specialization and decentralization method that discharged the UNGA mandates toward 
the non-UN international forums, such as the Conference on Disarmament (CD), to negotiate 
space security relevant issues was based on the rationale of professionalization and burden 
sharing in order to make the entire deal successful. Yet, these practices equally created 
organizational constraints and triggered the fragmentation of the entire governance 
constellation. 
The specialization and decentralization practices often faced the hurdles caused from the 
differences of managerial cultures, bureaucratic structures and decision-making procedures 
between different international space security regimes. Hence, there is no guarantee for the 
success of the entire global space security governance. The failure for a cap deal of CTBT 
and a specialized PAROS at the CD demonstrate these patterns. The UNGA discharged the 
space arms race prevention negotiation to the Conference for Disarmament, a smaller 
international forum than the UNGA. The 65 member states of the CD continued to discharge 
the overarching CTBT negotiation into a PAROS and the other two focused deals. The 
consensus decision-making procedure of the CD led to no resolution because every member 
state has simply the veto power to delay one deal and then stop the other deal. The PAROS 
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failure led the space security governance toward a greater fragmentation with the 
appearance of the other tactical proposals, such as TCBMs, and the ICoC. 
We use Figure 11 to sum up the point that it was commonplace that the intersecting 
strategic (S), functional (F), and organizational (O) driving forces jointly twisted a space 
security regime to its creation, growth, reform, or desertion, and stimulates the creation of a 
new regime since it can no longer fulfill some influential states’ expectation or desires. The 
single case became multiplied as we have demonstrated in the morphogenesis of the space 
security regime complex over time. By accumulating the transformations of multiple 
individual space security relevant regimes, it thrust the space security governance 
architecture toward its regime complex. 
 Figure 11. The three intersecting driving forces thrust an individual regime to change 
 
                                                                                                                   Author’s creation 
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The strategic-mindset-led space security regime complex 
We have presented an overview of the different degree of space security capability and their 
strategic stances of four major space powers alongside the entire evolutionary path of space 
security governance construction. In the course of the global space security governance 
formation, various international regimes were proposed, created, grew, improved, or failed. 
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strategic calculation and functional interests. The United States and the Soviet Union 
straight away internationalized the space security issue by promoting the peaceful use of 
outer space but actually in order to limit each other’s military space capability development. 
However, those disarmament agreements were often concluded only when the two space 
powers have accomplished their technical assessment on the cost-effect value of their space 
weapons. Otherwise, no concrete regulating agreement could be accomplished. Afterward, 
many of these established space security relevant regimes have a lack of effective 
verification and disinclining measures to constraint states outlaw behaviors. Because the 
applications of these international rules could only depend on the good will of states, when 
there were more states that possessed mature space capability, they started seeking ways 
to fix the imperfection of the existing regimes by either reforming them, involving other 
established space security regimes to complement the missing measures, or simply creating 
a new regime to fix all the problems at once. Subsequently, these old and new regimes and 
initiatives expanded and fragmented the entire space security regime governance 
architecture to its current complicated form as a regime complex. This complexity in form 
should not be destructive. It can be constructive if this regime complex can be better 
managed through the method of an intelligent labor division according to individual state’s 
space capability and regional particular necessities. Yet, in our opinion, there exist more 
fundamental issues about the space security regime complex that are needed to be solved 
with a long-term strategy.  
Further openness in popularizing space security capability  
Retrospectively, one aspect of the strategic thinking regarding the US SDI (Star Wars) was to 
engage the Soviets in a costly space arms race that would bankrupt the Soviet economy. As a 
defense strategy it was not successful but it was beneficial in the domestic realm by giving a 
boost to the US space aeronautic and astronautic industries and space tech exportation. In 
such a game for two, states’ strategic calculations actually hardly worked out in the real 
situation. The long existing space security oligarchy was compelled to open to China, the EU, 
and others. With more critical mass, governance became complex and probably also less 
effective to endure. In this context, it is important to not close the door of engaging more 
key space actors into the rulemaking but involve all interested states to learn together 
about to-do and not-to-do by all, even with the power and interest centered mindset. Only 
by letting all actors realize that space activities were becoming physically congested, 
contested, and competitive, is it possible to avoid selfish acts and omissions that would 
generate lose-lose consequences for all. 
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CHAPTER VI REGIME COMPLEX OF GNSS GOVERNANCE 
Abstract: Harmonizing the interoperability and compatibility between different existing 
and future global navigation satellite systems (GNSSs) is one of the most challenging 
governance issues nowadays. The GNSSs highlight the ambiguity of governing the dual-use 
of outer space since existing and future GNSSs are and will be almost all military-operated 
but are already widely employed for civilian purposes, e.g. land, sea and air navigation, 
search and rescue, and economic activities “from farming to banking”. Furthermore, the 
ubiquitous uses have brought GNSS governance to overarch different governance issue 
areas, namely security, safety and trade, which has led to the creation of a new specialized 
regime, the International Committee on GNSSs (ICG) to harmonize inter-GNSSs 
interoperability and compatibility issues. It also naturally involved other existing 
international regimes, such as ITU, ICAO, IMO, and WTO, to only resolve some part of the 
various problematic issues. Nonetheless, in many respects, GNSS provider states remain 
autonomous to negotiate bilateral arrangement between them to reduce technical conflicts. 
In this regard, the case of GNSS governance is valuable for its representativeness, providing 
a microcosm through which we can observe how the three driving forces thrust this 
sectoral governance architecture got extended and gradually fragmented. 
We will introduce four existing and future GNSSs, including the regional navigation satellite 
systems and their service provider states to illustrate the international GNSSs politics 
landscape. Afterwards, we look at the key governing challenges of GNSS governance, such as 
(1) the general space resource scarcity on satellite orbital slots and radio frequency 
attribution that physically impacted on the frequency overlay between the four GNSSs’ 
governmental only, mainly for military and other sensitive services. (2) The continuity of 
GNSS services remains critical for security and safety utilities. They are vital to provide a 
continuous global and positioning navigation, and timing (PNT) service for coordinating 
military operations, search and rescue, and for land, sea and air traffic controls. (3) In the 
socio-economic realm, since the GNSSs became ubiquitous and indispensible in many public 
policy areas, developing countries should be enjoying the GNSS services offered by different 
GNSS service providers. Nonetheless, these distinct systems should be integrated, 
interoperable and compatible. (4) The institutional spillover from the global space 
governance to international trade governance is caused by the commercial competition that 
service provider states and their downstream manufactured products probe impeding 
inter-GNSSs interoperability and compatibility in order to protect their distinct markets and 
economic interests. Technical trade barriers or discriminatory market access measures to 
prevent foreign GNSS services and products to enter the national market were often set. So, 
GNSSs also became a trade-related governing issue. Finally, we are interested in exploring 
the main driving forces that thrust the entire GNSS governance toward its fragmented 
complex form. With our analytical method, we investigate that both spacefaring and non-
spacefaring countries were stimulated to join in and became involved with their traditional 
allies and short-term business partners to gain issue linkages in order to fulfill their 
strategic interests and functional necessities. The regime interplay within the space 
governance ITU-ICG, safety regimes ICG-ICAO-IMO, and ICG-WTO trade regime will also be 
discussed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The utilities of GNSSs, far different from spacefaring-nations-led space exploration projects, 
such as the ISS or Moon and Mars exploration or comet landings, are physically valuable for 
most states and populations. GNSSs provide ubiquitous services not only for the military 
missions that were originally stressed, but also for land, sea, and air navigation and traffic 
control, for search and rescue safety operations, piloting farmers’ tractors for cultivating 
their land, tracking cattle in remote areas, and synchronizing international financial 
operations across different time zones with the inbuilt atomic clocks in the GNSS satellites, 
often from farming to banking.  
The GNSS technology and applications were developed already from the 1960s by the US 
navy for military purposes. In the late 1980s, the US decided to open the world’s first Global 
Positioning System (GPS) service for civilian use. Nowadays, the number of the current and 
future GNSSs and regional navigation satellite systems (RNSSs) has grown from the US GPS 
to add others, the Russian GLONASS, Chinese BeiDou and European Galileo. The three latter 
GNSSs are expected to achieve their full operational capability (FOC) by 2020. Besides, there 
were regional augmentation systems as well, such as the European EGNOS, Japan’s QZSS 
and India’s IRNSS, which were originally complementary to the extant GNSSs, gradually 
became autonomous regional satellite navigation systems (RNSSs). The GNSS is a space 
system consisting of segments of space-based satellites, ground stations and end users. The 
space system agglomerates all ranges of fundamental and cutting-edge space technologies 
to provide applications for telecommunications, navigation, accurate timing, and high-
resolution remote sensing services for military operations. The reason there is not one 
world GNSS that coordinates different regional supportive systems but multiple 
autonomous GNSSs is not technical but political. Because apart from the functional 
advantages of GNSS for safety and development, the GNSS has become a vital support 
instrument for states’ military operations, and an enabling tool to generate advantages for 
national space capability development, a high-tech manufacturing ability that creates GNSS-
related commerce. Hence, spacefaring nations are all vying for their own autonomous global 
or regional GNSSs. As for the user countries, they seemed to enjoy multiple choices for the 
best fit for their interest. 
To operate any single GNSS constellation to its FOC without discontinuity requires about 20 
satellites or more. This naturally put the fundamental question of space resource scarcity on 
the limited satellite orbital slots and their related radio frequency more evident. To this, 
service provider states can reshuffle their own space systems’ satellite constellations or 
ought to negotiate with other countries for technically adequate orbital slots and satellite 
frequency to their entire GNSS satellites constellation. Secondly, the GNSS service providers 
have been reluctant with regard to safety-focused and development-oriented inter-GNSSs 
interoperability and compatibility policy out of concerns for system independence and 
commercial interest. This has made it difficult to establish universal equipment standards 
and common operational rules for all GNSSs. This problem not only divides GNSS service 
providers but also places burdens on GNSS users when selecting their GNSS service 
provider(s) and production partners due to the system exclusivity. The interoperability and 
compatibility issues are naturally related to the trade disputes in which some counties have 
established national market barriers to impede undesirable foreign GNSSs products and 
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services. To solve this challenge, states are forming regional and international trading blocs 
for GNSS products and services. 
To better harmonize the military-controlled GNSSs that are largely used for civilian and 
commercial ends, the UN International Committee on Global Navigation Systems (ICG) was 
created in 2005 to promote and harmonize inter-GNSS interoperability and compatibility 
issues so as to arrive at the best outcome for development objectives. The establishment of 
the ICG was in response to the goals defined at the Third UN Conference on the Exploration 
and Peaceful uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE III) in 1999, the UN General Assembly 
endorsed “The Millennium: Vienna Declaration on Space and Human Development” with 
which the UN called for enabling space technology proving PNT services. Since then, in spite 
of its origin and heavy relevance to security and military uses, the GNSS governance 
architecture was founded in the governing dimension where safety, socio-economic pillars 
are the most important. Furthermore, various international regimes become relevant to 
GNSS governance international regimes. 
Naturally, the OST and other international space treaties and the UN space-related 
multilateral forum and specialized agencies, such as the COPUOS, are connected with GNSS 
governance. Other more specific issues were dispersed to be handled within other UN 
specialized agencies, such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) for 
allocating satellite orbital slots and radio frequency and preventing satellite frequency 
interference issues. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) were required to guarantee the safety for GNSS-
related aviation and maritime navigation by establishing specific equipment standards and 
operational regulations. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is expected by some to limit 
discriminatory access of national markets for GNSS-related trade. Others are developing 
regional GNSS augmentation systems to acquire necessary technology transfer from the 
global service provider, develop domestic manufacturing capabilities and commerce, 
conquer regional markets for GNSS-related products and services, and to resist Western-led 
global trade mechanisms. This can be regarded as space regionalization.324 The regional 
powers and their security alliances, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
regional space cooperation regimes, e.g. the European Community (EC) and European Space 
Agency (ESA), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), 
the China-led Asia-Pacific Space Organization (APSCO), and the Japan-led Asia Pacific 
Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) have been developed to attain these goals. 
International groups such as BRICs have also been created or utilized for similar purposes.  
The new GNSS-focused international regime creations and the functional shifts of existing 
GNSS-related regimes thrust the entire GNSS regimes constellation to a continuous 
expansion and growing fragmentation, viewed as a regime complex.325 This GNSSs regime 
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complex was, as noted above, generally driven to imperfection by three intersecting 
strategic, functional and organizational forces;326 likewise for GNSS governance.  
In the following sections, we study the global GNSSs regime complex by first introducing the 
key actors, the four global GNSSs ‘service providers’ and three regional augmentation 
systems by presenting their respective technical capabilities and political motivations in a 
nutshell. Further, we look at the key governing challenges regarding GNSS governance. They 
are about 1) the general problem regarding the satellite slots and relevant satellite radio 
frequency allocations, and particularly the encrypted GNSS signal frequency overlay among 
several GNSSs services. The issue is directly related to the guarantee of continuous GNSSs 
services for states national security and safety utilities. 2) The interoperability and 
compatibility of GNSSs are not only important for security and safety but also for national 
capability autonomy. They are vital to provide a continuous global GNSS service for the 
traffic controls of civil aviation and maritime transportation. In addition, the issues are 
beneficial for the developing countries to not be cornered by one single GNSS but enjoy an 
interoperable and compatible integrated multiple GNSSs service so as to improve daily life 
for their nation and their people. 3) Economically, the GNSS service providers and their 
downstream product manufactures seem to impede the inter-GNSSs interoperability and 
compatibility solutions in order to protect their distinct markets and economic interests. 
Therefore, trade barriers or discriminatory market access measures that make it harder for 
foreign GNSS services and products to enter the national market have often been instituted. 
Finally, we attempt to analyze the intersecting dynamics that over time drive the entire 
GNSS governance architecture toward regime complex status. 
Furthermore, we explore the main driving forces that thrust the entire GNSS governance 
architecture toward a complex and fragmented form with the “three driving forces” 
analytical model. In this, ambitious states were motivated to build their leverage power by 
creating institutions under their own lead or choosing the most convenient moment to be 
part of an international regime. Both spacefaring and non-spacefaring countries sought to 
involve and support their traditional allies and short-term business partners by expanding 
governance issue linkages in order to serve their strategic interests and functional 
necessities. Once states are bounded by international regimes, many would try to steer the 
organizational structure and decision-making procedure of these international regimes in 
their favor, either to safeguard existing advantages, or to gain more leverage by growing 
their influence within these multilateral governing mechanisms. The framing practices 
would nevertheless elicit counter-reactions that continuously adjusted the institutional 
development path closer or away from its ideal development route, creating organizational 
burdens or path dependency. We also address a few fragmenting processes in regime 
change, e.g. the creation of the ICG, and regime interplay between ICG, WTO and the new 
role played by the regional space cooperation platforms. 
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 2. THE INTERNATIONAL GNSSS POLITICS 
 
2.1. GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS AND ASTROPOLITICS 
The technical basis of a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) is a satellite positioning 
constellation of at least four orbiting satellites which constantly measure the distance 
between our positions to the locations of those satellites in order to calculate our position’s 
coordinates of latitude, longitude, and altitude at any given moment (see Figure 12). Further 
with an American ground-breaking engineering invention that uses space-based atomic 
clocks to synchronize the position data through extremely precise timing signals with an 
error of one billionth of second – a nanosecond – equals about one foot of error on the 
ground327 to the ground stations, GNSS can hence provide an integrated position, navigation 
and timing (PNT) data services.  
Figure 12. Global navigation satellite system operation diagram 
 
                                                                                                          Source: www.wirelessdictionary.com 
 
The US was the first state in the world to develop a global, all-weather, continuously 
available, highly accurate positioning and navigation system for locating ballistic missiles, 
submarines and other ships at sea in the 1970s. From 1982, the Soviet Union became the 
second nation to start developing its own global navigation satellite system (GLONASS) to 
counter the US military PNT service. In 1983, Korean Airlines Flight 007 was shot down 
because it had strayed into Soviet airspace. As a result, President Reagan promised to make 
the American GPS Standard Positioning Service available to the worldwide aviation sector 
when the GPS attained its Full Operation Capability (FOC) by 1988. The White House kept 
the GPS Selected Positioning Service exclusively for its own military and security uses. Only 
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in 1991 did Washington announce the fulfillment of its promise at the Tenth Air navigation 
Congress of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). At the same time, the 1991 
Persian Gulf War showed the magnitude of US GPS-supported military combat operations, 
sparking a global enthusiasm for these sophisticated technologies and their applications. 
Within a few years, other ambitious spacefaring nations, such as the member states of the 
European Union and the European Space Agency, and China, began to develop their own 
GNSSs, namely the European Galileo and Chinese BeiDou (or Compass) systems. Other 
regional augmentation systems – the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service 
(EGNOS), the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) – were built to complement and 
be compatible with the US GPS. India began to develop its own regional navigation satellite 
system (IRNSS), intended to be compatible with GPS, GLONASS and Galileo to improve the 
reliability and accuracy of the positioning data for each system. The applications and 
services of the GNSS became popular for thousands of civilian purposes, for example for 
search and rescue, aviation and maritime safety and traffic control, for farming, distance 
education, e-health care and e-banking for remote areas, as well as for the urban economy, 
e.g. Uber, and also for environmental monitoring and protection. The hybrid utilities for 
both military and civilian purposes, or in other words peaceful use, of the GNSSs triggered 
continuous discussions about how to regulate such a popular dual use of space capabilities. 
 
2.2. DIFFERENT GNSSS AND RNSSS IN THE WORLD 
The multiplication of these global and regional navigation satellite systems has created 
congestion, competition, and contests in the arenas of global GNSS astropolitics, space 
capabilities building, and markets for GNSS-related products and service. Below we will 
present a general picture of the different GNSS and RNSS service providers that are all vying 
for strategic position, and dual-use space capability development, as well as their global and 
regional coverage and business market expansion. Each keeps trying to involve 
partnerships among their traditional and security allies and neighboring regional 
cooperation organizations in order to maximize the use of their GNSSs and RNSSs. 
 
2.2.1. THE US GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)  
The US was the first state in the world to develop a satellite global position system. From 
the early 1960s, the US Department of Defense (DoD) started to develop a global, all-
weather, continuously available, highly accurate positioning and navigation system. The 
project was to meet the US Navy’s requirement for locating adversary ballistic missile, 
submarines and other ship at the ocean’s surface.328 By the late 1960s, the US Air Force 
(USAF) joined the venture to improve the Navy’s PNT system. In 1981, the US Department 
of Defense, which responded to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) request, opened 
the use of a “civilian” signal outside the US.329 After the 1983 downing of the Korean Airline 
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flight, President Reagan inaugurated the GPS dual-use to the civil aviation community. In 
the course of 1987-1988, the GPS reached its full operational capability (FOC). 
The longstanding development of the American military-use GPS attained its full flowering 
during Operation Desert Storm in the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War. The American satellite 
PNT services were widely employed in combat situations on the ground and in the air, and 
hence continued to serve the military and peacekeeping operations of the US and its allies, 
or the military and civil dual-purpose operations. During the Balkan crisis in the 1990s, GPS 
assisted in delivering aid to the Bosnians by dropping troops, food and medicine at night.330 
During Operation Restore Hope in 1993, GPS was used by the US army to airdrop food and 
supplies to remote areas of Somalia due to a lack of accurate maps and ground-based 
navigation facilities. The US forces relied on GPS when entering Haiti in 1994. In 1995, as 
the GPS achieved its FOC, President Clinton confirmed the US commitment to provide GPS 
signals for international civilian use at an ICAO meeting in Montreal.331 In 1996, Washington 
pledged to provide GPS “for peaceful civil, commercial and scientific use on a continuous 
worldwide basis, free of direct user fees.”332 In the year 2000, President Clinton announced 
that civilians could have more access to the new GPS technologies utilizing the one-time 
DoD navigation system – with the degradation feature Selective Availability (SA).333  
Nowadays, the US GPS is used for all sorts of purposes, from complex military operations 
down to how athletes train. According to the US GPS Agency, there are four million GPS-
enabled devices worldwide, a number that is expected to double by 2020.334 As of 2015, the 
second-generation GPS system (GPS II) had been in service for two decades already. The US 
Air Force is preparing the Third Generation GPS system (GPS III), which is expected to 
provide improved anti-jamming capabilities as well as improved accuracy for precision 
navigation and timing. Completion of GPSIII was foreseen for 2018, but in 2015 a delay was 
announced extending release until 2021,335 to start incorporating the common L1C signal 
which is compatible with the European Galileo global navigation satellite system and 
complements current GPS services with the additional new civil and military signals.  
    
2.2.2. THE GLONASS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND RUSSIA  
In 1982, four and half years after the first GPS prototype satellite went into orbit, the Soviet 
Union launched the first satellite of its own Globalnaya Navigazionnaya Sputnikovaya 
Sistema or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS).336 The GLONASS constellation 
was completed in 1995 and is operated by the Russian Aerospace Defense Forces. GLONASS 
is considered a Russian version of GPS, with a 24-satellite constellation covering the same 
area as the 31 GPS satellites.337 In terms of accuracy, GLONASS outperforms GPS in northern 
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latitudes, as it was originally developed for northern latitudes, unlike the US GPS, which was 
developed for southern latitudes. 
After a capacity decline due to lack of steady political support and sufficient financial means 
in Russia since the later 1990s, the restoration of GLONASS has now again become a priority 
for the Kremlin. Moscow is currently pushing GLONASS to penetrate into the commercial 
markets mostly occupied by GPS services, in particular before the European Galileo attains 
its FOC foreseen by 2020. President Putin substantially increased GLONASS funding from 
2001. To accelerate its FOC achievement, Russia, in the course of 2014-2015, convinced 
Brazil,338 China,339 Iran,340 and Nicaragua,341 as well as members of the Eurasia Economic 
Union, namely Kazakhstan and Belarus,342 to host Russian GLONASS ground stations in their 
territories. Israel was approached to host a Russian GNSS ground station under an Israel-
Russia cooperation framework.343 Other countries, such as India344 and Mexico,345 have 
expressed their interest in cooperating with Moscow. Up to 2015, the GLONASS network 
consisted of 28 satellites, allowing real-time positioning and speed data for surface, sea and 
airborne objects around the globe. From the end-user side, up to 151 smart phone 
manufacturers, including Apple, Samsung, HTC, Motorola, Sony, and Nokia, among others, 
are reported to be GLONASS service supporters.346 In the global race for the GNSS services 
market, Moscow is trying to produce its own electronic devices as from 2018,347 and is 
working with Beijing to develop a BeiDou-GLONASS-GPS compatible device in order to 
preserve competiveness in both Chinese and Russian GNSS user markets.348  
  
2.2.3. THE EUROPEAN GALILEO  
Europe had no presence in GNSS development before the 1990s because there was little 
pressure for an indigenous European satellite navigation system. Policymakers and 
industrialists became interested in it only when GPS was made available to civilian users as 
well as when conflicts erupted close to EU borders in the Balkan Peninsula in the 1990s.349 
European skepticism gradually grew, particularly with the US maintaining the capability to 
degrade civilian GPS accuracy immediately upon direction, though US President Clinton had 
reconfirmed his policy to make improved accuracy to approximately 10 meters of civilian-
accessible GPS selectively available in 2000.350 In 2000, a joint ESA/EC Report “A European 
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Strategy for Space” (sometimes known as the Bildt report) provided its central conclusion 
that Europe should not become dependent on an external ‘space infrastructure’ for strategic 
or commercial applications.351 It was noted later that, with a European GNSS project 
(Galileo) Europe can achieve political, security,352 and technological independence from the 
US.353 Furthermore, Europe was expected to envision overthrowing the US monopoly on 
GNSS by expanding the European GNSS market share and creating new GNSS world 
standards.354 French President Jacques Chirac went so far as to state that if Europe did not 
fund Galileo it would become an “American vassal.”355 Lately, the European Commission 
planned to complete the entire GNSS constellation of 30 satellites and their supporting 
ground stations to provide full services by 2020.356  
The initial phase and the slow development of the European Galileo were intricate. EU and 
ESA overlapping Member States (MSs), such as France, Italy and Spain, appeared 
particularly motivated to strengthen Europe’s global strategic independence with a 
European GNSS. They considered Galileo rather a public service than a pan-European 
commercial project.357 France in particular was keen on Europe’s strategic independence as 
well as for sales through the Public Regulated Service (PRS), Galileo’s equivalent to GPS 
Selected Availability. This prospect was not, however, sufficient to win agreement from all 
member states for the costly Galileo project, especially with the well-performing GPS 
already in place. Furthermore, the financial contribution shares and the governance 
structure of the future Galileo equally divided European member states. Any major decision 
would in fact need to satisfy at the same time the overlapping member states of the 
European Union and of the European Space Agency. The 28-member transatlantic security 
institution, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can be also implicated in the 
Galileo policy decision process since the US-led NATO compelled its member states to use 
the American GPS for operational and security reason instead of using any other GNSS 
system. There are also overlapping European states between EU, ESA and NATO. As 
different member states and three independent regional regimes have not always shared 
the same visions, strategic concerns and budgetary restraints about the ambitious European 
GNSS project, it took a long time to harmonize the conflicting stances of all parties, delaying 
the take-off and significantly inhibiting the entire development of the European GNSS.  
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Figure13. The Complex Governance of the EU Galileo 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           
                                     
 
 
                                     
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s creation 
 
Externally, the European Galileo project drew the non-EU and non-ESA countries’ attention 
regarding Europe’s security and diplomacy ambitions. This delicately implicated the 
traditional transatlantic relationship and the relations between the European Union and the 
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The US primarily 
downplayed European calls for Galileo and took measures to forestall its development. The 
European Galileo PRS initially overlay with the future GPS III M-code. As for US-led NATO, 
there were concerns that Galileo could provide enemy forces with a PNT service which 
could not be jammed without also blocking the existing US-operational GPS,358 thus the 
well-known stand-off on Galileo PRS and GPS III M-Code overlay. 
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By 2002, all NATO MSs except France had reached an agreement that prioritized the GPS 
military code for NATO operations. This meant that NATO should be able to deny access to 
any other satellite navigation system during a conflict, including Galileo. In turn, two 
traditional Atlantic partners reached the compromise that Washington accept Galileo as an 
independent GNSS in exchange for Brussels accepting the US security and commercial 
concerns with a GPS-Galileo cooperative agreement to produce an interoperable and 
compatible system for global navigation.359 The US agreed to develop a common standard 
for satellite navigation and by taking steps to strengthen the commercial and military 
competiveness of GPS.360 Concerning the European interests in sharing the global GNSSs 
market, Brussels accepted that both US and the EU should apply the non-discrimination and 
open markets principles of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in terms of the trade of 
satellite-related goods and services, and agreed to provide open access to information 
concerning signal specifications, signal structures, and frequency characteristics. This 
meant the US companies would have full access to Galileo technical information and 
markets in order to compete in the market for Galileo applications and services.  
 
2.2.4. CHINESE BEIDOU (COMPASS)  
Chinese satellite PNT technology research could be traced to the 1960s. Nevertheless, 
further to a series of single-star (satellite), double-star, three-star and five-star regional 
navigation satellite constellation tests, a Chinese satellite PNT system plan was documented 
only from 1983.361 In 1994, a “double stars rapid positioning system” paved the way for the 
BeiDou-1 two-satellite radio determination satellite service (RDSS) system (Graph 10). 
According to the press, the impetus for such systems seemed to be Chinese military 
requirements for more accurate missile targeting.362  
In the later 1990s, China was preparing newer BeiDou satellites. Some years later, China 
and Europe agreed that China become part of the European Galileo consortium – Galileo 
Joint Undertaking (GJU) as from 2003. Too soon, conflicting factors and intricate situations 
ended the Chinese GJU joint venture by 2006. First, the intra-regional divergence and the 
complex governing model of the European GNSS project slowed the progress of Chinese 
Galileo participation. Second, the unhappiness of the US and the NATO allies about the 
Galileo project constantly impeded its development. Moreover, Beijing’s participation was 
itself thought to be one of the security and commercial concerns of Washington. Finally, as a 
GNSS Supervisory Authority of the EC/ESA was created to take over the GJU by 2006, the 
new European GNSS Authority did not extend the partnership with China after the former 
GJU accord expired.363 All in all, Beijing had acquired 20 atomic clocks, one of the critical 
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components for GNSS, from a Swiss firm throughout the GJU.364 Hence, China accelerated 
the development of its own GNSS, BeiDou. The Chinese BeiDou system (BDS), with a 35-
satellite constellation, currently centered on the Asia-Pacific region and is to attain global 
coverage by the year 2020. The first experimental satellite of the BDS was launched in 2007. 
By late 2012, BDS started providing commercial and public GNSS services with short 
message capabilities as a RNSS covering the area of China and other Asian countries.365 The 
international Maritime Organization (IMO) ratified the performance standard of a receiver 
of the ship-borne BDS in 2014.366 Beijing is upgrading the BDS to ICAO standards in order to 
apply it to carriers.367  
The success of China’s BDS has important political, military and economic significances. The 
political significance means that China is growing its national military space power. China’s 
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planned to deploy BeiDou terminals to all its 
brigades/regiments, PLA Navy (PLAN) ships, the Second Artillery Force (SAF) and the Air 
Force (PLAAF) for disaster and emergency response, and to support public security and 
military operations.368 Externally, Beijing probed building up its regional space leadership 
by involving South East Asian nations as part of BeiDou system. Thailand, Laos, Brunei and 
Pakistan369 and other ASEAN nations have gradually agreed to use the BeiDou service and to 
host its ground facilities on their territories. In the realm of the commercialization of 
Chinese GNSS services, China signed a commercial agreement with Singapore to avoid 
jamming problems.370 Both China and Russia kept jointly promoting the compatibility and 
interoperability between BeiDou and GLONASS to be accommodated by the BRICS group 
members.371 In the recent (2015) Ministerial Meeting of the China-led Central Asia partner 
group, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and Russia announced that a 
GLONASS-BeiDou global international navigation system will be used by the member states 
of BRICS and SCO groups.372 After the MH 370 and MH 17 incidents, China proposed a 
“Space Silk Road” program, which can use the BeiDou system to create a live-feed “black-
box” which would provide constant global coverage of all air, shipping and overland 
routes.373    
   
2.2.5. EMERGING REGIONAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEMS  
Each GNSS service has its optimal geographical coverage, technical limitations and 
vulnerability to resist harmful interference and physical collision. The different GNSS 
services purportedly compensate each other’s deficiencies, including liability, integrity, and 
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inadequate civilian accuracy. 374  Regional augmentation systems based on different 
geographical areas worldwide are the solution. The GNSS global service providers on the 
one hand all need these complementary systems to better service accuracy and continuity. 
Nonetheless, they remain cautious if unexpected congestion, competition, and contests 
would appear to be detrimental to their own system utilities and other specific interests. 
Nor would spacefaring nations develop a regional augmentation system only expecting to 
support and complete any of the existing and future GNSSs. Developing a regional 
augmentation system helps a spacefaring state to improve its space capabilities via the 
acquisition from critical technologies transfers from an extant GNSS service provider. 
Meanwhile, these countries enjoy all the advantages of operating these sophisticated 
services to resolve its national policy areas in security, safety, economic growth and 
development, and environmental protection and sustainability. To the maximum 
advantages, spacefaring countries could develop its global GNSS via the development of a 
RNSS if all astropolitical, financial and market challenges would be overcome.    
In the development of various regional GNSS augmentation systems, the European 
Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS), Japan’s MTSAT Satellite Augmentation 
System (MSAS) and Indian GPS Aided Geo Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) all started their 
initial phase as the American GPS augmentation systems. (Figure 4) Hence, Europe 
continued to develop its own GNSS – Galileo. Japan started to develop its regional 
navigation satellite system – QAZZ. India is preparing an indigenous Indian Regional 
Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS). Chinese BeiDou created its own regional system before 
attaining a Chinese GNSS. The developments of European and Chinese GNSSs were 
presented the above. We, hereby, only introduce Japan’s QAZZ and India’s IRNSS. As shown 
in the Figure 12, the geographical coverage of the individual regional GNSS augmentation 
system does not only divide the world by geographical regions but also geostrategic regions. 
The overlaying of the Chinese, Indian and Japanese RNSSs in Asia-Pacific is particularly 
remarkable and, to a certain extent, significant that indicates the uprising space capability 
development competition and conflicting space security situations in this region.     
Figure14. Worldwide GNSS Augmentation systems 
 
Source: European Space Agency 
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2.2.5.1. JAPANESE QUASI-ZENITH SATELLITE SYSTEM (QZSS) 
Since the end of World War II, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has outlawed war as a 
means to settle international disputes involving the country. Accordingly, Japan’s national 
space program ought to be non-military, R&D oriented. In 2008, the Japanese Basic Space 
Law knocked out the door to dual-use space technologies.375 Related space policy was 
modified and became effective in 2009376 and 2013377 which proposed a space utilization-
driven approach to stimulate economic activity in Japan after multiple decades of stagnation. 
Tokyo’s new plan, issued in 2015, potentially switched the focus of the Japanese Space 
Policy away from the market and towards the military.378 These successive adjustments of 
Japanese national space policies are noted to complicate the development of Japanese QZSS, 
particularly the longstanding Tokyo-Washington space relationship. The conflicting GPS-
QZSS cooperation appeared to be in the arenas of 1) the encrypted military GPS code; 2) 
procurement (trade); and 3) the need for a long-term Japanese strategy in its navigation 
satellite system.379 Actually, Washington signed a joint statement on GPS cooperation with 
Tokyo in 1998. In 2002, the cooperation was reinforced by the cooperation between the US 
GPS and Japan’s regional constellation – Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS). With a 
constellation of seven satellites, Japan’s QZSS will be a dual-purpose system containing both 
a commercial S-band communication payload and a navigation payload. It is foreseen that 
the QZSS will start its primary service in 2018 with four satellites that will cover Asia and 
Pacific region.380  
For various reasons, including the US-Japan common security and economic interests vs. 
China’s BeiDou in the Asia-Pacific region, the GPS-QZSS alliance came to offer QZSS a 
functional GNSS complementary and augmentation capability and a newly developed GNSS 
application, messaging service. In turn, the QZSS will offer the country sustainable domestic 
GPS-like services and equally serves as a back-up option to the US GPS system in the event 
of malfunction.381 The QZSS is promised to use the same frequencies and protocols as GPS, 
and would be in effect a regional extension of GPS, rather than a competitor. For the 
economic rationale, Japan may not want to promote a new or modified standard that would 
harm its installed base of users or the companies involved in the manufactures of GPS 
equipment in Japan. Otherwise, the security and societal needs were stressed by Tokyo for 
having a national RNSS instead of a GNSS augmentation service. It was argued that Japan’s 
geography is poorly suited for accurately capturing GPS data due to its mountainous terrain 
and urban canyons.382  
                                                             
375 Aoki, The national Space Law of  Japan: Basic Space Law and the Space Activities Act in the Making. 
http://www.iislweb.org/docs/2011_galloway/Aoki.pdf  
376 Basic Plan for Space Policy, 2009. http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/utyuu/keikaku/pamph_en.pdf  
377 Basic Plan on Space Policy, 2013. www8.cao.go.jp/space/plan/plan-eng.pdf  
378 Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai, Japan’s Space Policy Shift Reflects New Asian Realities, Space News, February 
23, 2015. http://spacenews.com/op-ed-japans-space-policy-shift-reflects-new-asian-realities/ 
379 Beckner, Christian, et al. (2003) US-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation. Washington: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
380 Office of  National Space Policy, Cabinet Office, Government of  Japan. 2014.  
381 La Regina, Veronica (2015) Business partnership and technology transfer opportunities in the Space sector between EU and 
Japan. Tokyo: EU-Japan Centre for Industrial Cooperation.   
382 An urban canyon, or street canyon, is a place where the street is flanked by tall buildings on both sides 
creating a canyon-like environment. 
125 | P a g e  
 
2.2.5.2. INDIAN REGIONAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE SYSTEM (IRNSS) 
In the year 2001, the Airport Authority of India (AAI) and the Indian Space Research 
Organisation (IRSO) jointly conceived the GPS Aided GEO Augmented Navigation (GAGAN) 
project which aimed to enhance accuracy of GPS over the Bay of Bengal, southeast Asia, the 
Indian Ocean, the Middle East and Africa, in fact, up to 1,500 kilometers beyond the 
country’s borders. In 2013, IRSO launched the first satellite for its satellite-based air 
navigation services and entered the group of nations comprising the US (WAAS), EU 
(EGNOS) and Japan (MSAS) that each have similar regional satellite-based augmentation 
systems (SBAS). The GAGAN system fills a vital gap in the areas of coverage between the 
European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) and Japan’s Multi-functional 
Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS). GAGAN is inter-operable with other international 
SBAS and is useful for aviation, smart transportation, shipping, highways, railways, 
surveying, geodesy, security agencies, the telecom industry, personal users of location 
applications, and so forth. 
While GAGAN attempts to redefine navigation over Indian airspace, India is simultaneously 
developing an Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) covering the Indian 
region. The basic difference between GAGAN and IRNSS is that GAGAN will be for civilian 
use whereas IRNSS will be for India’s national defense. 
In 2001 the Indian Space Research Organisation (IRSO) launched an Indian Regional 
Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) initiative to develop an independent satellite-based 
navigation system to provide PNT services for users across the Indian region. The system 
uses a constellation of seven satellites and a vast network of ground systems. The first three 
satellites were launched in 2013-2014. The fourth satellite was successfully launched on 
March 28, 2015. The entire IRNSS constellation of seven satellites is expected to be 
completed in mid-2016.383 The IRNSS will be a dual-use regional PNT system which is 
foreseen to provide both standard position service (SPS) and restricted [encrypted] service 
(RS). 
The strategic requirements of New Delhi for a space-based navigation system were 
suggested to be regional. For security reasons, India would need its own RNSS to defend its 
national security and territorial integrity because its regional adversaries, China and 
Pakistan, have nuclear weapons and a significant inventory of state-of-art missiles. 
Furthermore, China has committed to providing Pakistan with a “military-quality” signal 
from its BeiDou system. For all these reasons, India needs to have an independent reliable 
and accurate space-based navigational system. As India has purchased military equipment 
of Russian origin and from the US and Israel, IRNSS could therefore in principle share 
commercial market interests with these spacefaring states, and so maintain a certain 
strategic parity for the country.384 In 2015, New Delhi announced the extension of GAGAN 
and IRNSS applications to South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 
countries,385 including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, 
and Sri Lanka, a new direction in India’s space diplomacy and a step towards conquering a 
new market. After all, India will be the third of the BRICS countries to have its own 
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navigation system, after China and Russia. At present Brazil operates the Russian system 
GLONASS.   
Finally, Table 2 summarizes the current GNSSs and RNSSs landscape, which highlights 
progress made towards building fully operational capability, geographical regional coverage 
(only about the two RNSSs), and their ally users and their commercial services targeted 
regional markets.  
Table 3. A comparison of the different global and regional navigation satellite systems 
GNSS Provider Year of FOC  Coverage Key Users & Targeted 
Regional Markets 
GPS (US) 1988  US allies, NATO 
GLONASS (Russia) 2020  EEU, SCO, BRICs  
GALILEO (EU) 2020  EU, NATO, ESA 
BEIDOU (China) 2020  SCO, BRICs, ASEAN 
QZSS (Japan) 2018 Asia-Pacific Japan 
IRNSS (India) 2016 Indian Region SAARC, India 
                                                                                                                                               Source: Author’s creation 
 
     3. THE EXPANDING AND FRAGMENTING GNSS GOVERNANCE 
ARCHITECTURE 
 
3.1. THE INTERCONNECTED GNSS GOVERNING ISSUES      
As the dual-use GNSSs expand from primarily military use toward multiple civilian utilities 
for safety, for economic growth and space capability development, and for environmental 
and generational sustainability, the entire GNSS governance architecture equally 
increasingly involves different international regimes of these interconnected governing 
issue areas. Within these policy realms, several longstanding issues have had to be solved, 
either via bilateral arrangements or through multilateral institutions. So, we look the key 
challenges facing GNSS governance, such as 1) the general problem regarding the 
attribution of satellite orbital slots and relevant radio frequency that indirectly created the 
frequency overlay between the four GNSSs’ governmental only services. The issue is directly 
related to national defense and the search and rescue utilities of these GNSS service 
provider countries, so GNSSs for security and safety. 2) Inter-GNSS interoperability and 
compatibility are not only important for security and safety but also for national capability 
autonomy. They are vital to provide a continuous global GNSS service for the traffic controls 
of civil aviation and maritime transportation. Likewise, the issues can help the developing 
countries to not be cornered by one single GNSS but can enjoy the integrated interoperable 
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and compatible GNSSs to improve their nations and peoples life, so GNSSs for safety and 
development. 3) The GNSS service providers and the manufacturers of their downstream 
products seemed to impede the inter-GNSSs interoperability and compatibility issues in 
order to protect their distinct markets and economic interests. Therefore, trade barriers or 
discriminatory market access measures to impede foreign GNSS services and products to 
enter national market were often set for this goal, so GNSSs for economy. 
 
3.1.1. GNSS MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT-ONLY FREQUENCY OVERLAYS 
 
A growing challenge to governing space is the scarcity of the limited orbital slots and 
related satellite radio frequency does not exclude GNSSs. For GNSS, the satellite radio 
frequency overlay became intricate since the growth of multiple GNSSs services. The GNSS 
satellites constantly need two or more frequencies in L band to transmit PNT signals that 
contain ranging codes and navigation data to allow the users to compute the travelling time 
from satellite to receiver and the satellite coordinates at any moment. As navigation 
frequencies occupy such a fairly small neighborhood on the radio spectrum, all GNSSs 
contend with each other to use the same radio spectrum. Once the number of GNSSs and 
user population grew, the individual needs for frequency increased as well. If a requested 
frequency overlays, this needs to be settled or regulated. Otherwise, individual GNSS’s radio 
signal can interfere with each other and then diminish the operation quality of the GNSSs 
services concerned. The UN specialized agency, the International Telecommunication Union 
(ITU), is the global regulating mechanism for this issue. Nonetheless, the ITU has no 
regulating power with GNSSs signal overlays because it cannot be resolved as a matter of 
satellite signal interference. The military have more problems because overlay makes it 
impossible intentionally to jam another network without jamming one’s own frequency. 
The issue can only be resolved between concerned parties. 
Figure 15 shows the results of how radio frequency bands have been allocated by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to the various global and regional navigation 
satellite services. Yet, when military GNSS overlays occur, namely between the US and the 
EU, between the EU and China, this fell outside the ITU’s mandate. It came back to the 
negotiations between the concerned parties who planned to use the same frequency 
bandwidth to resolve the problem themselves. Accordingly, agreement would depend solely 
on the good wills of the concerned parties to respectively make feasible frequency shift or 
share the overlay bandwidth. Otherwise, radio transmitting interference, intentional or not, 
between different GNSS space systems remains. There was a GPS M-code and EU Galileo 
Public Restricted Service code overlay when the EU announced their GNSS project in the 
early 2000s. The problem was solved between the US, NATO and the EU. So the GNSS signal 
overlays remain between GPS L5 / Galileo E5 / GLONASS G3 and GPS L1 / Galileo E1 / 
GLONASS G1 signals with up to 52MHz bandwidth while using only one common baseband. 
The other overlay dispute started after the non-extended EU-China GJU partnership. China 
decided to place the encrypted “government-only” (military) of its BeiDou navigation 
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service on a section of radio spectrum that overlays with Galileo quasi-military PRS and GPS 
M-code service.386  
Figure15. GNSSs Signals Overlays 
 
 
Source: European Space Agency 
 
3.1.2. INTER-GNSS COMPATIBILITY FOR SAFETY AND DEVELOPMENT  
When the GPS and GLONASS were the only GNSS service providers, managing respective 
intra-system no-harm compatibility and limited interoperability between security-oriented 
military operations and safety-oriented civil navigation management was already quite 
complicate. Once more different GNSS services appeared and would attain their full 
operational capability, the inter-system compatibility and interoperability will be even 
more intricate to handle. Because there will be simply more satellite orbital slots and 
relevant frequencies are needed by the different PNT services side. From the users’ side, 
they will have to choose to equip their appliances compatibly for one or more GNSSs in 
order to enjoy the services.  
The issue of inter-GNSS interoperability is primordial for the safety issue area. Civil aviation 
management and airline tracking are one of the uncompleted issues related to GNSS 
governance. In place of cross-border radar air controls, GNSS services possess more 
accurate real-time PNT service that can increase the efficiency and safety of air traffic 
management. Further to the mysterious disappearance of the Malaysian Airlines flight MH 
370 and the same company’s tragically shot-down flight MH 17, the international aviation 
community proposed systemically transferring the GNSS-tacked airplanes location data via 
space-based and ground-based routes to improve the aviation safety and rescue efficiency. 
As for inter-GNSS compatibility, it allows the users to shift from a single GNSS to another 
therefore become dual, and multiple GNSS signals receivers when the overlay and 
interference happens. It would also result in the receivers of these GNSSs being built more 
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easily and inexpensively. In such perfect user-friendly case, the different GNSSs need to be 
mutually compatible and interoperable in order to be able to enhance the effectiveness, 
efficiency of these respective systems, and maximize their profits because of the enlarged 
user market. 
The hurdles of applying such ideal applications of GNSS services appear in two arenas. First, 
in the context that national airspace sovereignty and territorial security prevails, 
systematically transferring the GNSS-tracked flight location data of aircraft flying over a 
country and across borders arouses all countries’ concerns. Moreover, even an international 
operation standard would be attained by all countries, establishing international 
operational and equipment standards387 to allow aerospace industry and airliners to 
produce and purchase compatible and interoperable equipment to all GNSS providers 
services instead of limited exclusive choice. In sum, although the safety issues and 
development counties concerns matter, both national sovereignty and security, and 
commercial advantages of GNSS services providers have constantly been ruling the 
situation.    
 
3.1.3. DISCRIMINATORY MARKET ACCESS FOR GNSS PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
As discussed above, states’ reluctance to set universal inter-GNSS compatible equipment 
standards and interoperable operation rules are due not only to their national security 
concerns. Such reluctance can result in creating technological barriers to trade that prevent 
undesirable foreign GNSS products and services from entering a domestic market. This is 
used to protect one’s own and one’s partners’ GNSS product manufacturers and service 
operators. It could also be explored to preserve the one GNSS market leadership or resist 
against the quasi-monopoly of some. 
It was pointed out that the true GNSS race actually happens in the equipment and services 
industry sector.388 Not only the civil aviation community and the maritime community but 
now also many other sectors “from farming to banking” need GNSS application services, as 
was explained above. Preserving the exclusivity of manufacturing standard equipment that 
respect GNSS operation regulations can generate lucrative benefits for a GNSS service 
provider nation. The service provider state will naturally wish to have access to national 
markets worldwide in order to sell their GNSS services and at the same time find reliable 
but lower cost manufacturers in such exporting markets. If a state is probing its own GNSS 
or already has its political preferences to work with certain GNSS systems, it can create 
various discriminatory measures in favor of its own products and services that raise 
technical barriers to discourage the importation of foreign GNSSs.  
The American GPS was the first and so far remains the dominant service provider in the 
global GNSSs market. This global GNSS market dominance has been laid on a long-term GPS 
strategic alliance and building of user market networks. Since 1978, ten NATO member 
                                                             
387 Berz, Gerhard, “Authorization and Operation of  GNSS Aviation Services in Non-Core Constellation 
States”, Presentation at the Civil GPS Service Interface Committee, Tampa, USA, Sept. 8th 2014. 
388 Mike Shaw, Director of  US National Coordination Office for Space-Based Position, Navigation and Timing 
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states and Australia have become part of the GPS technological development and have 
established a network for information flow. Israel, Korea, and Japan389 have also been part 
of the consortium. Although the US understood that interoperability could create a free ride 
for any potential non-GPS service provider to reduce their own infrastructure costs as there 
are already available compatible infrastructure and service networks once the GPS loses its 
quasi-monopoly position. The participation of these states from every corner in the world 
not merely consolidated the US-led strategic and security alliance, dispersing critical 
extraterritorial GPS ground stations segments, but also enlarged overseas markets for the 
US industries to export GPS-related products and service to those countries.  
In spite of enlarging the GPS user markets, the US cautiously protects the quasi-monopoly of 
GPS technology. To protect the GPS quasi-monopoly in the global GNSSs market and to 
prevent likely critical and sensible space technology transfer from the US partners toward 
non-allied states, most GPS users’ equipment shipped abroad prior to 1991 required 
individual validated license to ensure compliance with various US export control programs, 
for example, the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). ITAR has extraterritorial 
applicability over a listed commodity of information wherever it is located in the world. It 
has been an efficient instrument to preserve the US arms and space-tech leadership and 
military space power. Nevertheless, the US governmental export controls kept affecting GPS 
markets. Facing the currently strong competition in the global space market, the US ITAR 
has been criticized for equally creating disadvantages for US companies when it comes to 
the export of satellites and satellite components, even to NATO allies and other US-friendly 
nations.390 When the Galileo project was launched, Washington warned that Brussels should 
not use regulations or system-driven standards to mandate the use of Galileo thereby 
limiting the GPS manufacturers, service providers, and users.391 A mutual respect for GPS-
Galileo open access to the markets of both sides of the Atlantic was ultimately attained 
between Washington and Brussels. 
In 2014, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) announced that it would 
introduce a compulsory licensing procedure of the navigation signal and certification of 
user devices. The restrictive measure of licensing providers of the GNSSs, certifying 
multisystem receivers, and imposing restrictive measures was noted as a discrimination 
against using GLONASS. Russia argued the US regulations are pushing away the largest 
manufacturers of navigation receivers from using GLONASS and would narrow its market. 
At the same time, it could also stimulate a number of countries to follow the US example, 
this means to introduce the procedure of signal licensing and device certification.392  
Russia and China, who are not part of the WTO agreements barring technical barriers to 
trade in each others goods, and on rules governing government procurement practices, 
have been proactively expanding their joint GNSSs markets externally. To be competitive in 
a GPS-dominated GNSSs market, both Beijing and Moscow helped their traditional allies and 
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established strategic partnership to use their respective GNSSs products and service. They 
are jointly developing multisystem receivers for both GLONASS-BeiDou for the Eurasian 
Economic Union (EEU) and member states and the Silk Road Economic (SREB) markets393 
as well as the member states of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS 
group394. The EEU, including Russia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, is an 
integration association that aims to streamline the flow of goods and services between its 
members. The SREB, consisting of the countries situated on the ancient Silk Road route, 
starting from China, via Central Asia, West Asia, the Middle East, into Europe, is designed to 
strengthen economic ties between Asia, Europe and the Gulf states. The SCO-BRICS 
navigation system was announced to extend the use of GLONASS and BeiDou’s global and 
regional navigation satellite systems in Brazil, Russia, China, South Africa and Pakistan as 
well as in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. The two partner countries are also 
working on various GLONASS-BeiDou-GPS multisystem receivers in order to become more 
flexible to penetrate into more GPS-dominated GNSSs national markets worldwide.395    
 
3.2. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES OF GNSS GOVERNANCE    
As the civilian and commercial use of GNSSs have strong relevance to comprehensive civil 
navigation safety governance, these issues were dealt under the UN auspice, between 
several UN specific agencies and multilateral forum. Naturally, the GNSS governance 
architecture laid on the OST, and other international space treaties. More specific issues 
were dispersed to be handled within other UN specialized agencies, i.e. the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) for allocating satellite orbital slots and radio frequency and 
preventing satellite frequency interference issues. The International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were required to 
guarantee the safety for GNSSs related aviation and maritime navigation by establishing 
specific equipment standards and operational regulations. The World Trade Organization 
(WTO) is expected by some to limit discriminatory access of national market for GNSS 
related trade. Others are developing regional GNSS augmentation systems to acquire 
necessary technology transfer from the global service provider, developing domestic 
manufacturing capabilities and commerce, conquering regional GNSS related product and 
service market, and to resist Western-led global trade mechanism, thus a space 
regionalization.396 The regional powers and their security alliances, such as North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), regional space cooperation regimes, e.g. the European 
Community (EC) and European Space Agency (ESA), the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 
and the Silk Road Economic (SREB), China-led Asia-Pacific Space Organization (APSCO), 
Japan-led Asia Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum (APRSAF) have been developed to 
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attain these goals. International groups such as BRICS were also created for a similar 
purpose.  
 
3.2.1. THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU) 
All space-based systems, including GNSSs, need adequate orbital slots and relevant radio 
frequencies to avoid their satellites collide with other orbiting spacecraft and to transmit 
their data signals without interference. The ITU, which was established in 1932 and 
distantly originated in the International Telegraph Union founded by Napoleon III of France 
in 1865, became one of the UN’s specialized agencies in 1947. The ITU is governed by a 
series of conventions that are reviewed at the ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences every four 
years. These conventions determine the general ITU policies. By 2015, the ITU has a 
membership of 193 countries and almost 800 private-sector entities and academic 
institutions.397 Since 1963, the ITU started its mandates of the allocation of global radio 
spectrum and satellite orbits, development of the technical standards that ensure networks 
and technologies seamlessly interconnect, and commitment to improving access to ICTs to 
underserved communities worldwide.  
Satellite signal conflicts are not an uncommon occurrence. These conflicts were sometimes 
deliberately caused, often as a retaliatory measure. ITU is responsible for providing 
international protection from harmful interference of the ITU registered assignments in the 
MIFR. The interference issue is critical for GNSSs because GNSSs signals are particularly 
vulnerable to harmful interference due to their very low transmission strength. The 
concerned states should deal with the overlay problems among themselves. This was the 
case of the US-European satellite navigation discussion during the Galileo design phase as 
an example. We see that at the time, some European Galileo backers wanted Public 
Regulated Service (PRS) to overlay the GPS M-code that the US and China both reserve for 
military and civil-security uses. The issue was if a US GPS M-code or Chinese BeiDou signal 
overlay with PRS, it will not impinge on the operations of either system, but will make it 
difficult for either one to jam the signals of the other in the event of conflict. To preserve the 
existing monopoly of M-code, the US therefore threatened to cease all satellite navigation 
cooperation with Europe unless the PRS signal was moved away from the M-code 
frequencies. European governments ultimately agreed to the US request.398 Another dispute 
between Chinese and the European global navigation systems frequencies originated in 
2010. The case was due to go to ITU for settlement in 2012.399  The ITU claimed it had no 
legal instrument to handle the government-only encrypted service radio spectrum overlay 
disputes, because the issue fell outside the ITU mandate. 
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3.2.2. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON GLOBAL NAVIGATION SATELLITE 
SYSTEMS (ICG) 
We have already established that GNSSs are the most popular day-to-day use of outer space, 
with applications that can have beneficial impacts on infrastructure, education, health, 
farming, banking, and so forth. Possessing capabilities of manufacturing GNSS-relevant 
products and being able to operate GNSS services also help countries to stay on the track of 
continuous industrial and commercial modernization, so to economic growth. For this, the 
UN COPUOS established in 2001 the Action Team on Global Navigation Satellite Systems 
with the voluntary participation of 38 Member States and 15 organizations. The Action 
Team on GNSS subsequently led to the establishment of the UN International Committee on 
GNSS (ICG) to promote the enhancement of universal access to and compatibility of space-
based navigation and positioning systems in order to improve the efficiency and security of 
transport, search and rescue, geodesy and other activities.  
The origin of the ICG establishment was addressed at the Third UN Conference on the 
Exploration and Peaceful uses of Outer Space (UNISPACE-III) in 1999 that the world should 
seize significant opportunities for human development through advances in space science 
and technology. Thus, the UN General Assembly endorsed “The Space Millennium: Vienna 
Declaration on Space and Human Development” adopted by UNISPACE-III specifically for 
enabling space technology providing PNT services.400 The Vienna Declaration called for 
action, notably to improve the efficiency and security of transport, search and rescue, 
geodesy and other activities by promoting the enhancement of, universal access to and 
compatibility of space-based navigation and positioning systems. Consequently, the UN 
invited GNSS and augmentation system providers to consider establishing an international 
committee on GNSS in order to maximize the benefits of the use and applications of GNSS to 
support sustainable development in 2004.401 In 2005, the UN established a separate body 
completely devoted to GNSS – the International Committee on GNSS Navigation Satellite 
(ICG) for which UNOOSA acts as Executive Secretariat.402  
The ICG grouped the six global and regional system providers in a Providers’ Forum to 
conduct discussions of mutual interest focused on improving coordinated services 
provision to benefit humankind. The Providers’ Forum is not a policymaking body, but 
provides ways and means of promoting communication among system providers on key 
technical issues and operational concepts such as protection of the GNSS spectrum and 
orbital debris/orbit de-confliction.” The decision-making is based on consensus agreed 
guidelines for provision of open services, including transparency, cooperation, performance 
monitoring and spectrum protection; and agreed principles for ensuring compatibility and 
interoperability among systems.403  
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3.2.3. THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION (ICAO) 
GNSSs provide navigation services for land, maritime, and air transportation, and in so 
doing provide at least two types of advantage. They improve safety by providing traffic 
control facilities, and they improve efficiency by saving navigating time and energy 
consumption. As from the early 1980s, the international civil aviation community became 
interested in using satellite-based navigation aids as particular means of enabling aircraft to 
land in bad weather and at night. Since the advantages provided by satellite navigation 
systems for safety, accuracy and cost-benefit gains are so obvious, the aviation community 
intensified its strategic efforts to push a gradual transition from conventional navigation 
systems to global navigation satellite systems.404 To this end, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), a UN specialized agency, attempted to create an integrated global 
system of air traffic management, which should include the US GPS, the Russian GLONASS 
and other future GNSSs, over which Contracting States exercises a sufficient level control on 
aspects related to its use by civil aviation. The ICAO originated from the 1944 Chicago 
Convention and Annex, has 190 contracting states by 2015. The ICAO policies are decided in 
the ICAO General Assembly and the ICAO Council, which consists of 36 states. The ICAO is 
mandated to promote standards and recommended practices (SARPS) regarding the safety 
of international civil aviation.  
The ICAO proposed the concept of Communication, Navigation and Surveillance/Air Traffic 
Management (CNS/ATM) in 1991. The navigation element of CNS/ATM systems is meant to 
provide accurate, reliable and seamless position determination capability, worldwide, 
through introduction of satellite-based aeronautical navigation. Therefore, the CNS/ATM 
concept involved the establishment of a standard GNSS around 2005, with a second system 
(GNSS-2) – relying on a civil satellite constellation – to be installed around 2010. In 1994 
and 1996, the US and Russia in turn offered to provide ICAO with GPS/GLONASS services 
for the foreseeable future on a continuous worldwide basis and free of direct user fees. In 
1998, the ICAO General Assembly issued two resolutions: A32-19, “Charter on the Rights 
and Obligations of States Relating to GNSS Services”, and A32-20, “Development and 
elaboration of an appropriate long-term legal framework to govern the implementation of 
GNSS”. The use of satellite navigation for aviation was given a significant boost when ICAO 
recognized the benefits of this system resolved for global implementation of satellite 
navigation-based routes and fight procedures generically called Global Navigation Satellite 
System (GNSS) procedures in 2007. 
The ICAO Charter related to GNSSs embodies certain fundamental principles applicable to 
the CNS/ATM implementation and operation. Firstly, the safety of international civil aviation 
should be fully safeguarded by states and individual service providers at all times in the 
operation of GNSS, including during modification to the systems. Secondly, the multiple 
providers and commercial competition are expected to provide a natural basis for 
guaranteed GNSS accessibility, therefore a universal accessibility without discrimination 
needs to be guaranteed. Nonetheless, the remaining issue is how to render it generally 
applicable. Thirdly, the principle of GNSS service continuity is closely related to the issue of 
non-discriminatory access. The “continuity” may be understood in either a technical or a 
legal sense. In the narrower technical sense, continuity may refer to effective arrangements 
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to minimize the operational impact of unavoidable system malfunctions or failure and 
achieve expeditious service recovery. In a wider legal sense, continuity may also mean the 
principle that the services are not to be interrupted, modified, altered or terminated for 
military, budgetary or other non-technical reasons. It is recommended that States provide 
adequate safeguards to the principle of continuity in both the technical and legal meaning in 
the implementation and operation of CNS/ATM systems. The Charter states that every State 
providing GNSS services shall ensure the continuity, availability, integrity, accuracy and 
reliability of its services, including effective arrangements to minimize the operational 
impact of system malfunctions or failure, and to achieve expeditious service recovery. 
Fourthly, the principle of respect of states’ sovereignty over the airspace above their 
territory when states implement and operate CNS/ATM via GNSS shall neither infringe nor 
impose restrictions upon state sovereignty, authority or responsibility in the control of air 
navigation and the promulgation and enforcement of safety regulations. By contrast, the US 
and Russian have respectively agreed with the ICAO that the GPS and GLONASS will only 
provide navigation aid signals for use in aircraft positioning. Finally, the ICAO Charter 
equally urges compatibility of regional arrangements with as well as cooperation and mutual 
assistance for the global planning and implementation of CNS/ATM systems.  
The ICAO and ITU have been working together on the avoidance of harmful interference 
with GNSSs, which as stated previously are vulnerable to harmful interference because of 
their very low transmission strength. The ICAO-ITU Memorandum of Cooperation was signed 
soon after the unlawful harmful interference that occurred in the Incheon region of South 
Korea in 2011 and 2012. In 2011, 106 airplanes of 18 airlines were registered as affected. In 
2012, 1016 aircraft of 33 different airlines and 16 states were disrupted. 
 
3.2.4. THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION (IMO) 
Maritime users are viewed as a small community in comparison with other large user 
groups of a future GNSS. Nevertheless, in the General Assembly of the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) in 1997, the UN specialized agency for maritime safety 
proactively recognized the need for a future civil and internationally-controlled GNSS that 
can provide ships with navigational position-fixing throughout the world for general 
navigation, including navigation in harbor entrances and approaches and other waters in 
which navigation is restricted. Together with the ICAO, the two UN specialized agencies 
have been working the aviation and maritime requirements for a future GNSS.405 The IMO of 
171-Member States and three Associate Members, therefore established a set of positioning 
requirements for future GNSS to ensure that these requirements are considered in the 
development of future GNSS(s). Like the major considerations of the ICAO related to GNSSs, 
maritime safety, equipment and operational standardization with regard to GNSSs are the 
issues with which the IMO has primarily concerned itself.  
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3.2.5. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO) 
The popular GNSSs can keep a country on the track of continuous industrial and commercial 
modernization to generate economic growth. Developing GNSS-relevant manufactures and 
service sectors can stimulate industries and commerce to move from the low tech to high 
tech range. To keep their industrial and commercial leadership positions, or to protect their 
own domestic industries and commerce, GNSS service providers were reluctant to inter-
GNSS interoperability and incompatibility proposals, and set certain technical barriers to 
hurdle undesirable foreign GNSSs products and services entering its domestic and allies’ 
markets. For this issue, some GNSS service providers, namely the US and the European 
Union, but not China and Russia, choose the World Trade Organization as an international 
platform to handle disputes related to GNSS market access discrimination. 
Since 1948, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has provided the rules for 
the global tariff and trade system. Over the years GATT evolved through several rounds of 
negotiations. The last and largest GATT round, was the Uruguay Round which lasted from 
1986 to 1994 and gave birth to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Whereas GATT had 
mainly dealt with trade in goods, the WTO and its agreements further cover trade in 
services, and traded inventions, creations and designs (intellectual property). The first 
fundamental WTO principle to be applied in international trade is “most-favored-nation” 
(MFN) treatment. Under the WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate 
between their trading partners. Grant someone a special favor (such as a lower customs 
duty rate for one of their products) and you have to do the same for all other WTO members. 
In general, MFN means that every time a country lowers a trade barrier or opens up a 
market, it has to do so for the same goods or services from all its trading partners – whether 
rich or poor, weak or strong. Nevertheless, the WTO agreements allow countries to 
introduce changes gradually, through “progressive liberalization”. Developing countries are 
usually given longer to fulfill their obligations. 
The second fundamental principle is “national treatment”. This means treating foreigners 
and locals equally. Imported and locally produced goods should be treated equally – at least 
after the foreign goods have entered the market. The same should apply to foreign and 
domestic services, and to foreign and local trademarks, copyrights and patents. National 
treatment only applies once a product, service or item of intellectual property has entered 
the market. Therefore, charging customs duty on an import is not a violation of national 
treatment even if locally produced products are not charged an equivalent tax. 
The US recognized that World Trade Organization (WTO) rules applied to commercial GPS 
activities. In 2014 the US and the EU signed a wide body of satellite navigation agreements 
designed to promote open market access and interoperability.406 During the GPS-Galileo 
standoff (2004-2009), the US Government position was that any preferential treatment the 
EU gave to the Galileo PNT network would violate WTO agreements. Of particular concern 
to the Americans was that the EU was “weighing equipment mandates for aviation, car-
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accident reporting and emergency-call regulations that could unfairly tip the scale in favor 
of Galileo to the detriment of US GPS-enabled hardware.”407 
Because of the competition and cooperation of US GPS and EU Galileo, the World Trade 
Organization became partly involved in solving likely GNSSs related disputes. Otherwise, 
not all GNSS service providers, namely China and Russia, chose the WTO to rule the GNSSs 
trade matters. Meanwhile, China and Russia are proactively developing BeiDou-GLONASS 
interoperability and interoperable markets with the member states of various regional 
economic cooperation regimes, such as the Eurasia Economic Union (EEC), the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Silk 
Road Economic Belt (SREB). Ostensibly, GNSSs trading group other than the WTO is taking 
its shape.     
4. THE LOGICS OF GNSSS REGIME COMPLEX FORMATION  
The morphogenesis of the entire GNSSs related international regimes constellation recalls 
the liberal institutionalism approach. The concept underlined that harmonizing individual 
national stances on the dual use GNSS technologies and services by establishing common 
rules, operational standards, and managing institutions – international regimes is desirable 
by countries to avoid chaos and conflicts in the global GNSS astropolitics. Nonetheless, the 
continuous creations of new regimes and the shifted functions of extant international 
institutions could not completely reflect this approach. Because although states chose to 
solve a common problem by setting up an international regime instead of handling it alone 
or simply with a small group of countries, they nevertheless sought to align the institutional 
mandates, policy-making methods and organizational structure of these regimes to pursue 
their relative power and satisfy their own interests. Because of this, some stressed that the 
more issue-specific power an actor has in these international institutions, the greater its 
weight relevant to the issue area.408 States therefore are stimulated to sponsor the 
institutionalization of an international regime, choose the well-timed moment and look for 
the best participation formula to be part of an international regime in order to maximize 
their strategic advantages, satisfy their functional needs and solve the practical problems, as 
well as safeguard their interests and basic rights. In practice, new international regimes are 
often created on top of the existing regimes with overlapping membership to attain states’ 
various objectives.  
Lesage and Van de Graaf of the Ghent Institute for International Studies (GIIS) have 
suggested that the intricate morphogenesis of a particular governance issue area regime 
complex is mainly driven by the strategic, functional and organizational dynamics.409 These 
intersecting driving forces subsequently thrust the governance architecture, of GNSS issue-
area for example, toward expansion and fragmentation into a regime complex.410 In their 
view, countries becoming part of an international regime depends on their general and 
particular interests, or simply on functional necessity. The moment at which a country 
enters or leaves an international regime is also well timed. Powerful nations seem to have 
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no hesitation in influencing the missions and organizational design of the targeted 
multilateral forums in order to assure their leverage powers in the international institution, 
such as some groups of weaker and emerging nations. When the internal changes within a 
regime are not satisfactory, states will not hesitate to create new regimes, shift the 
institutional missions of existing bodies, or even desert an existing institution to satisfy 
their strategic calculations and interests. International regimes are also created or reformed 
to satisfy states’ capability building interests and to fulfill their functional necessity in the 
cases of GNSS governance. This might be for the GNSS service providers to group their 
supportive nations to host the ground stations of their system in the territories, or from the 
supportive states viewpoint, for them to become part of the different GNSSs for the interest 
in developing their own national and regional GNSS capabilities.  
In addition to the strategic concerns and functional requirements, the creation and changes 
of international regimes are equally constrained by a path dependency in its development, 
which can be legal and technical framework from the extant regimes and their institutional 
structure. These legal, technical and institutional frameworks have both descendent and 
transcendent power that limit individual states’ influential power to make policy choices 
toward their preferences on the one hand, and implicate other international regimes into 
competition or cooperation. An ostensive example of such overruling force is the equity 
approach in the GNSS governance. The equity emphasis has been constantly utilized by the 
developing countries and the emerging nations to improve their space capability 
vulnerability and legitimize their uprising in the vibrant global GNSS astropolitics and 
competitive markets. By consequence, such equity stress has not only often successfully 
downplayed the spacefaring states’ pure strategic calculations towards some equitable 
compromises in the bargaining processes on GNSS governance. It has resolved functional 
needs and even gained strategic advantages and commercial profits for some developing 
countries and particularly emerging nations.  
     
4.1. STATES’ STRATEGIC DISPERSION IN DIFFERENT INTERNATIONAL REGIMES     
Whether countries decide to be part of an international regime or not depends on their 
general and particular interests, or simply functional necessity. The timing to become in-
and-out of an international regime is well-timed as well. Powerful nations seem to have no 
hesitation about influencing the missions and organizational design of the targeted 
multilateral forums in order to assure their leverage powers in the international institution, 
or indeed some groups of weaker and emerging nations. When the internal changes within a 
regime are not satisfactory, states will not hesitate to create new regimes, shift the extant 
institutional missions, or even desert an existing institution to satisfy their strategic 
calculations and interests. 
In the realm of GNSS governance, the GPS M-code vs. Galileo PRS then later the GPS M-
code/Galileo PRS vs. BeiDou government-only overlays were salient cases in which all GNSS 
service providers were vying for their own strategic and security interests by owning their 
own GNSS and operating it independently in the security arena. Already from the intra-
regional level, the debates among the overlapping EU and ESA member states about whither 
European indigenous GNSS and Galileo PRS were virulent. France, an ambitious spacefaring 
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nation with nuclear and space capabilities, had a strategic plan to arm its future forces with 
Galileo PRS along with the use of the GPS M-code via NATO access. It was also pushing for 
an independent Galileo PRS in order to develop future Galileo-related arms sales in global 
and regional markets.411 The United Kingdom restricted its Galileo participation to civilian 
uses and would not use Galileo PRS for British forces. As a consequence, London sought to 
deny other European states’ use of PRS. The UK argued that the GPS M-code is sufficient for 
the UK, making Galileo PRS redundant.412 This strong resistance has long evoked French 
suspicion that the British preference not to adopt PRS seemed a camouflaged way of 
defending GPS’s M-code and its use by its allied governments,413 mainly the US and the US-
led transatlantic security ally, NATO. Germany as well has refused to express whether to 
accept PRS because the government-only encrypted code would greatly increase the Galileo 
budget.  
With regard to transatlantic relations, in order to protect the military superiority and 
market quasi-monopoly of the US GPS, Washington with its NATO allies continuously 
pressed Brussels to compromise its PRS overlay with the GPS M-Code around 2002-2003. 
The US had concern that China and Israel, two non-European partners of the Galileo Joint 
Undertaking (GJU), would be involved in managing Galileo’s encrypted, government-only 
PRS once the Galileo attains operationality. The non-EC partnerships could complicate the 
jamming risk management for both GPS M-code and Galileo PRS. The European PRS plan 
would compromise regional navigation warfare in the future in which any US adversary was 
using PRS signals. Since Europe had tiny room to hold its leverage over GPS NAVWAR 
operations, ultimately sacrificed its strategic independence by ceding the point and moved 
PRS off the M-code frequencies. 
In the arena of GNSSs worldwide commercial race, it was easily understood that GNSSs 
civilian use would generate great trade revenues and business opportunities for service 
providers and the downstream components manufactures. Once the GPS quasi-monopoly or 
the GPS-GLONASS disproportional shared oligarchy fails, other service providers would 
immediately enter the GNSSs markets to sell their exclusive or compatible GNSS products 
and services in an interoperable GNSSs global market. Before the foreseen opening of the 
GNSSs global market, the US from 1976 had its domestic International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations (ITAR) as a unilateral American arms embargo against the Soviet-led 
multilateral Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COMECON) of the 
Cold War Eastern Bloc countries. ITAR governs the transfer of arms and applies to business 
activities that are far removed from what one might consider arms exports, including 
satellite and space technology relevant components and space-tech transfer. ITAR remains 
as an efficient instrument to preserve the US arms and space-tech leadership and its 
military space power still until now though has also created impediments for American 
companies to export satellites and satellite components even to its NATO allies and other 
US-friendly nations.414 In 2014 again, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
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stated that it would introduce a compulsory licensing procedure of the navigation signal 
and certification of user devices. Russia considered the US’ practices to license GNSSs 
providers, certify multisystem receivers, and impose restrictive measures in its domestic 
market would create US internal market discrimination against using GLONASS. 
Furthermore, if the US regulates the users of GLONASS, the largest manufacturers of 
navigation receivers may abandon using GLONASS in their system, which would narrow the 
market. By consequence, a number of countries could follow the US example, introducing 
the procedure of signal licensing and device certification.415 
For the European GNSS, when it appeared as the third GNSS service in the global market, 
Washington pushed Brussels to make Galileo more open in international trade terms, which 
meant that American firms would have full access to Galileo technical information and 
markets in order to compete in the market for Galileo applications and services. It was 
argued that both the EU and its member states and the US recognized that World Trade 
Organization (WTO) rules applying to commercial GNSS-related activities, in particular 
regarding the market access non-discrimination issue. As to the two other GNSS service 
providers, China and Russia, which do not fully apply the WTO rules yet related to the global 
GNSSs market, are developing their own joint market to resist the US GPS monopoly. China 
has been suffering from the US ITAR sat-tech embargo until now. Nonetheless, Beijing has 
completed its full range space capabilities and aims to expand its BeiDou relevant products 
and services toward the global GNSSs market throughout the member states of the China-
led regional cooperation organizations, such as Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) via the Beijing-sponsored Asian Pacific Space Cooperation Organization (APSCO). 
Together with Russian GLONASS, China is developing other potential BeiDou user markets 
via the member states of the Russia-sponsored Eurasian Economic Union (EEC) and the 
international group BRICS.  
4.2. THE FUNCTIONAL ISSUE-LINKAGE FOR STATES’ INTERESTS   
International regimes are also created or reformed to satisfy states’ capability building 
interests and to fulfill their functional necessity in the cases of GNSS governance. Either for 
the GNSS service providers to group their supportive nations to host the ground stations of 
their system in the territories, or from the supportive states viewpoint, to become part of 
the different GNSSs for the interest in developing their own national and regional GNSS 
capabilities. 
Although the US GPS has been leading the GNSS military sphere and global market, 
Washington had no choice to but to make bilateral agreements with the Kremlin in 1993 
and 2001 that ten GPS ground stations would be built on the territory of the Russia 
Federation and will be under the control of Moscow.416 For the same functional concern, 
Russia needs to deploy 50 GLONASS ground data-collection stations outside of its national 
territories, such as in Antarctica,417 and opened negotiations with 36 other countries,418 
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including BRICS members419 – in particular China, Brazil420 and South Africa – Iran,421 
Nicaragua,422 and the Western countries Germany, Canada, France, Japan and the United 
States 423  to guarantee the stability and affordability of GLONASS. Israel was also 
approached.424 
The GNSS cooperation regimes were surely not only created for functional reasons. Security 
and market interests are, unsurprisingly, embedded in them. The GLONASS realignment 
that gathered the old Soviet states and new neutral partnerships of necessity became in 
vogue in the course of the standoff between Russia and the West over the Crimea crisis. 
Russia has announced that it will develop cooperation with BRICS members in defiance of 
any possible Western sanctions. Moscow pronounced that the technological partnership 
should be directed at the countries that are close to Russia in mentality and which in 
general constitute an emerging geopolitical force that Moscow could rely on in a hostile 
world. This is why the BRICS countries are the first and foremost.425 To prepare for the most, 
Russia considered that refusing “everything foreign” in the production of GLONASS 
navigation satellites was not yet possible. However, under the Western sanctions, Russia 
would order microelectronics and machines for rocket and space equipment from China, 
South Korea and other Asian countries.426 Moscow also planned to create a “common 
navigation space” with Kazakhstan and Belarus, its partners in the Customs Union.427     
In such a context, China also foresaw good prospects for cooperation with Russia’s 
GLONASS on regional support and chipsets development, which actually means working on 
mutual navigation compatibility. Russia expects an agreement with China, which allow the 
countries to build three ground operational stations on each other’s territories, for 
GLONASS needs to place satellites on three orbits, as every single satellite has its own 
frequency.428 As for India, New Delhi was interested in GLONASS services in Indian toll 
paying systems, rapid response emergency systems and asset management,429 though India 
is accelerating development of its own regional navigation satellite system (IRNSS), which is 
equally compatible with the US GPS. 
In many cases, a state’s strategic and security concerns and even diplomatic objectives 
would prevail when they intersect with functional necessity. In 2014, the US President 
Obama signed the 2014 Defense Bill rules that the navigation systems of other countries 
must not harm the American GPS system by making it less commercially attractive and 
obliged to transmit only non-encrypted data.430 The US did not want GLONASS (tracking) 
stations on its territory. The White House seemed afraid that Russia’s GLONASS global 
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satellite navigation system might be used to spy on the US homeland. In turn, Russia 
threatened to suspend the work carried out for US GPS stations sited within its borders if no 
agreement is reached to set up GLONASS ground stations in the US.431 This meant that the 
US-Russia bilateral GPS ground stations agreements signed in 1993 and 2001 no longer 
guaranteed what the two GNSS service providers have promised each other. 
Another example was that the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) attempted to 
prohibit the use of non-US satellites, currently meaning Russian GLONASS, requiring 
wireless providers to be able to transmit emergency indoor cellular phone calls to 911 call 
centers. The dilemma is that more satellites mean better accuracy and increased chances to 
fulfill the domestic emergency rescue and search necessity for identifying any location at 
any given time. Although the American cellular carriers – AT&T, Sprint, T-Mobile and 
Verizon – could rely on both the US GPS and Russian GLONASS services for increasing the 
reliability and accuracy of the US E911 system,432 there was no green light for this from the 
US FCC. 
 
4.3. ORGANIZATIONAL PATH-DEPENDENCE LIMITS INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES    
In addition to the strategic concerns and functional requirements, the creation and changes 
of international regimes are equally constrained by its development path-dependency, 
which can be laid out in the legal and technical framework of the existing regimes and their 
institutional structure. These institutional frameworks have both descendent and 
transcendent powers that limit individual states’ power to influence policy choices toward 
their preferences on the one hand, and on the other to implicate other international regimes 
in competition or cooperation. In the evolution of the GNSS regime complex, these 
descendant and transcendent restraints were found in those regimes with specific 
functional mission and from their organizational designs.     
The existing international regimes created descendent framing force over the later 
appearing regimes related to the similar governing issues. As Murray argued, space related 
technological development has not been occurring in a legal vacuum, even on the contrary. 
There are much pre-existing laws to be aware of and new laws will evolve. It was pointed 
out that when the ICAO established GNSS related CNS/ATM system, the established 
concepts of international law such as state sovereignty, nationality and jurisdiction have 
automatically applied to these humankind’s activities in space.433 These formerly accepted 
fundamental principles and institutional framework descended to bring forth other newly 
desired and required norms and the reformulation of the extant international space regimes. 
It occurred when an extant international regime became unbearable to some states’ 
individual interests, the options of creating a new regime, reforming or deserting an 
existing regime appeared as a radical solution. Nonetheless, it was almost impossible to 
create a new regime without applying similar international customary laws, universal 
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principles, decision-making rules, and the existing technical standards and operational rules 
which are already made and applied throughout the existing regimes. 
In the development of orbital slots and radio frequency common resource governance, 
which is connected with the GNSS and any other space-related governance issues, the 
questions of sovereignty and equitable access to GSO continued to be raised frequently, in 
particular by non-spacefaring nations.434 The well-known 1968 Bogotá Declaration was also 
successively brought out in several ITU conferences and in other UN venues over the 
years.435 On the eve of concluding the Moon Treaty, eight equatorial states in the World 
Radio Conference claimed their legitimate national sovereignty over their GSO. They argued 
that the orbital existence depends solely on the gravitation force of the Earth. So the 
Equatorial states have a legal right to protect their sovereign airspace extended until the 
geostationary orbit slot above their terrestrial territory.436 This claim was subsequently 
rejected by the nations which have launched satellites into GSO as well as developing 
countries which have not yet launched such satellites. The collective action nevertheless 
pointed out the arguable equality between those who theoretically and effectively enjoy the 
right of free access to outer space. The developing countries were finally successful in 
amending the ITU Convention in 1982 to include in the article on the Rational Use of the 
Radio Frequency Spectrum and the Geostationary Satellite Orbit provision that the special 
needs of developing countries and the geographical situation of particular countries must 
be taken into account. Later, the Space WARC on the Use of Geostationary-Satellite Orbit 
and the Planning of Space Services Utilizing It in 1985 and 1998 reconciled the principle of 
guaranteed and equitable access with that of the efficient and economic use of two limited 
geostationary orbit and the radio frequency spectrum. That combined the a priori allotment 
and first-come, first-served per request principles. The hybrid ruling methods may not limit 
the dominant steering power of spacefaring nations, yet cost them more to keep their 
power, for example by paying billions of dollars per year for having the right of using a 
satellite slot and radio frequency attributed to a developing state. 
There is equally the transcendent force, by which an international regime involved other 
international regimes, subsequently expanding and fragmenting the entire GNSS 
governance architecture into a complex constellation. It is known that the International 
Telecommunication Union process does not allocate the frequencies or orbital positions 
that are registered. The authority to place a satellite into orbit and employ frequencies for 
its use actually rests with each sovereign state. The ITU only acts as an efficiency-enhancing 
resource management regime when sovereign states attempt to avoid potential usage 
conflicts and as a convenient forum for resolving disputes that arise. Otherwise, the ITU 
cannot intervene if economic incentives perpetuated by the process as well as the legal 
preferences accorded to successful applicants to use geostationary system.437 The ITU also 
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lacks the means to be an independent international monitoring system. And there are no 
sanctions within the ITU regulatory system. The institutional imperfection of the ITU has 
already evoked many questions whether the system will be flexible enough as well as 
sufficient robust to deal with the beak neck speed of ever expanding and complex needs for 
radio frequencies and geostationary orbital position.438 In the case of GNSS governance, 
other questions regarding the military use, equipment and operational standards and trade 
issues, or even the core business of the ITU, to prevent the harmful radio interference 
cannot be completely dealt only throughout the 150 year-old regime but in other 
multilateral mechanisms. The question remains whether expected outcomes of a new 
regime, such as the ICG, or any (re)formed regimes, for example, ICAO, IMO or WTO are a 
complement to or would be an obstruction to each other. Subsequently, the increase of 
duplicated regimes with similar objectives has fragmented the entire GNSS governance 
constellation.  
Figure 16. The Emerging GNSSs Regime Complex over time 
        1960                    1970                    1980                    1990                    2000                    2010 
                 Directly related regimes                     
                 Partially connected international regimes                                                       Source: Author’s creation 
 
Figure 17 presents a visual scheme which summarizes the emerging GNSS regime complex 
over time. It shows the global governance architecture of the military-origin security-
controlled GNSSs has been developed merely in the dimension where security issues do not 
belong to the institutional mandates. It remains states’, more precisely service provider 
states to settle their own arrangement. States’ security-interest centered strategic 
calculations dominate the regulating outcomes in such invisible governance pillar. The UN 
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used the issue-linkage between space for safety and for socio-economic development to 
create the ICG which only plays a supportive role but not ruling power. To a certain extent, 
it can be wondered whether the creation of ICG eventually opened a new exclusive arena 
only for the GNSSs service providers. The answer would only be discernible when all GNSSs 
enter their FOC. After the US connected the WTO rules for GNSSs commercial matters, China 
and Russia seemingly use the linkage between GNSSs for regional development and GNSSs 
commerce to legitimize their GNSSs commercial expansion.  
 
5. KEY FINDINGS  
Our case study regarding the regime complex of GNSS governance indicates that states often 
developed their space capabilities with a focus on gaining military, political and economic 
advantages. States could work together for international space exploration projects, and 
particularly creating international regimes to resolve common problems, such as a space for 
safety, socio-economic development, and sustainability dimension. Nonetheless, when the 
cooperation encountered competitive elements, states’ strategic and national security 
concerns and functional necessity reigned. Moral obligations, such as the equity issue, could 
even be compromised to a certain extent. Further to the primary military focused utilities, 
the applications of GNSSs expanded to allow both military and civil (so dual-use) and 
commercial purposes that help countries to manage multiple policy areas, such as human 
safety protection, economic growth and space capabilities development, and environmental 
and generational sustainability – or in sum, peaceful uses. The broadened use of GNSSs 
naturally connected its governance coverage toward that of the above governing issue areas. 
Subsequently, the growing GNSSs governing issues linkage connected other GNSSs 
indirectly relevant international regimes over time, so expanded and fragmented the global 
GNSS governance architecture to its complex dimension.  
Because of this phenomenon, the holistic regime complex framework was valuable to 
analyze the current expanded and fragmented intricate GNSS international regimes 
constellation. It provided an approach to systematically analyze the formation of a specific 
issue-area regime complex that, as has been noted, was undertaken by three intersecting 
strategic, functional and organizational dynamics over time. In our focused research on 
GNSS governance, it was demonstrated that when countries joined an international regime 
depended upon their general and specific interests and functional necessity. Within the 
international regime, powerful spacefaring nations seemed not to hesitate to influence the 
missions and organizational design of the regime in order to assure their leverage force, so 
as some groups of small or emerging nations. When the internal changes within a regime 
are unsatisfactory, states created new regimes, shifted the existing institutional missions, or 
even deserted an existing institution to fulfill their strategic goals and calculated interests. 
In the case of GNSS governance, the different international regimes were created, 
reoriented their missions, or restructured for these causes. In addition, the incarnations or 
transformations of the international regimes were often constrained by its own along the 
way of its development – path dependency. The existing customary, legal and technical 
frameworks set by the existing regimes and their own institutions established the 
descendent and transcendent constraints that firstly limited individual states to influence 
146 | P a g e  
 
the institutional policy choices toward their preferences. They also drew other international 
regimes into competition or cooperation with them.  
Overall, the intersecting strategic, functional and organizational dynamics subsequently 
fragmented the entire global GNSS governance toward its current imperfect form – a regime 
complex. Apart from the strong leading influences from the driving forces, an equity 
emphasis has been constantly explored in the development of the GNSS governance. 
Developing countries and emerging nations have explored this moral stance to improve 
their space capability and justify their uprising in the vibrant global GNSS astropolitics and 
competitive markets. It seemed also became a tool together with their force as a 
competitive market to accommodate GNSSs powers’ bit for their supports. This instrument 
on the one hand resolved functional problems and even gained strategic advantages and 
commercial profits not only for a certain developing countries and emerging nations. 
Spacefaring countries on the other hand also took advantage from it to consolidate and 
reengage their security allies as well as enlarged the users markets. Nonetheless, the equity 
stress did not always downplay spacefaring states’ strategic calculations for making 
equitable compromises on GNSS governance issues.  
According to our analysis of the GNSS regime complex, the continuous expansion and 
fragmentation of its international regimes constellation seem unlikely to end its process, or 
processes. It is naturally because the ubiquitous applications of GNSS technologies 
continued to become relevant to more and more governing issue areas. So, it kept 
expanding the GNSSs governing architecture. In parallel, the populations of GNSSs service 
providers and their users did not cease to increase. The growth in scale and in number both 
simultaneously engendered and seems to grow the governance complexity more. 
Notwithstanding, this does not mean the GNSSs regime complex would be unmanageable. 
On the contrary, the expansion of the GNSSs regime complex would push the urges for a 
universal GNSSs regime louder and stronger in the long term. To a certain extent, the 
establishment of the ICG for GNSS governance indicated such a tendency. The EU-led ICoC 
for comprehensive space security as we discussed previously seemed similar.  
Regarding the governance architecture’s fragmentation, this depends upon whether regime 
proliferation leads to either the negative fragmentation or constructive differentiation. The 
former could bring the architecture to it collapse or abandonment. As for the latter, it can be 
expected to take into account heterogeneous countries’ motivations and capability, 
functional needs, and their ideal organizational expectations regarding the governance of 
the GNSSs issues, to harmonize these differences and suggest pragmatic solutions. The 
specialization on targeting particular governing topics as well the decentralizing 
management method fragment and perhaps weaken the entire governance architecture. 
However, the differentiated treatments with the account of the particularities of different 
geographical regions, cultural groups and their accommodation capabilities can sort the 
general challenging issues offbeat in different shapes and tailor-made solutions. It would be 
more effective, so constructive. Finally, the dynamic GNSSs regime complex seems to be a 
system with its own dynamics. Its creation was led by the three major intersecting driving 
forces described. There were and will be some others which were unfortunately not 
sufficiently investigated within the limited scope of our research. This opens various 
avenues to explore in the future. 
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CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION 
1. THE DEPARTURE AND THE PATH IN OUR ASTROPOLITCAL JOURNEY 
This doctoral dissertation departed from our research interests in seizing the vivid 
dynamics in international space politics over time and particularly in deciphering the 
growing complex connectivity in the galaxies of international space-related regimes from 
the early space age until our days in the 21st century. Factually, it is evident that the uses of 
outer space, notably the military, civilian and commercial applications of space-relevant 
technologies, such as rocket launching, satellite communication, navigation and remote 
sensing, have become vital and even indispensable in people’s daily life and for countries to 
implement their national policy over a wide-range of issue areas, including national defense, 
homeland security, search and rescue, and services ranging “from farming to banking” for 
socio-economic development, and finally Earth Observation activities to preserve the 
sustainability of ecological environmental and generational prosperity. 
Retrospectively, because of its cross-national border, inter-scientific disciplinary and 
overarching applications characteristics, the question of the use and the control of outer 
space became quickly a global issue put on the agenda at various multilateral forums, for 
example, the United Nation, the International Telecommunication Union, and the World 
Meteorological Organization. At that time, the agenda setting on discussing and negotiating 
international arrangements relating to space issues was conducted in the shadow of two 
Cold War space powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. Many space relevant 
international regimes were created and designed with a strong emphasis on de-
militarization because the use of outer space was primarily developed for military purposes 
by both space power. These international bodies, e.g. the UN Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), the Outer Space Treaty, etc. were all established with the 
mindset of de-militarization of outer space, so aiming the “peaceful use” of outer space. 
Hence, the architecture of global space governance was built on such politicized foundation 
to expand its governance dimensions as well as structural consolidation.         
In the course of 2007-2008, the successive anti-satellite weapon tests respectively 
conducted by China and the US refreshed the global concerns on the question of governing 
states’ space actives. Various international space regime initiatives, namely the EU-led 
International Code of Conduct and the China-Russia sponsored PPWT, were proposed 
respectively outside of any existing multilateral forum and at the non-UN Conference on 
Disarmament. The new happenings within the galaxy of global governance drew our 
attention to ultimately realize there is not merely the galaxy of space governance but a 
number of interconnected galaxies for space governance. This particular agglomerating or 
federating governing force has been embedded and constantly appeared in countries’ 
negotiations regarding the development and the control of human space activities. It was 
with this fundamental understanding, we put forward to decipher such interconnecting 
global space governance structure as a way to seize the vivid dynamics in international 
space politics over time. And we have chosen one of the most inspiring theoretical 
frameworks in our time, regime complex as our way to undertake a piloting analytical 
narrative in order to cultivate a broadened understanding of the topic.            
148 | P a g e  
 
The regime complex framework focuses on investigating various types of interplay between 
the international regimes within a specific governing issue area that fragmented the entire 
governance scheme. This general architectural framework provided the limits within which 
our research examined as its object of study all international regimes closely or more 
distantly related to issues of space governance. Nevertheless, bear in mind that we could 
not explore and study in-depth the galaxies of interconnecting governance issue areas, but 
merely establish a pilot analytical narrative which is expected to prove useful for further 
and more narrowly focused case studies in the future. In this regard, the analytical strategy 
proposed by colleagues at the Ghent Institute for International Studies (GIIS), which 
identifies how the strategic, functional and organizational driving forces led the growing 
institutional fragmentation within the global space governance architecture, was extremely 
valuable for our research. 
With this analytical instrument, we have established our general understanding of the long-
standing space governing issues (Chapter II), the legal inconsistency between different 
governing principles, norms, their interpretations and implementations over time (Chapter 
III), the highly politicized institutionalization process that from the beginning of the space 
age strongly stressed the de-militarization or disarmament objectives and consequently 
divided the entire global space governance architecture into two distinct dimensions 
between disarmament and the “peaceful use” of outer space, though the space affairs are 
never indivisible for it dual-use (Chapter IV). By applying the regime complex framework 
and the GIIS analytical strategy, we investigated “space security” governance by introducing 
the main actors, key governing issues and the institutionalization process of the sub-
governing regimes constellation in order to investigate how the space security governing 
constellation developed toward to its current fragmented stage of regime complex. In the 
power-interest centered space security governance dimension, states constantly required 
for regime change though almost always failed in the course of the last half century. New 
regime initiatives such as ICoC and PPWT raised new hopes though without certainty 
(Chapter V). With the same methodology, we achieved our analytical narrative on global 
navigation satellite system (GNSS) governance, which in our view represents a microsphere 
that demonstrates the fundamental problem of the whole of space governance and its 
structural fragmentation, the dual use that means military and civilian purposes, or 
nowadays “trio use” with the addition of a commercial dimension to the use of outer space. 
The interconnectivity of the three physical and practical dimensions naturally bring all the 
relating regimes together with overlapping mandate or missing competence to co-manage 
the space affairs.  
 
2. GENERAL DISCOVERIES  
Our investigation showed that the changes in the over-all landscape of international space 
politics and the space governing paradigm shifts have grown in magnitude in the following 
three ways. 1) From the end of the Cold War into the first decade of the 21st century the 
arena of international space politics has gradually opened up to more actors. 
Simultaneously, the paradigm of handling space issues followed the shift from a pursuit of 
balancing the former US-USSR, the East-West divide during the Cold War, toward the 
paradigm of managing governance complexity to satisfy multiple power interest centered 
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key space players. 2) Space powers and the spacefaring nations adopted their former 
hostile stances toward a more pragmatic and functionality-centered paradigm of regime 
making in the growing trends of the popularization of space capability development and the 
liberalization of the global space economy. The previous model of antagonistic competition 
has partly moved to the hybrid competitive-cooperation pragmatic model especially to the 
governance issue areas relating to safety, socio-economic development and environmental 
sustainability, but not space security issues. 3) With more key players, the rulemaking 
process became much more complex and complicated, the demand about the institutional 
form of new space related regimes became generally more and more flexible, e.g. instead of 
continuing to seek to establish legal binding rules, a non-binding code of conduct appeared 
as a new method to involve more general participation. 
    
2.1. SITUATIONAL CHANGES BROADENED THE DIMENSION OF SPACE 
GOVERNANCE  
During the Cold War, space powers developed their respective military space capability 
against their adversaries. Although they came to agree on the legal rights for all states to 
enjoy free access to outer space, they strictly controlled the flow of space capability transfer 
merely within their respective allied countries, therefore giving no chance for countries 
without technical capability to enjoy the use outer space. Those countries without space 
capability were counted but remained insignificant in the multilateral forum where space 
powers dominated the rulemaking of space governance. After the Cold War, the traditional 
space powers themselves faced major new challenges. Domestically, they had great 
difficulty to justify the continued astronomical governmental expenditure to maintain their 
space capabilities, notably when international politics seemingly turned less hostile. Along 
the way, the former race for military and scientific capability lost its ideological significance. 
Yet another type of “space race” has opened the space economy to more states through 
scientific personnel exchanges, technology transfers, trade in innovative products and space 
system services related to the use of outer space. In the course of this “race” for the 
popularization of space capability development and the liberalization of the space economy, 
more countries joined the game and therefore ought to become more involved in space 
governance. In this trend, states shifted from their previous strong demilitarization and 
disarmament centered governing focuses toward other broadened issues areas. The 
growing problems of managing the scarcity of space resources and the growing competition 
between the multiple GNSSs demonstrate this. States with a lack of space capability have 
obtained more attention because they can fulfill the needs of space powers and spacefaring 
states as their manufacturing partners or as extensive markets for selling space products 
and services. With the increase of key players and general consumers, the use of space 
expanded to cover the relating issue areas in safety, socio-economic development, 
preservation of environment, the sustainability governance approach was also 
accommodated. All these ever more widely broadened the scope of space governance issues 
and naturally generated more complexity and hurdles in the process of making rules to 
control the behavior of states.        
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2.2. GOVERNING PARADIGM SHIFTS IN INTERNATIONAL ASTROPOLITICS 
After the Cold War, space powers and the spacefaring nations adopted their former hostile 
stances toward a more pragmatic and functionality-centered paradigm on regime making. 
In other words, they moved the traditional antagonist competition model to a hybrid 
competitive-cooperation pragmatic model especially in negotiating the regime making in 
the issue areas relating to safety, socio-economic development and environmental 
sustainability. 
States adapted themselves to the new post-Cold War situation, shifting their approach to 
institutionalizing global space regime making. In the Cold War, states were used to holding 
the prevailing assumption that space meant power, privilege, and pride. Accordingly, the 
process of space-related regime making was marked by a rigid competitive model. This 
competitive paradigm appeared to fortify the space capability of each camp in order to lead 
the course in the ‘space race‘. Afterward, this Cold War competitive paradigm shifted to the 
hybrid competitive-cooperative functionality-centered paradigm. On the one hand, the 
traditional space powers continued their military and commercial “race” in or through 
outer space, e.g. ICBMs vs. BMD, and GPS vs. GLONASS, though bearing harsh domestic 
check-balance budgetary controls. On the other hand, they cautiously started a few 
symbolic and tentative cooperative space projects, for example, the International Space 
Station (ISS), which offered more scope for the industrialized countries to cooperate for 
scientific and civilian purposes. In addition, the industrialized states and a few emerging 
economies captured the new momentum to enter the global space economy with their 
limited and specific space capacities. They proactively developed new partnerships, notably 
with the developing countries, by applying the hybrid cooperative-cooperative paradigm for 
their highest benefits. This approach is also obviously found in our cases study about the 
regime complex of GNSS governance. 
The popularization of space capability development and the liberalization of the global 
space economy also divided states’ focuses in regime making. In the arena of security-
related issues, space powers continued hold their respective defensive line thus attained no 
more significant success after the 1967 OST. Actually, we can even say that content-wise, 
the OST was not as successful as it should have been because the competitive rulemaking 
model resulted in divergent interpretations, and unverifiable and unimplementable legal 
texts generated further governance problems. Problematic cases of legal inconsistency were 
evident in the ‘peaceful use’, demilitarization, and de-weaponization of outer space. After 
the entry of some new mature game changers on the scene of world space politics, 
particularly but not solely China, the EU, and India, the traditional competitive paradigm 
was not wiped away. It remained obvious in the cases of PAROS vs. CTBT, PPWT vs. ICoC, 
that the competitive divide between East and West remains discernible. By contrast, in the 
governing issue areas relating to ‘space for safety’, ‘space for socio-economic development’ 
and ‘space for sustainability’, states adopted a more hybrid competitive-cooperative 
regime-making approach to satisfy their own functional necessity in the trend of growing 
interconnection between these dual-use issue linkages. Under UN auspices and at the 
regional space cooperation levels, the institutionalization of technical rules and cooperative 
mechanisms was more easily established.               
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2.3. INSTITUTIONAL ADAPTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE REGIMES            
We have found that states, notably the space powers, started exploring the international 
regimes to gain their security guarantee and strategic advantage from the early space age. 
In this process, international space regimes were continuously created and functioned with 
an ambiguity in their different interpretation of various terminologies, lacking means of 
verification, and with no possibility of implementation, or of legal consistency. International 
regimes were established for form’s sake yet often with the leeway of not including 
particular issues in content as the ultimate compromise. For example, the primarily creative 
space diplomacy invented the rhetorical ‘peaceful use’ of outer space which ultimately 
gained universal acceptance, but this has nonetheless borne different interpretations either 
to achieve the goal of the ‘demilitarization’ of outer space, or to use outer space to maintain 
the means for self-defense and to assure the international peace and security by upholding 
the bottom-line of ‘non-aggression’. The different politicized interpretations actually 
pushed the entire global space governance architecture on to a path towards artificial 
differentiation. The regime-making matters considered related to the ‘peaceful use’ of outer 
space were mainly under UN auspices, for example through COPUOS, ITU, IAEA, WMO, and 
more. Space security-related regime making was in the UN First Committee and the CD. 
The novel situation after the Cold War brought in new elements to the existing space 
governance scheme. The popularization of the use of outer space evoked the creation, 
adaptation of mandate, or abundance of space related regimes to greater respond to 
countries’ general requests and specific problems. The ITU confirmed its mandate to 
manage the satellite orbital slots and radio frequency allocations as from 1992. The UN 
General Assembly endorsed the 1992 UN principles relevant to the use of nuclear power 
sources in outer space. The verification task was attributed to the UN specialized agency, 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 1996, the UN endorsed the International 
cooperation declaration for benefiting developing countries with outer space exploration 
and uses (International Cooperation Declaration) to promote the popularization of the use 
of space to benefit more people. When the explorer and user population grew massively, 
states and their citizens became more aware of the risks caused by the maladministration 
and mismanagement of space issues. The concept of inclusive global space governance 
gained greater acceptance and accommodation because of functional necessity. The 
International Committee on GNSS (ICG) was created not only to deal with GNSS technical 
issues but also with strongly connections to the use of GNSSs for economic growth and for 
development. The international space regimes became more interconnected than ever.  This 
also led to the initiative for establishing an International Code of Conduct (ICoC) that 
attempted to stimulate a regime making that can cover the security, safety and 
sustainability issue for space activities.  It resulted in a complex governance scheme, as 
illustrated in Figure 17. 
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Figure 17.  An architectural overview of the global space governance institutions  
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forward the different focuses by investigating the institutional interaction (regime 
interplay), the interdependency and the issue-linkage between of different international 
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Our research objective being to establish the first piloting literature, we presented an 
overview of the regime complex of space security governance and undertook a case study 
on the increasingly fragmented regime complex of the GNSS governance scheme. To 
complete the groundbreaking, we applied the analytical methodology proposed by GIIS 
colleagues that argues that the growth of a regime complex is usually stimulated by three 
intersecting driving forces, summarized as the strategic, functional and organizational logics. 
1) The strategic input guided states to create or be part of one or various international 
regimes with attempt to gain their upmost interests. 2) The direct and indirect functional 
interdependency agglomerates states to involve themselves in different international 
regimes to fulfill their necessity. 3) The constellation of international regimes could become 
a loosely attached system itself. These linkages between different regimes appearing in the 
form of competition, cooperation, coordination or labor division could become customary 
and create managerial burdens within the global governance scheme. The tri-logic prism 
was convenient to decipher the hindered spectrums that disguised the entire evolution of 
space governance regime complex over time.           
 
3.2. STRATEGIC FORCE POLITICIZED THE GOVERNING ARCHITECTURAL DIVISION    
Countries pursue their relative power and individual interests when deciding to create or 
enter different space security regimes where they tried to steer the design and the functions 
of any interested international regimes in favor of their leverage power, or choose the 
moment of entrance to these international regimes that most suits their interests.  
Already in the course the genesis of space regimes building in the late 1950s, making rules 
on governing space issues were decided to promote security and peace with the use of outer 
space. This decision was political, not with technical rational. This division basic on strategic 
reasons led the respective camps to continuously proposed space security regime creating 
initiatives to prohibit “militarize” in avoidance an arms race in outer space or “weaponize” 
outer space with placement of “weapon” in outer space. More recently, China became 
interested in a PAROS in the 1990s because that was when the US was imposing limits on 
Chinese strategic nuclear capabilities. After the failure of the PAROS attempt came the 
Russia-China co-sponsored PPWT initiative and the EU-led ICoC proposal, the former 
motivated by the Russia-China coalition to restrain US space power, and the latter based on 
the new strategy of the European Union to gain more space autonomy and to explore the 
EU’s space diplomacy. None of these strategic actions was considered feasible to consolidate 
unanimity of global space security governance, but exacerbated the fragmentation of the 
space security regime complex over time.  
 
3.3. FUNCTIONAL LINKAGES BIND THE GNSS REGIME COMPLEX  
The GNSSs regime complex case study presented another fragmented pillar within the 
entire global space governance architecture. The GNSS services were opened for civil 
utilities as from the early 1990s. GNSS services require continuous transmission between 
the three segments between the dispersed ground stations, their satellites constellation and 
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the end users. The regional augmentation systems are also important to improve the 
accuracy of the positing function. The popularization of the military controlled but largely 
civilian used GNSS services is one of the most salient cases to expose the problematic 
fragmentation in the pillar of ‘peaceful use’ of outer space in the entire architecture. 
Because of the ubiquitous use of GNSSs applications and extensive services, it also spilt over 
its governance dimension toward other governance issue areas from security to safety, 
socio-economic development and sustainability. The governing issues such as resolving the 
military or government-only satellite radio frequency overlays for their military operators, 
the challenges of managing the scarcity of outer space resources, the protection on the 
guaranteed continuity of the GNSSs services for navigation safety which directly requires 
the inter-GNSSs interoperability and compatibility which are highly connected with the 
market access discriminatory measures for different GNSSs providers to protect their 
markets and commercial interests. The overarching utilities of the GNSSs have continuously 
drawn the international regimes that are mandated in harmonizing the above issue areas 
into the GNSS governance constellation. The functionality-centered GNSS governance 
scheme with cooperative stress has been equally an arena for strategic competition 
instrument, particularly for the emerging game changers that involved their military ally 
countries and commercial partners to join their respective group of GNSS 
interdependencies. These different GNSS interdependent groups of states generated 
competitions, tensions between the concerned states and fragmented the GNSS governance 
constellation. In our case study, we have presented the complex GNSSs interconnectivity 
that has created ICG, involved ITU, ICAO, IMO, WTO and more and more regional 
cooperation organizations to join the governance constellation. None of them has completed 
mandate to handle all GNSSs related cases alone.     
      
       3.4. ORGANIZATIONAL PATH DEPENDENCY GROWS REGIME COMPLEX  
In the studies on space security and the GNSS regime complex, we noticed that the entire 
space governance architecture was founded upon the politicized division for the reason of 
the dual-use nature of outer space utilities. Furthermore, the entire space regime 
constellation was not constructed without any precedent regime. Quite to the contrary, ITU 
and WMO were two intergovernmental organizations that had existed long before the 
creation of COPUOS. They were immediately connected with the space governance for 
technical reasons. Therefore, COPUOS could not act alone when coordinating and promoting 
the ‘peaceful use’ of outer space that are related to the mandates of ITU or WMO. The clear 
distinction between the dimension of space security and ‘peaceful use’ also made the space 
activities governance more difficult, not easier. The EU initiative for an ICoC demonstrated 
this problem since the draft ICoC promotes rulemaking on space activities with the 
comprehensive aspect that covers security, safety and sustainability. The ICoC in the end 
found no place in the organizational reality that could provide a legally adequate 
multilateral platform to undertake the progress of this non-binding, voluntary initiative. 
This organizational imperfection resulted in the continuous regime changes that often aim 
to fix the labor division problems yet often ended up fragmenting even more the regime 
complex.    
 
155 | P a g e  
 
4. REFLECTIONS ON THE FUTURE OF GLOBAL SPACE GOVERNANCE  
It is to be hoped that this work can open a certain novel perspective upon the future 
development of global space governance, though we bear in mind that the current global 
space regime constellation will not cease its architectural expansion and fragmentation in 
the near future, precisely because of those intersecting driving forces we have identified in 
this dissertation. These new challenges slowly stimulated a growing general sense of crisis 
on the question about the appropriate use of space for now and for future generations. 
Under these circumstances, we were also brought to consider the question of how the 
complex global space governance could be functionally and organizationally improved in 
order to more efficiently, effectively and sustainably govern space-relevant matters. 
We think a new governance paradigm that encourages more inclusive popularization of 
space capability development with greater support from the spacefaring countries will be 
necessary and beneficial. This new paradigm would require more affordable and responsible 
burden-sharing by both spacefaring countries and non-spacefaring nations to jointly assure 
a balanced dynamic governance environment to cultivate cooperative projects. 2) A 
structural rationalization of the current space regime complex should be undertaken, 
especially by applying the strong interdependency or the federating force of human space 
activities to fixing the imperfection of the current space architecture and the division of 
labor in its regimes. This can happen through the less politicized regime coordination and 
merging process toward an emphasis on technical specialization at the global level. It 
should also happen simultaneously by enhancing the tailor-made decentralization space 
capability scheme at the regional level to stimulate general awareness and bottom-up 
regime reform initiatives so can discharge the concentrated rule making burdens at the 
global level and also link the global rule-making impacts closer to the terrains. We noted 
that this specialization process became explicit in the growing regionalization of space. 
Regionalized capability-building cooperation and regional space economy development are 
constructive forces to consolidate the foundation of the global space governance 
architecture and could repair the current regime complex. Because of this, further studies 
along these lines are needed. 
Ultimately, it seems that we have accomplished one step on a fascinating journey of 
discovery. Yet apparently, another vibrant exploration could start soon again because our 
enthusiasm has grown even greater to look toward other twinkling spots in the infinite 
universe. 
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